ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2489 4 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - FWD #1 - 0261) 30 November 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | CH'OE, Song Sam (崔成三) (최성삼) |
| RANK: | Capt (總尉) |
| AGE: | 33 |
| DUTY: | Bn CO |
| UNIT: | 27 Ind Brig, 4th HMG Bn |
| EDUCATION: | None |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | YONG-TU (龍斗) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 16 Oct 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | P'YONGAN PUKTO, SONCHON-GUN, YONGYON-MYON, SANGTAN-NI (平安北道 宣川郡 龍淵) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | SINUIJU, HANMAE-RI #9 (新義州市 寒梅里 9班) |
| INTERROGATOR: | Cpl HATTORI (ATIS) |
PW was fairly cooperative but appeared to be averse to giving information. Despite his lack of education, PW seemed to be intelligent.
Information obtained is fairly reliable.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
19 Oct 44: PW volunteered into the CCF at HWAPUK-SONG, MAN-HYON (草北城 灣縣), CHINA and was engaged in several engagements with the Japanese Army.
19 Oct 45: PW and 500 other CCF men (Koreans) were sent to MUKDEN (奉天), MANCHURIA, PW was here assigned to Korean Volunteer Army. 5th Brig, 17th Regt.
16 Jun 57: PW (now a Plat Ldr) and several others were sent to HARBIN (哈彌濱). On this date the Korean Volunteer Army in MANCHURIA was redesignated as the Chinese People's emancipation army. PW was assigned to CCF Trade Section, Trans Co as commander.
3 Nov 48: CCF Trade Section relocated to MUKDEN. PW was reassigned as Chief of Coal Supply Section (Sr Lt).
1 Aug 50: PW was released from above assignment and departed MUKDEN by train.
4 Aug 50: PW arrived at P'YONGYANG (平壤) KOREA and was promoted to Captain. Along with other officers, PW was assigned the task of organizing/the 27th Brig.
8 Aug 50: PW and 42 officers departed P'YONGYANG and arrived at KUMCH'ON (金川) a few days later to organize the 27th Brig. New men were conscripted and trained. PW was assigned as 4th HMG Bn commander.
26 Sep 50: 27th Brig was ordered to defend KUMCHON (金川).
10 Oct 50: Arrived at KUMCHON.
12 Oct 50: 27th Brig was subjected to UN Arty fire.
14 Oct 50: The unit retreated and was completely dispersed.
16 Oct 50: PW was captured in the vicinity of YONGTU (龍斗).
Unit Organization and Strength:
Original Organization and Strength:
27th Ind Brig (as reorganized 8 Aug 50) was composed of 4 HMG Bns of 770 men each; Inf Bn of 800 men; mortar Bn of 160 men; Comm Bn of 100 men, and Eng Bn of 200 men. There were a few sub units (Supply Section, Sanitation Unit, etc) within the Brig Hq, accounting for 260 men. Total strength of the 27th Ind Brig was 4,600 men.
4th HMG Bn was composed of 2 Inf Cos of 150 men each; 2 HMG Co of 60 men each; Eng Co of 80 men; Arty Co of 100 men; and the following sub-units - Comm Plat of 30 men, AAMG Plat of 30 men; AT-rifle Plat of 30 men; Supply Plat of 38 men, Sniper Plat of 30 men, and medics Plat of 22 men.
Last known Composition of Unit: Dispersed at KUMCHON.
Equipment: (27th Brig as of 10 Oct 50)
The following is a list of new Russian equipment, except mortars, and ammo issued to the Brig from P'YONGYANG Aug 60, and Sep 50. Some of weapons and ammo were dispatched to the unit periodically in small numbers, until the maximum allotment was reached during mid-Sep 50.
14 x 45mm AT-Gun, M-1937 - 90 rds per gun; 14 x 82mm mortars, M-1937 - 30 rds per mortar; 45 x HMG's, MAXIM, M1910, 2000 rds per HMG; 10 x 7.62mm AAMG, M-1493 - no ammo - Note: despite the fact that it used the same calibre ammo (7.62mm) as the HMG the ammo could not be interchanged. Ammo was reported to be on its way but never arrived.
40 x 14.5mm AT-Rifle, PTRS-41 - 12 rds per rifle; 700 x PPsh SMG's - 200 rds ea; 6 x ZIS-151 Truck; 1 GAZ-67 Jeep; and 30 x TAM field telephone.
Due to the acute shortage of trucks, which were utilized only to haul ammo and supplies, in the Brig, all heavy weapons (AT Gun and HMG were hauled by the EM. Mortars were taken apart and carried, on the backs of the men. At times when the trucks broke down, the men were made to carry ammo in addition to their personal equipment.
The single jeep was used by the Brig Comdr, when the unit was on the march.
Of the 30 field telephones possessed by this unit, more than half were inoperative. PW stated that the construction of the TAM telephones was inferior and crude. The inoperative condition due greatly to poor batteries, whose life was very short.
PW stated that the 45mm AT-Guns were almost useless as effective-offensive-weapons. He heard that this weapon was too light to cause heavy damage to enemy tanks. In the informant's opinion, this type of weapon was not suitable for KOREA. The gun crews were usually inexperienced and contributed greatly to the ineffective slow rate of fire.
PW on several occasions observed ammo (HMG, AT-Rifle, etc) with colored tips. Colors observed were red, yellow, and violet. PW did not know the type of ammo each color represented.
Unit History:
27th Ind Brig was activated in the early part of Aug 50. The unit was first organized at KUMCH'ON (金川) with an approx strength of 400 men. Youths of this city were conscripted daily until the maximum strength of 4,600 men was reached late Aug 50. All the officers were experienced combat men. The conscripts received several weeks of intensive combat training under these officers.
Communications:
The rating of the communication system within the Brig was considered average, according to Korean Army standards. Despite the lack of wireless and radio equipment the Brig Hg was in fairly good contact with its sub-units by use of field telephones, or runners.
Communication of this Brig with other outside units was very poor. The only means of communication, other than runners, was trucks. Even then, an average round-trip would require from one to four days, depending upon the location of the unit from its superior command (Defense Ministry in this case). Messengers and trucks travel only during night.
PW stated the Defense Ministry published maps and road guides for the NK Army. However, they were so limited in number that only the Brig CO, possessed a road map of KOREA. This condition greatly handicapped the movements of sub-units, which had to depend on instinct rather than on accurate maps. There were numorous occasions when the mapless sub-units temporarily "got lost". despite their use of compasses (possessed by plat 1drs and above).
Personalities (of 27th Brig):
Maj Gen CHO, Kwan (趙寬) (조관) - 27 Brig CG.
Col CHONG, Yong Phyo (丁龍表) (정용묘) - Brig Chief of Staff.
Lt Col KIM, Yon Chun (金淵春) (김영춘) - Brig Chief of supply.
Morale and Propaganda:
The morale of the soldiers in PW's unit was very low, because the men were conscripted, food rations were critical, and they were subjected to frequent aerial attacks.
The morale of the officers was almost equally low, since they know that NK Army in Sep 50 was fighting a losing war.
The condition of the morale was in such a low state, that approx 70% of the soldiers (out of 4,600 men) deserted the 27th Brig the day before it engaged in combat.
PW along with the rest of his unit, observed UN propaganda leaflets on several occasions. There were no orders from the Brig CG forbidding the troops to read them. PW believed that this privilege accorded to the soldiers contributed greatly to the large number of deserters.
4. GENERAL INFORMATION:Foreign Elements:
Two Russian military advisers (arty 1st Lt and a Capt) were assigned to the 27th Brig at KUMCH'ON in mid-Aug 50. These officers made up daily training schedules for the troops. The Russians did not enter the combat zone with the 27th Brig.
Training Manuals:
In the NK Army the training manuals, which were published in limited number by the Defense Ministry in P'YONGYANG, were classified as "SECRET". These are issued only to platoon Ldrs and above, and during troop training periods only. Every manual must be accounted for at the end of the training period, the manuals are returned to the Defense Ministry.
For the Commanding Officer:
GERARD
