본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
sidemenu open/close

CHEN, Chin-Ching 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 20 NO. 2573 1950-11-11
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2573 7 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - LDI - 1238) 20 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
NAME: CHEN, Chin-Ching (陳金淸) (Chinese)
RANK: Pvt
ORGN: 8th Army, 2nd Div, 338th Regt, 1st Bn, HMG Co, 1st Plat, 2nd Sqd
DUTIES: Ammo bearer
EDUCATION: 6 months
AGE: 20
OCCUPATION: Farm hand
ADDRESS: CHINA, KWANGTUNG SHENG, CHINGYUAN HSIEN, SAN-KENG, SHIH- YANGTSUN (中國 廣東省 靑遠縣 三坑石瀁村)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 110900 1 Nov 50 at NAM DONG
INTERROGATOR: G.W.


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was willing and cooperative; he was limited in knowledge of army organization, personalities, and education. One reason for his willingness to speak freely was that he was treated as an outcast. He does not know the dialect of the troops with whom he served and was therefore miserable in his short service with the 38th Army. Hence, when there was someone who was able to converse with him in his own dialect, Cantonese, he was more than happy to tell all.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH OF:
38th Army was composed of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions.
2nd Div was composed of 337th, 338th and 339th Regiments and a Arty Bn, mountain type.
338th Regt was composed of 3 Rifle Bn’s and each battalion 3 Rifle Companies and a HMG Company.
1st Plat, HMG Co:
a. Personnel: 1 Officer and 51 EM
b. Equipment & ammo:
3 Model 38 Jap rifles (80 rds per rifle) (carried by Sqd Ldrs)
3 HMGS (1500 rds each)
HMG Co, 1st Bn:
a. Personnel: 7 Officers and 163 EM
b. Equipment & ammo:
Two Plats of HMG, cal .30 US, 3 guns each, or total of 6 HMG with 1500 rds per gun.
One Plat of US 81mm mortars with 3 mortars (120 rds per mortar).
One rocket launcher (size unk) for each plat (mortar plat). Number of rounds unknown.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS:
Unknown unit of undetermined strength located at NAMDONG up to 7 Nov 50 then they moved west (direction away from morning sun).
PW’s 1st Bn marched for ten (10) nights prior to arriving at NAMDONG. 7 Nov 50 they also moved in the same direction toward the hills. Reason for moving was to escape air and artillery attacks.

5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
PW was conscripted into the Nationalist 63rd Army in Jan 1949 and was sent to HAINAN Island via CANTON. PW was captured at that island on March 1950 by the Communist 40th Army. Only those who were able to escape by boat were not captured. Of the three (3) Nationalist Armies, 62nd, 63rd and 32nd, that defended HAINAN, at least one half were captured. The PW, together with those captured were returned to CHINA via LIU-CHOU peninsula to CANTON. PW was told that all were to be released to their homes, but to his dismay, he discovered that only those over 40 years were released, and those under 40 years old were forced (at gan point) to board a northbound train from CANTON. They passed through CHANG SHA (長沙), HANKOU (漢口), TIENTSIN (天津), PEIPING (北京) and detrained at KAI-YUAN (開遠), MANCHURIA during the latter part of May 1950.
After reaching HANKOU, the PW was told that there will be no more war. All men were being sent to MANCHURIA.
The PW heard that those former Nationalists of the 62nd, 63rd and 32nd Armies who were captured at HAINAN were, redesignated and incorporated into the Communist 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies at KAIYUAN. It was at KAIYUAN that the PW was hand-picked by an officer and assigned to his present organization, May 1950.
PW‘s Regt (338th Regt) crossed the YALU River by train midnight 26 Oct 50, crossed a bridge into KOREA, and detrained at an unknown city in KOREA soon after crossing the river (length of time in travel could not be estimated). PW described the bridge as over 100 meters long, one section is for rail travel while the other section is only for pedestrian crossing.
To the PW’s knowledge, the entire 38th Army had departed from KAIYUAN (a great staging area) for KOREA o/a 24 Oct 50.
The PW was unable to trace his route of march in KOREA.

6. FOOD & AMMO SUPPLIES:
Food in CHINA:
Per Week - Two (2) meals of white rice, 3 meals of noodles the rest of the meals during the week consisted of millet. Only two meals were served daily.

Food in KOREA:
Not regularly fed; sometimes 2 meals per day, sometimes one; then at other times, none. Type of meals depended on what could be acquired from the natives. Sometimes rice was obtained, other times, millet or soybeans.

How Food Was Obtained:
Commanders would go to the head of a village and borrow from that village whatever they could accept in whatever quantity the natives could spare.

Amount on Hand - None

Clothing:
One summer uniform and one winter uniform, both worn on the person; nothing else.

Ammunition:
Nothing except the original issue at the time of crossing into KOREA. Ammunition in his own HMG Sqd consisted of:
 OriginalPresent
Issued: 15001050
Fired :  200


7. ARMOR & ARTILLERY:
Most feared are US planes and artillery, including mortar fire. This was the reason for his battalion’s moving to the hills toward the west. Other weapons such as tanks and MG’s are also feared.

8. MORALE:
a. Difficulties:
Always on the march at night, few rests and no sleep. If a soldier is unable to go on any longer, others help him carry his equipment and keep him moving.
Hardly any food to eat.
During the day, always afraid of American planes.
PW is supposed to receive 80,000 Yuan per month while in CHINA, but he has never received a cent as his Co commander deducted for food and other necessities.
There is one former Nationalist soldier to three Communist soldiers throughout the 38th Army. Everyone of the former Nationalist soldiers would escape if he had an opportunity to do so. In the PW’s particular case, he just remained behind without being discovered, when his company moved toward the hills.

9. GENERAL INFORMATION:
a. No tanks in the 2nd Division.
b. There was only one (1) battalion of mountain artillery (drawn by horses, four pieces (116mm and 120mm).
c. In CHINA, the three (3) Armies, 38th, 39th, 40th altogether had one motor (Transportation) regiment, In KOREA, the PW knows nothing of this motor regiment (he had never seen any motor vehicles in KOREA).
d. No chemicals, such as smoke gas or poison gas observed.
e. All those who had escaped from HAINAN went to FORMOSA. Only one (1) Army Commander was captured. He was Maj Gen CHEN Chih-chung (陳左中), CG, 62nd Army.
f. Soviet Advisers:
There were no Soviet advisers in the PW’s Division.
g. Communications:
One (1) telephone to each battalion.
No radios.
3 runners per company.
1 VERY pistol to each Company, red flares only, meaning the start of a jump-off.
h. Security Forces:
One platoon constitutes a reconnaissance unit for the Regt. It includes 20 men and one officer. Their mission is to reconnoiter and report enemy dispositions.
i. Movements:
Movements are always at night. Never occupied buildings or dwellings.
J. Propaganda:
The officers of the company disseminated propaganda. They always maintained that CHIANG-Kai-Shek’s soldiers ruined the common people of CHINA.
One day after crossing the YALU River, the PW was told that there are three groups of soldiers in KOREA fighting the North Koreans. These soldiers, after conquering North KOREA will be in good position to attack CHINA. These groups are the CHIANG-Kai-Shek troops, the South Korean troops and the American troops. The PW was further told that he is now in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and that he must help to fight these three groups tn keep them from attacking CHINA. If he lets himself be captured, he would surely be killed by his enemies.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

페이지 상단으로 이동하기