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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1293　24 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 0930)　21 September 1950

PW surrendered to US troops on his own volition.

PW was awaiting an opportunity to surrender, but as C/S it would seem highly suspicious for him to be at the front lines. On the evening of 20 Sep 50, the Division Commander was called to a meeting and PW had an opportunity to go to the front. While there in the mountains he worked his way down to surrender.

PW left his unit in the mountains (South of TABUDONG) and approached the American lines at night. He approached two American soldiers sleeping on a roadside, and roused them by gently shaking them; and they brought him in as a PW.

PW was disgusted with the communist doctrine and system and consequently surrendered. About the beginning of this year (1950) he read much of the communist literature (Marx, Lenin, etc) and upon objective observation realized that instead of the living portrayed by the philosophers, the people were forced to work harder - even women were put to work.

PW was aware of the surrender of the 13th Division’s Artillery Regimental CO to UN forces a few weeks ago. He cannot recall the name of this man because PW was with the Div only four days before the incident. However, he claims that he can identify the man if confronted by him.

The 13th Division's retreat route will most likely be over the road loading from TABU DONG, (1150 - 1460) to KOMHWA DONG (1150 - 1460) to HAJANG DONG (1140 - 1470) to WARSONG DONG (1130 - 1470) to POT DONG DONG (1150 - 1490) to NAKTONG NI (1120 - 1490) to SANJU (1110 - 1500) up to HAMCHONG (1110 - 1520) from which point PW believes they will disperse into the mountains. The 13th Division is now located around TABU DONG. The original route of retreat was the road leading from TABU DONG up to HYORYONG MYON (1150 - 1460) to PWONGSU DONG (1150 - 1470) and up to TOWON DONG (1150 - 1490), around UISONG (1160 - 1490) and up to ANDONG (1160 - 1520). However, the 8th Division and 1st Division will most likely retreat along this road, and it would be virtually impossible for the 13th Division to take the same route.

Furthermore, the American advance into the HYORYONG Area has been met by the 1st Division and the road is blocked. The retreat route of the 13th Division is now along the aforementioned road to HAMCHONG.

The 19th Regiment is now located along the southern wall of KASAN Castle, 21st Regiment is to the east of TABU DONG, and the 23rd Regiment is located south of TABU DONG (approximately 1150 - 1457). PW believes that in the event of a withdrawal, the 13th Division will pull back along the line extending from YUHAKSAN to KUMHWA (approximately 1145 - 1463). Another likely position would be CH'ONSANGO SAN, the line extending to CHANGCH'ON MYON. Delaying action type of defense is expected to be established along the route of retreat. PW believes that a northward thrust along the NAKTONG River would completely cut off the 13th Division from retreat.

PW believes that the final defensive stand in this sector will be roughly along the mountain range from SANYONG NI, YONGAM NI (1097 - 1520), TOGONG NI, SONAM MYO, SANBUNG MYO, SONGI DONG, YECHON, UNGBUNG MYON, CHAPPUM DONG, CHUHK DONG, CHUDOMOK, MARYONG DONG (1195 - 1525). PW's information is restricted to this area. This would be the anticipated final defense line in the event that sufficient replacements are available. PW also heard that defensive positions were being prepared along the southeastern and eastern areas of NOYON SAN (1108 - 1500) northwest of SANJUO.

Major supply point (only one to the PW's knowledge) was in the area north of and including UISONG. However, because of American thrusts near this position the supply point has been moved northward along the road to ANDONG, and the PW believes that it is situated somewhere in this vicinity; exact location unknown. The PW knows of no other supply points. The movement of these supplies is by rail to ANDONG, and by trucks from ANDONG to UISONG.

The 13th Division has only approximately 200-250 rounds of artillery shells at the present time. There is a sizable amount of small arms ammunition and also a fair amount of anti-tank ammunition. Very little gasoline remaining. There are enough rations remaining for the troops for a meager existence. There is definitely a food and artillery ammunition shortage in the 13th Division.

PW stated that all the major roads are in excellent condition except for those bridges and other structures destroyed by the retreating UN forces. The problem of destroyed bridges has been partially met by the erection of underwater bridges, that is, sand bags are laid one on top of the other to a height of about one and a half feet below water level. These sand bags cannot be observed from the air and enable vehicles of truck weight to cross. It is believed that railroad tracks are in operation condition except for the river crossings in or around ANDONG.

In view of the fact that the 13th Division is part of the Ⅱ Corps and the NAKTONG River separates the Ⅱ Corps from the Ⅰ Corps (which is on the west side of the NAKTONG River) PW cannot offer any information regarding Ⅰ Corps. He could not comment on the outcome should the UN Forces attack north and west of the NAKTONG River because he is not familiar with the forces to the west and south of the NAKTONG River line.

It is believed that there will be some harassment of UN Forces by guerrillas below the 38th parallel. However, PW believes that there will be a great increase in guerrilla activities north of the 38th parallel.

The Ⅱ Corps consists of the 1st Division, 13th Division, 8th Division, 5th Division, 3rd Division, 12th Division and organic replacement Regiment. Roughly, the right boundary of the Ⅱ Corps is 1090, from a line at point 1090-1400 to WAEGWAN (1138-1453) and along the eastern boundary of the NAKTONG River. The Ⅱ Corps occupies the western territory.

Organization and location of Ⅰ Corps is unknown to PW except that he knew that their thrust was in a southeast direction to PUSAN originally.

Headquarters NKPA was situated at SEOUL about one month ago. PW has heard that the Headquarters was moved to vicinity of HAMCHANG (1115 - 1524).

Locations of the 3rd, 1st, 8th, 15th, 12th, and 5th Divisions conform to G-2 situation map, 21 Sep 50. 73rd Indep Regt: last heard to be around 15th Regt d/u. 105th Armd Div: heard to be around WAEGWAN. 17th Armed Brigade: in Ⅰ Corps. PW never heard of the 11th, 14th, and 18th Regiments, they may be recent designations. 13th Div strength as of 20 Sep 50 was approx 3,500 troops.

The PW was quite emphatic in stating that the mission of the Ⅰ Corps was defensive. PW believes that under the present circumstances they will not attack. On 18 Sep 50 orders were received from Corps Commander that mission was hereafter defensive.

Replacements were received in the Ⅱ Corps. The caliber of these replacements was very poor and they had no training whatsoever. Their training consisted of indoctrination under fire; most of them had never fired a rifle prior to entering battle.

As far as 13th Div is concerned a great majority (70 - 80 %) of the troops are south Korean conscripts. The NCO's and officers are North Koreans. This condition has existed for approximately one month prior to date. It is the personal opinion of the PW that there are possibly 100,000 troops in training in NORTH KOREA at the present time. He arrived at this conclusion because the barracks now being utilized for training accommodated prior to this were approximately 100,000. It is believed that they should be adequately equipped by this time. The reason for believing this is that the force which crossed the 38th parallel at the outbreak of the war was fully equipped within thirty days.

PW learned of the UN landing in the north at INCHON through leaflets dropped over the area by the UN. PW cannot remember the date. The eastern landing was unknown to him.

PW stated that about one month ago a tank battalion, the 105th Armored Division was attached to the 13th Division. Since that date, however, all tanks have been destroyed. Of a total of 16 self-propelled guns in the 13th Division S Gun Bn, only two (2) remain at present.

The actual use of mines by the north Korean Army is unknown to PW. It is believed that the 10th Division has only about 20 - 30 anti-tank mines at present. Trip type anti-tank personnel mines are improvised and can be expected to be employed.

There are areas in which the rice paddies are dry enough for Armored operations due to neglect of these rice paddies. However, specific areas cannot be named in which they will support the weight of a tank.

Electrical communication are very poor but are still utilized. The actual equipment such as telephones and wireless are very inferior to US products which have been utilized when captured.

PW believes that North Korean air capabilities are nil. There have been repeated promises of air support but none has ever been received. He has not even the faintest idea as to how many planes there are, if any.

PW cannot identify units dispatched to the Seoul area. However, he is certain there are several units located above the 38th parallel which will be committed into that area. He also believes that elements of the Ⅰ Corps may swing upward into the area. He has never heard of any NK Corps organization other than Ⅰ and Ⅱ.

For the AC of S, G-2: