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CHAO, Hung-Sheng 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 21 NO. 2663 1950-11-18
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2663 9 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1246) 23 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHAO, Hung-Sheng (趙紅聲) (Chinese)
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
ORGN: 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 114th Div; 342nd Regt, 1st Bn, 1st Co, 1st Plat, 3rd Squad (code name 1st Co: 1st SHAO TUI (一小隊) be fore crossing YALU River.)
DUTIES: Rifleman
EDUCATION: None
AGE: 39
OCCUPATION : RR Policeman
ADDRESS: LIAONING SHENG, SUI CHUNGLOIEN, SHA-HO-CHAN-TSUN, WANG-ROU-TUN (遼寧省 粹中縣 沙洞站村 王戾屯)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 181500 I Nov 50. According to the PW card place of capture was SHINZAN (深井站) exact location unknown.
INTERROGATOR: C.H.S.


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW seems cooperative.
Info seems reliable.
PW claims he has tuberculosis.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:
4th Field Army: Composition unknown
38th Army:  〃 〃
114th Division:  〃 〃
342nd Regiment:  〃 〃
1st Bn: 3 Inf Cos, Signal Sqd, Mortar Unit, Guard Co, Medical Detachment, and HMG Co.
1st Co: 1 Inf Platoons, one Mortar Platoon.
1st Plat: 3 Inf Squads.
Mortar Plat: 3 Mortar Squads
1st Platoon:
a. Personnel: 2 officers and 33 EM
b. Equipment and ammo:
18 38 type rifle, Jap make (80 rds per)
3 LMG (US) (300 rds per)
6 Grease Gun (US) (30 rds per)
Grenades (3 per man, carried only by rifleman)
Mortar Platoon:
a. Personnel: 2 officer& and 30 EM
b. Equipment and ammo:
3 x 60mm Mortar (Chinese) (30 rds per)
1st Company:
a. Personnel: 12 officers and 148 EM
Of these, one Korean interpreter who had a rank equivalent to Plat Ldr was included.
b. Equipment and ammo:
6 Dynamite (Chinese) pkgs
wt 3 Kilogram
Usually two dynamite packages were carried by each asst Plat Ldr. They were used for AT defense.
4 Mauser (30 rds per)
1st Battalion:
a. Personnel: Approx 700 officers and EM
b. Equipment and ammo:
6 HMG (make unk) (rds unk)
3 x 81mm (US) mortar (25 rds per)
Field Telephones
Signal Guns, make unk (rds unk)
T/O & E of Higher Echelon unknown.
3 months before crossing the YALU River, a Korean interpreter with the equivalent rank of Plat Ldr joined his Co at KAI-YUAN (開原). The PW's unit is intact and under the same chain of command now as it was prior to crossing the YALU River.
No parts of PW's unit have been integrated into Korean units.

4. LOCATION & ACTIVITIES OF UNITS: (as of 17 Nov 50)
Mission of the PW's unit was unknown. The CCF came into KOREA believing they were going to guard the Manchurian Border.
On the night of 17 Nov 50, when the PW's Co was advancing to an unknown area, they were suddenly attacked by ROK artillery. The PW and a fellow soldier were captured on 18 Nov 50.
Whereabouts of the lat Company was unknown.
CP’s and Hqs locations were unknown.
The PW's unit did not construct any elaborate defense positions while travelling south from the YAW River.

5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
3 months after the deactivation of the NC Transportation (RR) Police, the PW was caught by the CCF Reserve Regt at WONGHO TUNG (home) on 5 Oct 49.
He was placed in the CCF Reserve Regt at LI-SHU-HSIEN (梨樹縣) and underwent 3 months of indoctrination and close order drill.
The Reserve Regt, left LI-SHU-HSIEN (梨樹縣) in Dec 49 by train and arrived at KAI-YUAN (開原) in Jan 50. The Reserve Regt personnel ware placed into various battalions in the 38th Army. Here they received indoctrination and basic inf training.
The PW heard that the 342nd Ragt left KAI-YUAN (開原) by train in Oct 50; after 3 days in the closed-door freight cars, they arrived at a small unknown RR station in KOREA. There were approx 20 cars; the PW's freight car contained 30 men and baggage.
He saw the steel bridge which spans the YALU River. When they came to the bridge, all the soldiers alighted and were planning to walk across it but, discovering the bridge in good condition, they crossed by train.
Route taken after embarking from the train to place of capture was unk.
PW did not see other CCF units on his trip to KOREA.
While in CHINA, his unit was called the 38th Army, 114th Div, 342nd Regt, 1st Battalion.

6. FOOD & AMMO SUPPLIES:
Troops brought 3½ days ration with them when they crossed the YALU River.
After the food was gone, the CO somehow acquired food.

7. ARMOR & ARTILLERY:
PW did not see any tanks in the 114th Division.
15 days after crossing the YALU River, the PW saw 6 field guns (estimated having a 12 cm bore) pulled by 6 horses to each piece; these passed his Co, to the forward area, date and location unknown.

8. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION:
Above Bn level communication was by telephone. Company level and below employed messengers.

9. MORAL:
The morale in the PW’s Company was low after they discovered that they were in KOREA to fight US Forces. They realized this after being bombed and strafed by US planes.

10. GENERAL INFO:
PW was not a volunteer for Korean service nor was his unit.
No instruction had bean given to CCF soldiers to appear to be volunteers if captured.
PW's unit did not undergo amphibious training.
There were no Japanese units in the CCF but the PW did see one Japanese named KUROKI, a Pvt, in the 114th Div at KAI-YUAN (開原) Feb 50. PW did not know the whereabouts of this Japanese.
The Chinese Communists did not have Militia and Public Security Units in addition to their regular troops.
The PW received 70,000 Yuan per month. Wages for respective ranks was unknown.
PW did not know of any CCF units with Soviet equipment.
PW did not see or hear of any paratroop training or paratroopers in the CCF.
White in CHINA, political officers gave indoctrination lectures, especially to the former NCA troops.
In KOREA, all the troops, including unit commanders, slept in foxholes or under trees, camouflaged by grass.
The PW stated that he was issued one pair of winter shoes at KAI-YUAN (開原) before coming to KOREA. He did not wear it because it was too heavy for marching.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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