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LEE Chon San 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 19 NO. 2426 1950-11-06
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2426 30 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (IX Corps LDI 0158) 11 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: LEE Chon San (李兆山)
ORGN: 38th Army, 335th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co, 2nd Plat, 4th Sqd
AGE: 20
RANK: Pvt
DUTY: Ammo Bearer
OCCUPATION: None
EDUCATION: None
DATE OF CAPTURE, PLACE: 060800 K Nov 50 at Hill 225 (YE-4327) near UNSAN


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was cooperative during interrogation and the information obtained seems fairly reliable. However, he had no education and his memory was poor. He is not recommended for further interrogation.

3. OWN UNIT:
Prior to PW's conscription into the CCF Oct 49 he was a rifleman in the Chinese Nationalist Chinese Army. He, as well as all former troops of the Nationalist Chinese Army were forced into the CCF when it overran MANCHURIA. This group comprised the bulk of the CCF 38th Army. As a result about 70% of the troops under its command are former Nationalist troops. During the month of his forced reenlistment, the 38th Army, including all of its attached units, moved to KWANGSI area to combat the Chinese Nationalist Forces from MUKDEN, MANCHURIA. o/a Feb 50 it moved to SUIPING, Hunan Province when the Corps and its attached units reverted to a non-military but labor unit status and helped the farmers with their farms up until Jun 50 when the 38th Army and all its attached units returned to SUNTAIJO (三台子), MUKDEN, MANCHURIA. There PW's 1st Div received about 2 months of combat training after which the 38th Corps and its attached units departed and arrived in the vic of the YALU River (exact location unknown) via SOPINGJE (四平街), TUNG HWA (通化), MANCHURIA o/a 10 Oct 50. It then crossed the river by train. PW noted that at site of river crossing there were two bridges: one wooden bridge constructed by engineers and the railroad bridge itself. After the YALU River was crossed PW entered an unknown town (possibly MANPOJIN) where he saw several factories. The 38th Army was composed of the 1st 2nd, and 3rd Divs, according to PW, with strength of 8,000 to 10,000 men per Div which in turn consisted of 3 Regts. Each Regt consisted of 3 Inf Bns and 2 Arty Cos. Also attached separately to each Regt was a Bn composed of Security, Communication, and Medical Units numbering 700 men. Each Bn consisted of 3 Inf Cos and one Heavy Weapons Co. Strength of each of these Cos was 150 men according to PW. Up until date he was captured he believed his Div was located in the vic of hill 225 (YE-4327). Besides the 335th Regt he believed that the 334th and 336th Regts of the 1st Div, and the 2nd and 3rd Divs of the 38th Army were also believed to be deployed in the vic of hill 225.

4. MISSION OF PW's UNIT:
PW was told by the Cultural Officers that their mission was to liberate all of KOREA from the enemy forces and to eliminate the danger of enemy forces invading MANCHURIA by using KOREA as a base of operations.

5. ENEMY SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:
a. Supply
PW stated food consisted mainly of Kaoliang (sorgum) and salt. Three days ration of these items were carried as food when he entered KOREA. He does not know the initial source of food except that it was brought to the unit by trucks. PW stated that after his 3 days ration was consumed no additional ration was received because of the intense enemy air attacks. Consequently food was obtained from villagers through the use of meal tickets. PW explained that these tickets, if taken to the finance office of the unit, would be redeemed in currency. He also stated that this meal ticket system was widely used in CHINA. Whether such a system was effective in North KOREA was unknown but he said that it was used to obtain food.
PW stated that his LMG crew issued 800 rounds of ammo while 50mm gun crews were issued 60 rounds. These were brought with them from MANCHURIA. He stated that o/a 3 Nov 50, this supply of ammo was expended at Hill 225. No new supply of ammo was received due to enemy air action. He also stated that each rifleman was issued 80 rounds of ammo and 4 hand grenades.

b. Equipment
There were 5 HMG (water cooled, Japanese make, caliber unknown) and 3 mortars in the heavy weapons Co. There was one LMG manned by a crew of 4, in each of the 3 sqds of a plat. Each of the 2 Arty Cos attached to regt had 6 Mt gun Jap 92 model with an unknown amount of ammo to each gun. The rifles used were mostly of Jap (model 99). He also stated that 60mm guns were also used but he did not know what units these belonged to. He observed that sqd ldrs were equipped with SMG (US make).
Radio was used for communication above regt level. Phones were used between regt and bn. Runners were used below Bn level.

6. ENEMY LOSSES:
o/a 18 Oct 50 after crossing the YALU River PW's Regt was strafed and bombed by enemy planes resulting in a loss of 1 heavy gun (type unknown), 3 men killed, 3 wounded, and 5 horses killed.
o/a 4 Nov 50 PW heard that more than 50 trucks were destroyed during strafing and bombing runs by enemy planes. Exact location was unknown.

7. PERSONALITIES:
HU Za En Ming, 335th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co, 2nd Plat Ldr.

8. REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL:
As far as PW knows he did not know of any replacements of personnel coming in.

9. ENEMY TACTICS:
PW stated that double envelopment tactics were regularly used by the CCF. This was accomplished by encircling to the rear of the enemy unit from the flanks, thus cutting off his retreat route. After completion of encirclement, flares were fired and firing commenced by those of the rear of the enemy indicating completion of encirclement at which time firing was done from all directions.

10. MISCELLANEOUS:
PW stated that morale among the CCF troops was low because they have been fighting for such a long time in their own country. They felt that it was not their business to fight in North KOREA when they themselves had their own civil war to wage.
PW stated that they were told by their officers that they would be killed by the Americans upon capture or be used as forced laborers, and would never be permitted to return to their homes.
PW stated that there was one Korean in each Co who acted as an interpreter.
PW stated that he believes about 40% of the CCF troops presently in KOREA have some sort of an education while 60% had none at all. He also states that 60% of the men range in age from 20 to 30 years. He believed that most of the troops do not know that they are fighting American troops. He further stated that should they find out they are fighting US Forces they would surrender at the first opportunity because they, as former members of the Nationalist Army, know and are confident of good treatment at the hands of US Forces.

For the AC of S, G-2:

YAMADA

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