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KIM Il Chin 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 6 NO. 1138 1950-09-11
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1138 17 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0776) 15 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: KIM Il Chin (金日鎭) (김일진)
PW NUMBER: 63 NK 869
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 23
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: 2nd Div, 17th Regt, 2m Bn, 4th Co
EDUCATION: Primary School (6 yrs)
OCCUPATION: Paper mill guard & investigator
PLACE OF CAPTURE: 2 km South of CH’ANGNYONG (1140-1390)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 11 Sep 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: CH’UNCH’ONG PUKTO, OKCH’ON GUN, IWON MYON, CHIGYONG NI #328 (忠淸北道 沃川郡 伊院面 池亭里)
HOME ADDRESS: SEOUL, YONGDUNGP’OKU, YANGP’YONG DONG, #403-36 (서울市 永登浦区 陽坪洞 四0三에三六)
INTERROGATOR: MORI DAFC (FEAF)


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was in good physical condition and had friendly attitude. He worked as a Security Guard at the YONGSANKOKGCHAKSO CHEJI KONGJYAN (龍山工作所 製紙工場) paper mill of SEOUL, from Mar 46 to 27 Jun 50. As a guard he was also an active member of TAEHANNOCH’ON (大韓勞總) ROK Govt Labor Bureau, as asst investigator at this factory. His duty was to guard the factory and also investigate or arrest communists working in the factory.
When the NKPA captured SEOUL, PW returned to his home in CH’UNCH’ONG PUKTO (忠淸北道). After being inducted in the NKPA PW was ordered to charge up a hill near CH’ANGNYONG without any arms. PW voluntarily surrendered to US Forces after reading a Safe Conduct Leaflet. His Co was almost entirely annihilated by US machine gun fire.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
Chronology:
When SEOUL was captured by the NKPA, PW returned to his home in CH’UNCH’ONG PUKTO but again returned to SEOUL 14 Aug 50. He. was here caught by one of the Communist Party members he had arrested when he was a member of the TAEHANKOCH’ONG (大韓勞總) ROK Govt Labor Bureau and escaped before they were able to bring him before a Peoples Court. He again returned to his home and, this time, caught by the Home Defense Unit and forced to join the Supply troops 2 Sep 50. They assured him of the safety of his relatives.
Departed OKCH'ON (沃川) on foot with 200 men and arrived at POUN (報恩) 3 Sep 50. At this town the 200 joined with 550 men also from OKCH'ON, and 750 men from CH'ONGJU (淸州). Approx 50% of the 1,500 men were volunteers. Departed POUN 4 Sep 50 on foot and arrived HWANGGAN (潢江) 5 Sep 50. Departed HWANGGAN 5 Sep 50 on foot arrived KUMCH’ONG (金泉) 6 Sep 50. Departed 6 Sep 50 by foot arrived SANGJU (尙州) 7 Sep 50. Departed 7 Sep 50 by foot arrived KORYONG (高靈) 8 Sep 50. Departed 8 Sep 50 by foot arrived HYOPCH’ON (陜川) 9 Sep 50.
Crossed the NAKTONG River the night of 9 Sep 50 with 200 men. Destination of other 1,300 men unknown. Received uniforms which were taken from dead NKPA troops and assigned to the 2nd Div, 17th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co. Approx 50 men carried ammo boxes made of firewood, 30 x 30 x 10 cm, to road sides of POGONG-NI and rented here the day of 10 Sep 50. US aircraft dropped leaflets. Most all members of unit read these leaflets. PW from that time on waited for a chance to desert from the NKPA.
On night of 10 Sep 50 departed for hills toward CH'ANGNYONG (昌寧) with 100 men, of which group of eight were guarded by two older members of the NKPA armed with PPsh M1941 SMG. The men who had volunteered with this supply troop were given hand grenades but no rifles. Other men who were forced to join were not given any arms. Their order was to shout MANSEI aloud, so that the US Forces would retreat. The US Forces opened up with machine gun fire on this hill and most of the 100 unarmed men were killed. PW escaped to the foot of the hill and with two other men surrendered to the US Forces the following day.

Disposition:
Ammunition was crated in wooden boxes and stored alongside roads. No further information. No information on higher headquarters.

Communications:
Roads and trails were in fair condition but details were unknown as PW travelled only at night. All bridges were destroyed and PW used NIP Ponton bridge rafts to cross the NAKTONG River.

Intentions:
PW heard from older members of the 2nd Div that the Div was to fight until they captured MIRYANG via CH'ANGNYONG and, there, wait for further orders, No further information.

Morale and Propaganda:
Morale of the 2nd Div was low as most experienced men were killed and the new soldiers recruited in occupied areas had to be guarded by the regular NKPA soldiers with SMG so that they would not escape. Also the new soldiers were not given arms. Unit also faced a severe shortage of food and equipment. All men were quite fatigued. PW believed that most soldiers drafted in occupied ROK areas would surrendered after reading the UN Safe Conduct Leaflet if they had the chance as PW did.
PW was told that the NKPA had already captured all of KOREA including PUSAN and they were only cleaning out the small US troops still fighting in the vicinities of TAEGU and MASAN. He was also told that the NKPA air force and the NK Navy had attained a great victory in the capture of PUSAN. The American troops are mistreating the SK women. PW stated that the soldiers drafted in occupied ROK areas did not believe this propaganda but troops from NK were inclined to believe it.

For the Commanding Officer:

WEELDREYER

Executive

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