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SON, Hong won 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 19 NO. 2479 1950-11-20
    전사 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2479 2 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (521 - MISD - 0320) 26 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: SON, Hong won (孫洪遠) (송흥원)
PW NO: #660
RANK: Pvt
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: 401st Unit, 3rd Bn, 2nd Co, 2nd Plat
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SANG NI (上里)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 20 Nov 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: HAMGYONG NAMDO, PUKCHON GUN, YANG HA MYON (咸南道 北靑郡 陽化面)
HOME ADDRESS: HUNGNAM
INTERROGATOR: Pvt TSUDA


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was cooperative and voluntarily gave information.
Reliability: Fairly good
Length of Service: 1 mos
Education: Technical School (3 yrs)
Age: 38
Physical Condition: Good

3. MILITARY HISTORY:
7 Oct 50 - Inducted at HUNGNAM (興南).
8 Oct 50 - Assigned to the 401st Unit, 3rd Bn, 2nd Co, 2nd Plat at HEYANG RI (回陽里) 3km E of HAMHUNG. The 401st Unit had no weapons. It hid in the mountains due to the continuous air raids.
15 Oct 50 - The 401st Unit received weapons and left HAMHUNG for SINPUNG NI (新豐里) to defend that city The 401st Unit marched approx 15km at night.
17 Oct 50 - The 401st Unit arrived at SINPUNG NI and hid in the mountains.
20 Oct 50 - The troops received 5 days rice. The 401st Unit started marching northward.
o/a 4 Nov 50 - The 401st Unit arrived at SANG NI (上里) via SUSNAG NI (水上里), HWANGSUWON NI (黃水院里), HONGUN (洪君), and KAPSAN (甲山) and set up a defense Line. Here scouts were sent out southward.
o/a 7 Nov 50 - The 401st Unit fought UN Forces and retreated to a mountain 500m N of its original position. The 401st Unit had little contact with UN troops, but was gradually pushed to NAMPUNG RI (南豊里) 12-15 km NW of SANG NI o/a 17 Nov 50.
20 Nov 50 - PW deserted his unit and surrendered to US troops near SANG NI.

4. PERSONALITIES:
RHEE, Ho Chin (李孝鎭) (리효진) 25-27 Capt 401st Unit, 3rd Bn Co

5. PROPAGANDA:
O/a 4 Nov 50 at SANGNI PW heard the following story form a political leader (Lt, name unk): "CCF are coming for replacement. We are expecting them any minute. CCF troops are well equipped and they will surely push the UN troops back."
O/a 7 Nov 50 at SANGNI. the above political leader told the men that approx 10,000 CCF troops had entered KAPSAN. Other CCF units were moving southward form SINUIJI (新義州) and PYONGYANG was re-captured.
With the exception of the pro-communists (about 1/3 of the total), the men did not seem so happy on hearing this new. The majority were longing for the war to end.
On 11 Nov 50 the political leader told the troops that the CCF in KAPSAN had moved to CHOSHIN Reservoir and had passed eastward toward SONGJIN (城津). The strength of the CCF will be 8 Divs and their purpose is to encircle the UN troops in HAMGYON NAM DO (咸鏡南道); one group was to go south from CHOSHIN Reservoir to WONSAN and the other to SONGJIN.

6. CODE NUMBER:
401st Unit: 119 Regt
On 17 Oct 50 at SINPUNGNI, 3rd Bn was given a name "CHANG BAEK SAN" (長白山); 2nd Co "AMNOK KANG" (鴨綠江) and 2nd Plat "CHONTU" (戰斗). Each organization from Bn to Plat, had a code name which seldom changed. PW believes these names are still used to designate these units.
Pass words for night were CHONTU (戰斗) - SUNGRI (勝利). This pass word was used all during PW's service by not only the 401st Unit by the other units. A suspected man would be challenged, "NUGUYASOT" (Halt! Who goes there?). He must answer "CHONTU" and ask "NUGU" (Who are you?). The first man will answer "SUNGRI". This is mainly for recognizing ROK troops from NKA Units.

7. ORGANIZATION: (See Organization Chart)
The 401st Unit had four Bns; each Bn had three Cos, each Co, three Plats; and each Plat, three Sqds. This unit was an Inf Regt and was newly organized in Oct 50 at HAMHUNG. The 401st Unit was originally a labor unit and was engaged in construction in the HAMHUNG area.
The troops were armed mainly with US Enfield Rifle M 1917. PW remembers a US and 1917 mark on the rifle (5 rd clip). PW saw only one machine gun in his company. There were no large guns in this unit. Each man had 140 rds when PW left this unit. Hand grenades were scarce, probably 10 to a Plat. PW does not know from where or how the ammunition was supplied.
The 401st Unit had suffered few casualties during PW's service in the unit. PW heard that the 401st Unit would go north to SINGALPAJIN (新乫坡鎭) if necessary.

8. FOOD AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES:
Food was obtained from the local people's committee (地方人民委員會) and brought by carts to the front. Ammunition supply was unknown.

9. WOUNDED:
Wounded with the exception of officers were usually left behind. PW noticed a great discrimination between EM and officers in medical treatment.

10. ENEMY INTENTIONS: (Obs - 20 Nov 50)
At NAMPUNG RI the 568th and 588th Units joined the 401st unit. The 568th Unit had a total strength of about 150. PW heard from the troops of 568th and 588th Units that all units in the area were to assemble at SINGALPAJIN.

11. MORALE:
In spite of political leaders' propaganda, there was no signs of the NKA being victorious. Consequently, the morale was very low. Troops called themselves stragglers.
Troops were fed three times daily (800 grams) if the situation permitted.

12. PUBLIC OPINION:
The attitude of the people towards the NKA was very bad in NAMPUNG RI area. PW heard people complain that the NKA confiscated food, clothing and money.

13. ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE 401st UNIT:
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE 401st UNIT


For the AC of S, G-2:

SHORT

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