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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2667　9 November 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1250)　23 November 1950

PW is cooperative but below normal intelligence, and not alert. He was able to tell the interrogator as much as he did because his companions helped him prior to the interrogation.

The information should be assessed accordingly.

PW could not offer anything beyond the unit designation he has given above in regards to unit breakdown.

2nd or 1st Platoon (MG):

a. Personnel: 2 officers and 42 EM

b. Equipment & Ammo

2 HMG, US Cal 30　(2,000 rds)

HMG, US Cal 50　(2,000 rds)

2 Rocket Launcher 2.36　(Only one Sqd in Bn carries them)

Grenades (None in HMG Co)

Pistol, Chinese make　(Carried by Plat Ldr)

Carbine, US Cal 30　(Carried by Asst Plat Ldr)

3rd Platoon (Mortars)

Personnel - same as above

Equipment & Ammo

2x81 mm Mortars US (24 rds)

HMG Co, 1st Bn:

a. Personnel: 10 officers and 150 EM

b. Weapons: (1 CO, 1 Ex 0, 2 Directors, 6 Plat & Asst Plat Ldrs)

1st Plat: 3 HMG, Cal 50　(2,000 rds per)

2nd Plat: HMG, Cal 50　(2,000 rds per)

3rd Plat: 2x81 mm Mortars　(24 rds per) Under control of Bn Comdr

2 Rocket Launcher 2.36 US (12 rds per)

PW was conscripted into the Nationalist Army at LO-TING HSIEN (羅屯縣) on 13 Jan 48 and assigned to the 63rd Army, 153rd Div, 459th Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co, 2nd Plat, 6th Sqd. He participated in a number of engagements against the Communist Army. First, at KWANGTUN, TAN-CHIANG, HSI-YING (廣東 壇江 西營) on Oct 1949. Departed HSI YING for HAINAN Island on Nov 1949. They took up defensive positions along the. beaches defending HAI-KOU (漢口). They then marched to TUNG-SHUI KANG (東水港) and trained for two months on beach defenses. Repelled the communist in their first attack in Feb 1950. However, in their third attack two or three thousand Communists landed. PW’s battalion resisted for 7 days before retreating to HAI-KOU. During their fourth attack the Communists, with many reinforcements defeated the PW’s battalion, 23 April 50, PW believed that at least 1/3 of his bn were killed. However, PW thinks that only twenty (20) men of his company were captured. On 25 Apr 50, over 10,000 captured Nationalists were shipped to CANTON City; among them was a Maj Gen LO (羅). PW was told that all PW 1s were to be released upon their return to CANTON. However, only those over 40 years were released to their homes, while those under forty were given Communist indoctrination until 29 Jul 50, when over 10,000 troops including newly conscripted troops, left CANTON for MANCHURIA by train. They passed through the following cities and provinces and arrived at KAI-YUAN (開原) on 15 Aug 50.

At KAI-YUAN the PW underwent training for two months in defense against air attacks, night marches and night attacks but received no instructions in mine laying, fortification, (such as pill boxes), obstacle construction and the like.

Left KAI-YUAN by rail on 21 Oct 50. PW only knows that his own Bn left, Rode for two days and nights, crossing the YALU River on 232100 1 Nov 50, and detrained three hours later at a small village under a 3/4 moon. The PW could see approximately 15 or 20 houses, surrounded on four sides by high mountains. They headed southwest (away from the moon at midnight) toward the mountains, After one mile of marching, they began to ascend and covered over ten miles, Each night after darkness, they hiked until one hour before dawn, taking a continuous single file formation without intervals between squads, platoons, or companies on the main highway until the last four or five nights when they took to mountain trails. PW, together with two other members of his squad, HUANG, Chieh (黃杰) and WU, Shih Tung (吳詩通) deserted his company after descending from a high mountain. PW claims that he was instructed by his squad leader to desert. He had already learned that his whole company was to desert during that very night. PW and his companions passed the night and day at a farmhouse (double type) until the group was captured by ROK troops.

In CHINA.

Obtained food wherever the unit stopped since leaving CANTON City in South CHINA. Received two meals of rice and leafy vegetables per day up to Central CHINA; two meals of bread and vegetables per day in North CHINA. There was sufficient food in CHINA.

In KOREA, PW received only one meal of corn and white cabbage per day. Food was insufficient in KOREA.

Low to the last level. At least 7 men out of each squad of 13 are of the same feeling. The reasons for the above are as follows: Poor weapons and equipment; lack of food, cold weather leaders from assistant squad leaders up, mistreat those who do not belong to the Communist Party. (Out of a squad of thirteen, at least six are members of the Communist Party). In PW's particular company, even members of the Communist Party deserted.

Most feared are UN aircraft, artillery and mortar fire (in that order).

No building of temporary or permanent field fortification such as machine gun pill boxes, MG nests laying wire fences, or mines during their movement southward from the Manchurian border.

PW was never told why he was fighting in KOREA.

Those of low rank and particularly those who are not of the Communist Party, are not informed of the reason for which they are fighting.

These have no opportunity to get acquainted with platoon leaders, not to mention higher echelon leaders. All leaders are addressed by their titles only, I.e. Squad Leader, Company Comdr, etc and not by rank or names.

For the AC of S, G-2: