포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1253　22 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0850)　19 September 1950

PW was intelligent and cooperative. PW was in good physical condition. Recommend further interrogation on technical phases of the NKPA Medical organization and capabilities. Reliability good. Uniform was removed from PW when captured.

The morale of the troops was extremely high until the battle of HWANGGAN when the division suffered a large number of casualties. Since this period, morale began to drop noticeably. After the battle, the division received a large number of replacements who had absolutely no will to fight. The daily air attacks and the resulting loss of equipment and supplies and also had great effect on the morale of the men. Since the division crossed the NAKTONG River, the men were opposed by mechanized units of the US Army and became acutely aware of the deficiencies of their forces. This was the factor which caused the complete disorganization of the 2nd Div. Subject saw US propaganda leaflets and was partially convinced that to surrender would not necessarily mean death and it was the only factor which caused his surrender. Subject believes that the leaflets have a very favorable effect on the average soldier.

1. Channels of evacuation: The evacuation of casualties depended upon the military situation and on the availability of transportation. The Bn aid stations were situated between 5 and 105 km to the rear of the front lines. The Regt’l aid stations were situated between 2 to 4 km to the rear and the Div hospitals (the 266th Hospital in the ease of the 2nd Div) were situated between 6 and 8 km to the rear of the front lines. The Bn aid station gave little or no medical aid and the Regt’l aid station was able to give a limited amount of medical attention. The lack of medical attention was due to the fact that there was only a limited number of aid men. PW noticed that the Regt’l aid station was in reality merely a collecting station. It usually took about 3 days for a patient to be evacuated to the division hospital. At the division hospital the patients were given medical attention and where immediate surgery was necessary, the operations were performed. From the division hospitals, the patients were evacuated to the Field hospitals. usually after a delay of about 7 days. The field hospitals had adequate facilities and personnel to give immediate attention to the seriously wounded only. The patients were hospitalized at the field hospitals for about 7 days and further evacuated to the Area hospitals. The Area hospitals are capable of giving all necessary medical attention.

2. Transportation facilities: From the field, the wounded were evacuated to the regt’l aid stations on stretchers. From the regt’l aid stations, the men were evacuated on ox or horse carts to Division Hospitals. The Div Hospitals had 12 hospital trucks for evacuation of wounded to the Field Hospitals. The Field Hospital also has hospital trucks but exact number unknown.

3. Medical personnel: There were six (6) medical officers and thirty (30) aidmen at the regt’l aid station. The Div hospital staff was composed of 16 medical officers and about 180 aidmen. The personnel of the Field Hospital numbered about 300 men but details are not known.

4. Identification of dead: All division KIA were the responsibility of the Div Graves Registration Officer. The death of each individual was recorded wherever identification was possible. Identification was established from the ID books carried by the soldiers. Identification of the dead during the latter part of the war was almost impossible because a large number of the men lost their ID books. Identification fo replacement dead was in most instances impossible because the majority of them were no issued any ID books.

5. Graves and Markers: There were no established cemeteries and consequently the dead were buried where they fell. Graves were marked with a one meter high board bearing name, unit, and home address. The unidentified dead were buried in unmarked graves. In many instances, the men were buried in common graves and markers of the identified dead were erected. Depth of the graves has not been specified by Army regulations and in many instances, the dead were buried only at a depth of one foot from the surface. The dead were not provided coffins.

6. Notification of Deaths: The next of kin of all identified dead were notified. A standard form was available for this purpose. Notifications were sent by the immediate headquarters of the deceased. In the case of infantry men, by the regt’l Hqs. Notifications were sent through the military postal system.

7. Missing in Action Personnel: The next of kin of all soldiers classified as missing in action were notified. A standard from was available for this purpose. Subject believes that most of the unidentified dead were carried on this status.

8. Disposition of Personal Effects: Army regulation specifies that all personal effects of the deceased would be sent to the next of kin together with notification of death. However, subject knows of no instances when the regulation was complied with. The soldiers usually had nothing of sentimental or material value. The dead who possessed anything of value were usually relieved of the items by this comrades.

9. Compensations: The families of the dead received no monetary compensations because it would be against the ideology on which the government was founded. The physically disabled were given some compensation but the PW does not know details of regulations governing such policies.

There was sufficient hospital equipment and supplies at the division hospitals. There was an ample supply of surgical instruments and medicine to attend to 300 patients each day. There were no shortages of medical supplies. 50% of the hospital equipment was of Russian origin and the remainder was of Japanese and Korean manufacture. Special items such as penicillin were of US origin.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, PW heard that plasma in powdered form would be made available to division level hospitals.

However this did not materialize. Subject believed that plasma is not used in any of the NKPA hospitals.

The objective of the 2nd Div was to occupy CH’ONGDO and cut off the TAEGU-PUSAN RR and highway.

Prior to the unit’s departure form N. KOREA, the men were given immunization shots for typhus and cholera. Prior to crossing the NAKTONG River on 1 Sep 50, the men were given immunization shots for cholera since there was word that an epidemic of that disease had broken out in the UN sector.

2nd Div - 235

17th Regt, 2nd Div - 242

4th Regt, 2nd Div - 238

6th Regt, 2nd Div - 244

Div Arty, 2nd Div - 247

Div Hqs, 2nd Div - 266

1. Subject heard, o/a 1 Sep 50, that the motor torpedo boats of the NK Navy would operate against the UN Navy. This was a rumor among the officers and not based on official date. Details of the NK Navy unknown.

2. Subject heard that the NK airforce was responsible for the maintenance of coastal security and that it was as yet inadequate to be used actively against the enemy. No details of the airforce is known.

3. PW information: Subject states that the N. Korean constitution prohibits maltreatment of prisoners and the use of derogatory language against them, and that offenders will be punished. The maximum penalty is death and the minimum punishment is 3 yrs imprisonment. Subject saw a truckload of prisoners being transported to SEOUL on the ANSONG-SEOUL highway. No other information is available.

4. N. Korean Currency Information:

a. Rate of exchange: There was no finance office where N. Korean currency could be exchanged for ROK won. Exchange were made on the black market only. Rates of exchange varied but the average rate of exchange was 1 NK won to 2 ROK won.

b. Value of NK won:

Prevailing prices in N. KOREA as of Jun 50 were as follows: 1 pr leather low quarter shoes - 1,000 won, 1 pr rubber sandals 300 won.

5. Red Cross Insignias: All hospital trucks had Red Cross Insignias painted between the headlights and on the rear doors. The aid stations and field hospitals used Red Cross flags in cases where there were no buildings available. The flags were concealed to prevent detection from the air of the hospitals. When buildings were used, insignias were painted on the doors only.

6. Personnel 2nd Div: Subject estimated that prior to crossing the NAKTONG River on 1 Sep 50, only 10% of the 2nd Div were original members and that replacements composed the remainder of the division. The division strength was about 2/3 of T/O on 1 Sep 50. No detailed information is available as replacements.

For the Commanding Officer: