ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1133 17 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0770) 15 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | AN Son Ho (安善鎬) (안선호) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63 NK 900 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| AGE: | 28 |
| DUTY: | Ammo bearer |
| UNIT: | 7th Div, 3rd Regt, 3rd Bn, 82 mm Mortar Co |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School 4 yrs |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | Approx 2 km S NAM River-NAKTONG River junction (1140-1370) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 10 1100 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HWANGHAEDO, YONBAEK GUN, HWASONG MYON, HONGOK NI, #232 (黃海道 延白郡 花城面 鴻谷里 二三二番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Sfc INOMOTO (ATIS) |
PW had very limited information. Firmly believes that UN Safe Conduct Passes will greatly accelerate surrender of NKPA troops.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
| 2 Jul 50: | An estimated 200, including PW, inducted at SARlWON. Departed this date by rail. |
| 3 Jul. 50: | 40, including PW, detrained at HAEJU. Disposition of remainder (160) unknown. 40 assigned to the 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt, 7th Div. 2nd Bn of the 3rd Regt was also stationed at HAEJU. 1st Bn had already departed from HAEJU, by this date. PW assigned to a 82mm Mortar squad as an ammo bearer. 3rd Bn, strength approx 690, all fresh conscripts except for officers. 60% of Bn issued weapons. PW's training included close order drill, rifle marksmanship and service of the 82 mm mortar. |
| 28 Jul 50: | 3rd Bn departed HAEJU by rail. 2nd Bn had already departed by this date. |
| 30 Jul 50: | 3rd Bn detrained just north of SEOUL, at a station called SUSAEK (水色). RR line was disrupted by aerial bombing beyond this point. 3rd Bn marched the rest of the way. |
| 15 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn arrived CHINJU. |
| 17 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn departed CHINJU. |
| 22 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn. arrived UIRYONG. |
| 25 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn departed UIRYONG. It was reported at this time that HAMAN was beseiged by unidentified NKPA unit. |
| 27 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn arrived approx 4 km W HAMAN. |
| 30 Aug 50: | 3rd Bn marched HAMAN and headed southeast. |
| 82 mm Mortar Co set up its mortar in line, on the reverse slope of a mountain, with 15 m interval between mortars. | |
| 31 Aug 50: | Rifle companies of 3rd Bn launched a pro-dawn attack towards MASAN but the attack disintegrated, after two hours, under powerful UN counterattacks. At time of PW’s escape north, 3rd Bn’s mortar positions were being overrun by UN infantrymen. |
| 8 Sep 50: | PW, alone since 31 Aug 50, had slowly headed north, intending to escape by crossing the NAM River north of HAMAN. Decided to surrender after reading a UN Safe Conduct Pass which he picked up somewhere north of HAMAN. Headed toward NAKTONG River on the assumption that UN Forces would probably be situated near river. |
| 10 Sep 50: | Waving the pass, PW walked up to a ridge line occupied by US Forces (F Co area, 35th RCT). |
Strength (as of 31 Aug 50):
3rd Bn approx 690. Note: PW's Co sustained a loss of 50% in the last operation, which brought strength down to approx 30.
Equipment (as of 31 Aug 50):
82mm Mortar Co - 3 x 82mm Mortar.
Note: 3rd Bn started off with 6 x 82 mm mortar in Co but 3 Mortars were destroyed by aerial bombing at CHANGUNDONG (1110-1350) while on the march. No NKPA tanks observed in the CHINJU-HAMAN sector.
Armor:
30 Jul 50 - Observed 20 x STALIN tanks on flat cars (1 tank per flatcar) at the SUSAEK RR yard. Tanks were lashed to the cars by heavy ropes and were camouflaged with leaves. PW seemed certain that tanks were of the JS type, upon being shown photos of the STALIN tanks. Observed tanks from a distance of about 800-1,000 m.
4. GENERAL:N. Korean Currency Info :
Extent of its usage - The average N. Korean farmer lived almost entirely off his farm for his daily subsistence. In order to purchase necessary food and household items, farmers sold their produce at the market. However, due to the low purchasing power of the average N. Korean, a farmer barely earned 500 won from sales per month. Out of this profit, an average farmer had to pay various taxes to the government which ran up to about 300 won per month. One can safely assume that the usage of currency in N. Korea is very limited and currency is practically useless except for paying taxes. Rice showed a rise in May 50 from 640 NK won to 800 NK won a large “mal”.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
