ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1173 19 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0802) 18 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | PAK Sang Sin (朴商信) (박상신) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63 NK 3070 |
| RANK: | Pvt (戰士) |
| AGE: | 19 |
| DUTY: | Artilleryman |
| UNIT: | 15th Div, Artillery Regt, 3rd Bn, 9th Btry |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (4 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Farming |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | IMP’O DONG (林浦洞) (1190-1440) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 14 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | KANGWONDO, CHOLWON GUN, TAEKWANG MYON, MAYONG RI, SAMKU, 999 (江原道 鐵原郡 大光面 馬用里 三区 999番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | TAKESAKO (FEAF) |
PW was in good physical condition and seemed glad that the war was over for him. He lost all desire to fight after reading the propaganda leaflet at SONSAN (善山).
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
| 15 Apr 50: | Inducted into the Communist Youth Organization at CH’ORWON GUN (鐵原郡). Transferred on same day te NAJIN where PW received artillery basic training. |
| 1 Jun 50: | Transferred to the 15th Div, Artillery Regt, 3rd Bn, 9th Btry at NAJIN. |
| 22 Jun 50: | Regt moved by train to CH’ORWON. |
| o/a 4 Jul 50: | Regt moved by trucks to YOJU (驪州) via CH’UNCH’ON (春川). |
| o/a 12 Jul 50: | Regt departed fer CH'UNGJU (忠州). |
| o/a 20 Jul 50: | 3rd Bn of the Artillery Regt fired first rounds (place unknown). |
| o/a 1 Aug 50: | Regt arrived in KUMCH’ON (金泉). |
| 3 Aug 50: | The Artillery Regt which was supporting the 7th Div up to this point, was detached and transferred to SONSAN (善山) where all personnel were engaged for 11 days in the repair of bridges and the construction of gasoline-drum rafts. Four days after the Regt’s departure from SONSAN, the 3rd Bn, Artillery Regt engaged in combat for its fifth time, supporting the 7th Regt of the 15th Div. The other two battalions were unable to participate in this battle because they were held up by UN aircraft attacks. After the reorganization of this artillery regt, the unit moved to KUNWI (軍威) sometime during the first week of Sep where they remained for three days. The Regt then moved to YONGCH'ON for 4 days. |
| 14 Sep 50: | PW was captured at IMP’O DONG. |
Unit Organization and strength:
1. Original organization & strength: 3rd Bn, 15th Div, Artillery Regt was composed of three (3) batteries designated 7th, 8th, and 9th. The 9th Battery was equipped with 4 x 122-mm M1938 Howitzers and 4 x 14.5mm PTR-41 AT rifles. Battery strength was 4 officers of which the ranking officer was a Lt, and 81 EM. The other two batteries were each equipped with 4 x 76mm M1942 guns.
2. Last known composition of unit: 12 Sep 50, IMP’O DONG. The strength of the 9th Battery had dwindled to 45 men. Two guns were lost enroute, one through lack of transportation; the other fell in a ditch. The total Bn strength was 122 officers and men.
Equipment:
Original composition of 1st and 2nd Bns same as 3rd Bn.
Unit History:
The 9th Battery, 3rd Bn, 15th Div Artillery was reprimanded at NAJIN because it was unable to accomplish its mission in the given one month period (Objective unknown to PW).
Intentions:
According to a squad leader, the reason that depleted units did not receive replacements, although inexperienced recruits were available, was that they would be ineffective in the coming battle. The original plan of the 15th Division Artillery (Regiment) was after the engagement at IMP’O DONG to advance to PUSAN via P’OHANG-DONG (浦項洞).
Personalities:
Div Arty Regimental Commander prior to arrival at SONSAN, was a Lt Col KIM Yon Sop (金連燮), who became a casualty and was subsequently replaced by a major. 3rd Bn Commander, a Captain CHANG Sang Yol (長相烈) became a casualty before the unit's arrival to KUNWI. He was replaced by another captain. The PW's platoon leader, a Jr Lt KIM Kui Ch’on (金貴千), was transferred to the 8th Battery, became its CO and subsequently was promoted to Lt (中尉).
Morale and propaganda:
Privates and corporals felt the effect of US propaganda leaflets and desired to surrender. In PW's case he saw his first leaflet at SONSAN and lost all desire to continue fighting. The leaflets, however, with the exception of a handful of NCO's had almost no effect on officers and NCO's. Even immediately prior to the unit's engagement at IMP’O DONG, most of the NCO's and all of the officers were prepared to give a good account of themselves.
Because of the disruption of supply lines, almost no supplies reached the regiment. The unit lived off the land from SONSAN on. For the engagement at IMP’O DONG, each gun had a supply of 12 rds. Only six shells were fired from the PW's gun due to harrassing aerial attacks.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
