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IM Chin Sun 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 6 NO. 1149 1950-09-14
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1149 17 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0787) 16 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: IM Chin Sun (林鎭順) (임진순)
PW NUMBER: None
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 17
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: 1st Div, 1st Regt, 3rd Bn, 1st Co, 1st Plt, 1st Sqd
EDUCATION: None
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: 4 km S of KASAN Castle (1150.9-1451.4)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 14 Sep 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: HWANGHAEDO, YONPAEK GUN, KUMSAN MYON, TAEHA-RI, #3009 (黃海道 延白郡 錦山面 大河里 三00九)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Sgt HAYASHIDA (ATIS)


2. ASSESSMENT:
Subject was cooperative but is extremely unintelligent. Subject is illiterate and cannot carry on an intelligent conversation. Subject had a slight wound on his forehead and it is possible that it has affected his mental capacity. Not recommended for further interrogation. Reliability poor

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
Chronology:
1 Aug 50: Inducted into NKPA at SARIWON (沙里院). Approx 1,000 men were inducted.
2 Aug 50: 700 men issued uniforms. Departed SARIWON by rail. Disposition of 300 men unknown. The 700 men were unarmed.
5 Aug 50: Enroute, at NAMCH'ON (南川) o/a 05600 Aug 50, the train was strafed by 8 US aircraft and about 100 men were killed or wounded. The attack occured about 2 km NW of NAMCH’ON. During the attack subject observed the destruction of an ammunition dump situated in the hills approx 2 km SW of the NAMCH’ON RR Station. Amount of ammunition destroyed unknown.
9 Aug 50: 600 men arrived at SEOUL, detrained, and marched south. The men were unarmed and were escorted by 5 armed NKPA troops. PW did not see any NKPA troops in SEOUL. The troops did not carry any rations or other supplies.
O/a 10 Aug 50: Approx 500 men arrived 2 km N of the KASAN (架山) Castle where they were all assigned to the 1st Regt, 1st Div. Enroute from SEOUL, the group did not sustain any air attacks but suffered a loss of about 80 men through desertions. PW does not remember route cf march from SEOUL but vaguely remembers the place names CHUNGJU (忠州), MUNGYONG (聞慶) and HAMCHANG (咸昌). Upon assignment to the 1st Regt the men were issued used but serviceable weapons. The entire 1st Regt was assembled at the above location. The strength of the Regt including the 500 replacements was approx 800 men.
o/a 11 Aug 50: 1st and 2nd Companies, 3rd Bn were ordered to march south, objective unknown. Remaining units of the 1st Regt remained at the above location. The 1st and 2nd Companies marched south through the castle enclosure to a ridge approx 2 km south of the castle. At this point at about 2000 hrs, the 2nd Co was ordered to proceed further south while the 1st Co remained at the position, The 2nd Co proceeded south to a point approx 5 km S of the castle and was ambushed by UN forces. In the ensuing battle the strength of the 2nd Co was reduced from 60 to 14 men. The remaining 14 men retreated to the position of the 1st Co. At about 2200 hrs, the 1st Co, with the 14 men from 2nd Co, proceeded southeast from its position to a point about 5 km SSE of the castle where it was also ambushed. The engagement lasted for two hours until about 2400 hrs. At the end of the engagement, the combined strength of the 1st and 2nd Co was about 50 men. Prior to the engagement, the strength of the 1st Co was approx 70 men. When the engagement ended, subject remained concealed. He then became separated from his unit.
12 Aug 50: Subject taken prisoner by Americans.


Morale:
Morale of the troops was very low. The men were aware that the majority of them were untrained and that the units were understrength. Consequently, the men were very reluctant to become involved in aggressive warfare. Some of the men refused to advance while the unit was under fire and subject saw three men of his plt being killed by his platoon leader for this reason. The unit commander had much difficulty in controlling the troops under fire because the inexperienced men were panicky.

Equipment:
Subject did not see any tanks, artillery or mortars. The only equipment PW has seen during his service with the 1st Regt were rifle, SMG’s, LMG’s and HMG’s.

Supply:
No information is available on source or methods of supply. Upon assignment to the 1st Regt, each man was issued 2 grenades and 70 rounds. Much of the ammunition was taken from casualties.

Currency information:
Extent of usage: The people of N. Korea had unquestioned faith in the value of their currency and it was used as the standard medium of exchange. Some of the prices as of 1 Aug 50 were as follows:
1 kilogram of beef - 90 won
1 pans of cotton trousers - 900-1000 won

For the Commanding Officer:

WEELDREYER

Executive

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