ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2660 9 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1243) 22 November 1950
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 2539)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | LI, Ssu-Chun (李四春) (Chinese) |
| RANK & DUTY: | Sqd Ldr (班長) |
| ORGN: | 4th Field Army, 39th Army, 117th Div, 351st Regt, 3rd Bn, 8th Co 2nd Plat, 6th Sqd (第四野戰士 三九軍 一一七師 三五一団 三營 八連 二排 六班) |
| EDUCATION: | 3 yrs |
| AGE: | 34 |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| ADDRESS: | CHIANGSU -SHENG, HSU-CHOU, FU, SU-CHIEN HSIEN, WANG LOU HSIANG, CHIAN-CHUANG TSUN (江壽省 徐州府 宿遷縣 王楼鄕 集庄村) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 181000 1 Nov 50 at YONGSAN DONG (YE 3012) |
| INTERROGATOR: | W.T.O. |
The PW was cooperative and was very talkative. He was at ease and felt confident of receiving good treatment and did not hesitate in offering information.
The PW seemed alert.
Information seems reliable,
3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH OF UNIT:The 4th Field Army composed of the 38th, 39th, 40th and the 41st Armies.
39th Army composed of the 115th, 116th and 117th Rifle Divisions, Medical and Transportation Unit of unknown strength, Guard (營街団) Regiment, and possible (unk) artillery division. (PW has heard from a platoon leader that an army included an artillery division.
117th Rifle Division was composed of the 349th, 350th and 351st Rifle Regiments, Medical Unit, Signal Unit and Transportation Unit of unknown strengths. It also contained Guard battalion and possible artillery regiment.
The 351st Rifle Regiment composed of 3 rifle battalions, Guard Company, Signal Unit, Medical Unit, Transportation Unit, Reconnaissance Unit (30 men) and possible artillery battalion.
Each rifle battalion composed of 3 Rifle Companies, mixed HMG and Mortar Company, and Signal and Medical Unit of unknown strength.
Each rifle company composed of 3 rifle platoons.
Each rifle Platoon composed of 3 rifle squads.
The Guard unit 1s duties in the army, divisions and regiments were general policing duties. During battle, these units were placed directly to the rear of the infantry to see that no one deserted.
A criminal investigation detachment was attached to armies, divisions and regiments. It handled all criminal acts committed by the troops against the civilian population. It is similar in function to the U.S. CID.
After air attacks by UN planes, the 349th Regt suffered approx 600 killed and wounded at PAKCH’ON,
O/A 5 Nov 50, some rifle companies were annihilated. The PW had heard this from another soldier who had witnessed it.
2nd Platoon: Officers 2 and 35 EM
3 LMG's (Canadian), (1000 rds each); 6 Carbines (US), (100rds each); 15 Rifles (Jap), (60 rds each); Grenades, 4 per man
8th Company: 4 Officers and 160 EM
4 Mausers (German); 40 Rifle (Jap), (60 rds each); 3 x 60mm Mortars (US), (30 rds each); 18 Carbines (US), (100 rds each); LMG’s (Canadian), (1000 rds each)
3rd Battalion: EM & Officers 700
4 x 81mm Mortar (unk make), (20 rds each); 6 x HMG's (US), (rds unk); 2 x 2.63 Rocket Launcher (US), (20 rds each); Unknown number of trucks (Captured from CNA); 27 x LMG’s (Canadian), (1000 rds each)
351st Regiment: EM & Officers Approx 3,000
Mixed, HMG & Mortar Co: 10 Officers and 200 EM
6 HMG (US), (rds unk); 4 x 82mm Mortar (unk make), (30 rds each); 10 Mausers (German), (rds unk).
In Aug 50, one Korean was assigned to each Company, in LIAOYANG (遼陽), MANCHURIA. The reason for this, PW heard, was that the CCF may have to intervene in the Korean war. These Koreans were inhabitants of MANCHURIA and were seen wearing CCF uniforms.
PW does not know if his unit is under the same chain of command now as it was prior to cross inf the YALU.
Strength of Unit: 117th Division - Approx 10,000
Strength of the 39th Army was heard to be approx 50,000.
PW heard that there is an artillery division in the army, an artillery regiment in a division and an artillery battalion in a regiment. No such units were oserved.
O/A 5 Nov 50, PW observed 8 or 9 guns, resembling. the 76mm M1902/30 guns being pulled by horses, heading toward the front. To what unit these guns belonged was not known. PW was marching with his company toward the front when he observed these guns. Final destination of these guns not known.
4. LOCATION & ACTIVITIES OF UNIT:PW was with the 2nd Plat in defensive positions in an unknown area.
PW and another soldier were situated on a hill, approx 50 meters away from his platoon, as observers at an O.P. 18 Nov 50, U.S. forces were seen advancing toward the PW's sector. When some U.S. troops saw the PW at the O.P., they beckoned and persuaded him and the other troops to surrender. The PW and his comrade surrendered to those troops on 181000 1 Nov 50.
The PW heard from his officers and the company political officer that the entire 4th Field Army (38th, 39th, 40th and 41st Armies) has arrived in KOREA.
5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:Inducted Sep 47 into the CNA at HSUCHOU (涂州).
Assigned to the 6th Army, 148th Div in CHINCHOU (鎭州) and received 4 months training.
Captured 28 Oct 48 at HEISHAN (黑山) by the CCF and assigned to the present unit.
39th Army departed HEISHAN Dec ·4a and arrived at TIENTSIN (天深), in Jan 49 (dates unk).
39th Army departed TIENTSIN Apr 49 and arrived at HUPEN SHENG (湖北省), June 49.
39th Army departed HUPEN SHENG Aug 49 and arrived at HUNAN SHENG (湖南省), in Aug 49.
39th Army departed HUNAN SHENG Dec 49 and arrived at HONAN SHENG (河南城), in Jan 50.
39th Army departed HONAN SHENG in Jul 50 and arrived at LIAOYANG (遼陽), MANCHURIA Jul 50.
39th Army departed by sections, o/a 20 Oct 50, for KOREA.
PW detrained at a small. village (believed to be KUANTIEN HSIEN (寡甸縣) approx 40 Km before reaching the YALU River). It was believed that the entire 39th Army used this route.
351st Regiment crossed a concrete bridge o/a 252400 1 Oct 50 over the YALU.
Regiment marched through mountains, using only secondary roads and arrived at YOHSAN DONG, 20 days later, o/a 14 Nov 50.
PW surrendered to US troops 181000 Nov 50.
39th Army was stationed at LIAOYANG, MANCHURIA, before coming to KOREA.
It is believed that the entire 39th Army came to KOREA.
PW’s unit did not participate in the invasion of HAINAN Island.
6. PERSONALITIES:CHANG, Chien Cheng (張鮮成), CO, 117th Division.
YANG, Pao Huai (揚保怀), CO, 8th Company.
LIN, Piao (林彪), CG, 4th Field Army.
PENG, Teh Huai (彭德怀), CO, 1st Field Army.
LIU, Pe. Cheng (劉佰承), C.G. 2nd Field Army.
CHEN, I (陳義), C.G. 3rd Field Army
TU, Kun (杜根), Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat
No Soviet advisors were in the PW’s unit.
7. FOOD & AMMO SUPPLIES:Troops received 2 meals a day, usually consisting of Kaoliang. Source and amount of supplies were unknown.
No supplies being transported were observed.
No resupply of ammo received after the PW arrived in KOREA. He stated that the ammo he possessed was issued in 48 when he entered the CCF. Many men of the unit were believed to possess ammo issued while fighting the CNA in CHINA in 1948.
8. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION:Communication between companies and lower echelons was conducted by runners.
Between company and higher echelons, phones and radios were employed.
9. MORALE:The PW stated that approx 80% of the Company, platoon and squad troops consisted of former CNA soldiers.
The PW believes that most of these former CNA soldiers will surrender at the first opportunity if they are given assurance not to be killed, and be given adequate food. Many, evidently, had not read surrender leaflets dropped by U.S. planes, as their only fear of surrendering was death. The PW, upon reading a leaflet and feeling. assured of good treatment, surrendered at his first opportunity. The leaflets have great effect on those not willing to fight.
There is no fighting spirit within the (80%) former CNA soldiers. But, regardless of the opposition facing them, these soldiers will fight and attack if an order is given. These soldiers act only upon orders and no one disobeys, due to fear of being shot. When a unit is engaged in combat, a guard unit is placed to their rear to see that no one deserts.
The PW has read leaflets of the United Nations troops participating in the Korean War. The other soldiers are under the impression that only a small force of United States and British troops are engaged in the War. PW has often heard officers telling the men that the CCF outnumbers the U.S. and British forces. The fact that the United Nations troops are participating in this War is unknown to most of them.
PW stated that after encountering only hardships and sufferings in the CCF, lie holds only ill-feelings against MAO, Tse Tung and does not look up to him as leader.
Former CNA soldiers, while in the CNA, fought sort of mechanically and actually had no purpose or objectives. They took things as they came along. While fighting with the CNA, the PW stated that no matter what hardships they encountered, they always looked up to CHIANG Kai Shek, as a leader and had confidence in him.
The only reason there were so many captured CNA soldiers was that the CNA was not organized properly, and its administration and commanders were not up tp proper standards. At times, CNA units battled each other through mistaken identity due tp the inefficiencies of some of the commanders.
CCF troops feared air attacks and artillery shelling most.
The PW and his unit did not volunteer for Korean service.
No instructions were given to appear as volunteers if captured.
The unit did not undergo amphibious training.
PW does not know anything of the Iron and Steel Brigade,
No known Japanese units are in the CCF.
No known Militia or Public Security units exist besides the regular troops.
Pay of Various Grades:
1. Privates - 60,000 Yuan
2. Squad Leaders - 100,000 Yuan
Others were unknown.
The 39th Army moved to MANCHURIA in Jul 50,
No known paratroop training or units are in the CCF.
Whether or not the Chinese were recruiting in MANCHURIA was not known.
Captured CNA troops and equipment are being used by the CCF.
Political officers frequently lectured the troops on the democratic ideals of the CCF and of their obligations to liberate the poor.
PW spent most of the time sleeping in foxholes, usually prepared under trees. No one slept in buildings, because of the fear of air attacks.
Shoes worn by PW were produced in KWANG CHOU (廣州). It is an athletic type shoe bought by the CCF to be distributed to the troops. It was originally produced for civilian use.
This type of shoe was issued to both enlisted men and officers and issued only when a person was badly in need of it.
No winter shoes were issued to the PW, because of a shortage.
The PW was captured wearing the CCF officers uniform and the following is the given explanation:
On or about 12 Nov 50, PW's Company and elements of other companies were ordered to climb a mountain for a possible battle, believed to be the PAKCHON (YD 2199) area. Being too hot, PW and the others removed their jackets and left them in the mess area. Upon returning, PW picked up an officer's jacket by mistake. Due to the intense air attacks and frequent matching undergo by these troops during the period, no effort was made by the owner of the jacket and the PW to remedy the error. The PW was found wearing this officer's jacket, and upon capture, had the red sleeve band removed.
This story had been checked with another PW who was in the PW’s unit and captured on the same date and under the same circumstances. Both produced the same explanations. It could have been probable.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
