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KIM, Yong Hi 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 15 NO. 2041 1950-10-13
    소위 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2041 25 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0058) 16 October 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: KIM, Yong Hi (金龍姬) (김용희)
RANK: Jr Lt
AGE: 28
DUTY: Liaison Officer
UNIT: 107th Security Regt, 36 Bn
EDUCATION: Primary - 3 yrs
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: YONGNUN-NI (용능리)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 13 Oct 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: SEOUL, CHONG RO KU, SAJIK CHONG # 262 (서울市 鐘路區 社稷洞 #262)
HOME ADDRESS: KANGWON DO, CHORWON GUN, CHORWON MYON, HWAJI LI #336 (江原道 鐵原郡 鐵原面 花地里 #336)
INTERROGATOR: Cpl HATTORI (ATIS)


2. ASSESSMENT:
Informant was cooperative and appeared to be of average intelligence. PW was in good health, and surrendered voluntarily to UN Forces, after reading a UN propaganda leaflet. The information obtained is fairly reliable.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
Chronology:
29 Aug 50 - Inducted in PYONGYANG (平壤). Did not receive any basic training.
1 Sep 50 - PW with 38 other soldiers departed PYONGYANG on trucks and arrived in SEOUL (서울). Commissioned a Jr Lt and designated as Liaison officer in the Independent Supply Plat, 36th Bn, 107 Security Regt.
3 Sep 50 - 36th Bn departed SEOUL upon receiving orders from 107th Regt.
4 Sep 50 - Arrived ILSAN (一山) and was ordered to stop any advance of the UN Forces.
11 Sep 50 - Marched from ILSAN.
12 Sep 50 - Arrived KAESONG (開城) to make preparations for the march to YONGNUM NI (龍南里).
16 Sep 50 - Arrived YONGNUM NI. PW resumed his duties as Liaison officer (supply).
11 Oct 50 - Encountered unknown elements of the UN Forces for the first time. Bn was reinforced with components of the 34th, 35th and 37th Bn’s of the 107 Regt.
13 Oct 50 - Surrendered voluntarily to the US 5th Cav Regt, after reading a UN propaganda leaflet.

Unit Organization and Strength:
Originally (1 Sep 50) the 107 Security Regt was composed of four (4) Bns. These were: 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th. PW stated that the 107 Security Regt activated sometime in early summer of 50, as the components of this unit were made up mostly of new recruits.
On 12 Oct 50, when the 107th Regt was losing a considerable number of men as combat casualties, the 34th, 35th, and 37th Bns were consolidated with the 37th Bn. The 107th Regt was thus reduced to one (1) Bn, Each Bn started out with an original strength of 40 Officers and 760 men. By 13 Oct 50, the Bns were down to one fourth of their total strength.
Composition of the 36th Bn was unknown after 13 Oct 50. PW believed that the Bn was dispersed, and that all the soldiers had either fled or were captured.

Equipment:
33 AA Guns (? mm); 2 HMG; 2 Arty Guns (76-mm?); 2 Mortars (60-mm?) and 1 truck.
Bn was always short of ammunition. The truck was used only to carry small amounts of ammunition for the entire Bn.

Unit Duties: (107 Security Regt)
The primary mission was to set up defensive positions and await the advance of the UN forces in the vicinity of YONGNUM-Ni. Regt was to carry out harassing operations against the enemy.

Unit Duties: (Independent Supply Plat, 36th Bn)
PW was a liaison officer between the above supply platoon and the supply Comdr of the 107th Regt. This supply platoon controlled the issuing of rations to each Co. Each Bn had its own supply platoon carrying out a similar line of duty.

Communications:
On 11 Oct 50, in YONGNUM-NI a complete telephone system was brought to the unit area from an unknown source. Before it could be set up, the equipment broke down and was never put in use.

Personalities:
Maj PAK, Chang Shil (朴昌実) (박창실) 36th Bn CO
Maj CHAE, Su Hung (蔡洙興) (채수흥) 36th Bn Propaganda Officer
Maj WON, Yung Hi (元永熙) (원영희) 36th Bn Supply Off
Cap HO, Yung Il (許榮一) (허영일) 36th Bn Staff Od Officer

Morale and Propaganda:
The morale of PW’s unit was very low, due to the fact that there were so many combat casualties and no reinforcements. The unit’s lines were broken repeatedly by superior UN thrusts. The men went many days without food, and several of them deserted.
PW on two occasions read UN Propaganda leaflets in secret and decided to surrender. Believed that the leaflets greatly influenced other soldiers in the unit to give themselves up.

4. GENERAL:
Foreign Elements:
Did not observe or hear anything concerning the presence of CCF of Soviet forces in KOREA.

For the Commanding Officer:

BATEMAN

Executive

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