포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2591　7 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (Ⅸ CORPS - LDI - 0179)　20 November 1950

PW was cooperative and willingly gave information which was limited due to lack of education and his short military service. Not recommended for further interrogation.

PW was drafted at a village called YONGMON-NI, He received 2 months basic training at the Youth Training Center at HAERYON (会寧), after which, he was sent to P’YONGYANG and assigned to the food section of the National Rehabilitation and Relief Committee, a committee, which was part of the Youth Training Center. He worked there for 4 months and was sent to NAJIN (FB 0973) where he became a cook of the training center loca ted there. O/a 10 Jul, he became a Jr Lt and was assigned as a mess officer to the 18th Brig, 120mm Mortar Bn, then located in CHORWON.

Brig departed CHORWON by train Aug 50, and arrived SEOUL 15 Aug 50. O/a 10 Sep 50 Brig was redesignated the 18th Div. PW reassigned to the 3rd Bn, 2nd. Regt of the Div. 18th Div remained in SEOUL until 20 Sep 50, its defensive positions being along the HAN River.

O/a 25 Sep, PW escaped to CHORWON via UIJONGBU (CS2778) and YONCH’ON (CT3116) and arrived there around the 13th of Oct. He departed CHORWON on 14 Oct for YONGHON-NI, his home town, and took refuge there until 20 Oct when he surrendered to the Security Force on 8 Nov 50.

O/a 10 Jul 50, when P was assigned to the 18th Brig as a mess officer, it consisted of 6 Bns. PW believed that the strength of the Div after its de feat at SEOUL was 6,000 men.

Arms and ammunition of the 18th Div as of 20 Sep 50 were as follows: 4,000 Russian rifles with 100 rounds ammo each, 5×120mm mortars, 10×82mm Mortars, 5×AT guns.

Food was very scarce because of enemy air and artillery fire.

Communication by messengers or runners.

There were no trucks in PW’s Bn or Regt. However, there were 6 to 7 trucks in the 18th Div that were used in transporting food and ammunition

While PW was in CHORWON from 8 Oct to 13 Oct, the advance headquarters of the North. Korean People’s Army was located there. 20 officers and 30 to 40 enlisted men were observed, while the highest ranking officer observed was a major general (name unknown) who he believed was the CG of this Hq.

It was the mission of this Hq to assemble all stragglers in retreat northward who were later reorganized and sent to the front.

He observed that all the officers were armed with pistols, while the enlisted men were armed with rifles (with about 50 rounds per rifle).

Present disposition and/or location of the North Korean People’s Army Hq is unknown.

500 troops of an unknown unit were observed at CHONGIM-NI (BU-7354) o/a 20 Oct. These troops were armed with Russian rifles with 100 rounds and 2 hand grenades, re treated north when UN Forces arrived.

Prior to his surrender, he heard from the security force that an unknown number of troops of an unknown unit were in the vicinity of the gold mine in SUNGIN-YON (BU-8232). These stragglers came down to the village frequently for food.

PW believed that the 18th Div was rendered impotent, as a combat unit, by enemy air and arty fire at SEOUL, with practically all of its arms and equipment damaged or destroyed.

CG 18th Div: KIM Hun (金흥), Major General, age approx 60.

CO 2nd Regt: CHOE, Yong Ho (崔用鎬), Lt Col, age 27.

The morale of PW’s unit was very low which resulted from loss of many troops, arms and equipment and because they realized they were fighting a losing war.

After they were defeated at the front PW was told that it was a strategic withdrawal necessitated by lack of air support. They were assured repeatedly that they would win at the and because they were fighting for a righteous cause. They were also told daily that they will be killed if captured by the enemy.

For the AC of S, G-21: