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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1877　16 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADV ECH ATIS - 0030)　10 October 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 1690)

Informant was very cooperative. Due to his being located in a coal mining town (KAINEI for the past eight years), and due to his short period of service, the information received is general and limited in scope. Information is believed to be reliable.

Informant graduated from a middle school in Japan in 1933 and went to KOREA. Worked in a hospital in NANAM as medical apprentice under a Japanese doctor for five years specializing in surgery. Took and passed a medical examination and worked for two years at same hospital as interns. Later went to KAINEI and took over as director of a hospital serving the coal. mines in the area, He was called to HEIJO on 28 Jun 50 and inducted into the 21st Inf Regt, as a Capt. Later was transferred to the 13 Div and served as Div Hospital Director. Captured near CHUNGJU.

In the 13th Div there was a surgeon general and one medical Bn consisting of approx 23 medical officers plus 10 quasi-medical officers who had only a technical school background in medicine. The 23 medical officers included a Bn surgeon, hospital director (informant), chief of surgery and four others, three medical doctors, three sanitation officers, three receiving medics and two who sent patients back to rear echelons. There were other medical officers assigned to Regts and lower units,

Within the divisional medical organization, the high ranks were held by medical officers who were politically reliable. Professional skill was secondary. This resulted in inefficiency but during the later stages the division surgeon reorganized his setup and. gave rank according to ability. At this time informant was promoted to Lt Col from Capt.

The professional ability of these medical officers was very low and informant strongly suspects that beside himself there were not more than throe others who had general practice certificates, The wounded from the various regts were sent to this Div hospital, located 12 km to the rear of the battlefront. The wounded were later transferred to a field hospital receiving patients from various division and independent units. The field hospital was located 20 km to the rear of the division hospital.

The organizational setup is believed to be an exact replica of a Russian Division Medical setup.

Informant, as director, followed the principle or having a wounded soldier remain not more than three days in his hospital no matter how serious the wound.

Medical equipment and supplies were of very poor quality and informant being used to Japanese medical equipment and medical supplies had a difficult time administering medicines and conducting surgery.

About 80% of the surgical instruments, medical supplies and equipment came in kits, the size of a footlocker. The quality of the instruments was so poor that they were sterilized in alcohol only, boiling would have un adverse effect upon them. The instruments were, as a whole, blunt and unwieldy, They were crudely built, more for sturdiness than for fineness. The syringes were poor in that a vacuum could not be created, the needles were crude and twice as large as those of Japanese manufacture.

The five cultural officers in the medical Bn had their fingers in everything and got in everybody's way. It seems that quite a few NK wounds were self-inflicted and the cultural officers would try to stop treatment for them. In order to determine who had self-inflicted wounds, they would try to coerce the medical officers into acting as informers. The cultural officers tried unsuccessfully to bolster the morale of the wounded to got them in the proper frame of mind to fight again. They would also threaten and sometimes beg the troops not to inflict wounds on themselves.

The cultural officers were suspicious of most of the doctors whom they classified as intellectuals. Informant is of the opinion that 80% of the medical officers would desert if given the chance.

The three sanitation officers were supposed to make analysis of water specimens and chock food supplies, mess halls and latrines. Although they did a fairly good job at first, later they neglected their duty because they were busy with other things and just didn't have the time. Therefore, no checks on latrines, mess halls, food supplies and water were made, resulting in lowering the efficiency of the soldier. During a period of a few weeks, informant personally knows of at least 1,000 diarrhea cases. No dysentery cases were observed however.

The sanitation section was also in charge of inoculations against various communicable diseases. Inoculations were compulsory and the regimental medical officer kept complete records of each man's shot record. However, though shots were given, informant believes that the vaccine was of such poor quality that he doubts it had any effect at all.

His children back home were given three smallpox vaccinations but none of them took. He doubts if the vaccine given to troops was any better. Regarding inoculations against typhoid, a man was given 0.5 grams of vaccine and a week later 1 gram of vaccine. The same for cholera. There was no typhus inoculation program, if one contracted typhus, a pill or powder was given orally. There was no tetanus vaccine available and informant knows of over 70 deaths from tetanus.

80% of the vaccine came from RUSSIA. Informant believes that vaccines of Korean manufacture come from a plant located in or near PYONGYANG. He believes that all types of vaccine were made here. He was promised tetanus, typhus and other vaccines but they never arrived. The regulations governing sanitation and inoculations wore very explicit, following the Russian setup, however, in practice it was impossible to follow regulations due to the lack of medical supplies and poor quality equipment.

The malaria control program was a dose of atabrine for five days prior to entering the suspected area, and one thereafter. Therefore, malaria was very prevalent among the troops and two out of three were affected in some way. For treatment, quinine and salvarsan were used but wore very ineffective clue to scarcity and poor quality.

Informant has never seen nor heard of cholera epidemics in NK during the past five years. There was no case of typhoid in his unit prior to his capture. Informant knows of a typhus epidemic during Feb to May 1948, with the peak reached in March. This occurred in HAMYONG POKTO, locality. Informant claims that cases are more common near large factories and coal mines, The epidemic figures are unknown to informant because the NK government classified such information secret.

During Jun-Oct 1949, an outbreak of encephalitis occurred, and in his county KAINEI 50% of the populace was affected. The mortality rate was surprisingly low, about 20; however, informant explained that the doctors, whose professional ability was very low, tended to classify all illnesses occurring during a period of epidemic into the same category.

Typhus, typhoid and diphtheria cases are found all the year round in various localities although very few in number according to the informant. If cases of smallpox and cholera occur, they create panic among the doctors who do not know what to do.

Informant claims that the water in NK is much cleaner than that found in SK. This is due to the fact that the Russians put great emphasis on sanitation and NK has followed that principle. Regulations are very strict. Wells are clean and well built. The water supply system is very adequate and efficient. Informant believes that this is one good principle the Russian system of government has introduced.

There was no plagues in NK as far as the informant knows.

The ministry of public health is believed by informant to be run by a former major in the Russian Army, a Korean by the name of LEE, Tong Wha. He also holds the position equivalent to our surgeon general. He supervises these two posts with the rank of a two star general. He has two civilian vice ministers under him in the ministry. Other details are unknown. Directives from the ministry of public health comes through the prefecture office down to the county office then to the various institutions.

For the Commanding Officer: