ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2590 7 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (Ⅸ CORPS - LDI - 0175) 18 November 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| NAME: | CHON Jin Ching (陳金淸) |
| AGE: | 20 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| DUTY: | Ammo Carrier |
| UNIT: | 38th Army, 2nd Div, 338th Regt, 1st Bn, HNG Co, 1st Plat, 2nd Sqd |
| DATE OF CAPTURS, PLACE: | 110900I Nov 50 vic of NAM-DONG (XE8407) |
| CIVIL OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| EDUCATION: | None |
PW was cooperative during interrogation and the information obtained seems fairly reliable. However, PW was very vague as to names of places and dates. He spoke in the Cantonese dialect which made it very difficult for the interpreter. Further interrogation is not re commended.
3. ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, AND DISPOSITION:PW was a rifleman with the Chinese Nationalist Army from Jan 49 to Jun 50 at HAINAN Island, After its capture by the CCF, all men between the ages 18 - 30 were conscripted into the 40th Army of the CCF and were shipped by train, including FW to KAIWEN, MANCHURIA, arriving there o/a 26 Jun 50. There they were assigned to the 38th Army. PW himself was further assigned to the Heavy Weapons Company, 1st Bn, 338th Regt, 2nd Div and received 3 months of basic and combat training.
O/a 23 Oct 50, the whole 2nd Div departed KAIWEN and arrived at an unknown point in the vicinity of YALU River and remained there overnight. O/a 272100I Oct 50, PW’s 338th Regt crossed into KOREA on a train over a single track railroad bridge. After disembarking from train at a unknown place 280300I Oct 50, his Regt marched for 5 nights (direction of travel unknown, route unknown) and after making contact an enemy force, the Regt advanced up to 7 Km. While consolidating their position at an unknown place, PW’s company was hit by enemy artillery dispersing the troops. PW himself lost contact with his company, and remained in the hills for 4 days after which he surrendered to ROK forces who appeared nearby.
The 38th Army consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions. Although the strength of the 2nd Div was unknown, PW said that it was composed of the 338th Regt and two other Regts. 338th Regt strength was approximately 2,000 men. Each Bn had 3 Inf Co’s (strength 180) and one Heavy Weapons Co (strength l30), which was composed of 2 HMG Plats (strength 17 each), a Mort Plat with 3 Sqd (strength 17 each), and Hq Plat of 20 mem.
PW believed that the area occupied by the Bn was in the hills located in the vicinity of NAM-DONG (YD5393). Whether his Bn was still situated in this area vas unknown to PW be cause an advance was made against the enemy o/a 6 Nov. Locations of the Bn, Regt, and Div CPs were unknown to the PW.
During PW’s one day stay near the border, they were told by their Co CO that 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies will also be committed in North KOREA soon.
4. MISSION:His Co CO had told them that the South Koreans had attacked North KOREA and were occupying North KOREA for a possible invasion of MANCHURIA. MAO Tse Tung then had issued orders to his troops to repel the enemy in KOREA. As such their mission was to attack and destroy the enemy before it approaches MANCHURIA.
5. ENEMY SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:a. Supply:
When PW left MANCHURIA they were given 5 days ration which consisted of Kaoliang and Biscuits. These rations were consumed with in 5 days after he arrived in KOREA. Presently food consists of corn bought from Korean villagers with ration tickets.
Prior to leaving MANCHURIA, the supply of ammunition issued were: 6 cases (250 rounds each) per LMG, 40 rounds per 60mm mortar, 80 rounds per rifle. Machine gunners and, mortar men were issued one grenade each, while each rifleman was allotted four grenades. Subsequent to the initial issue there was no resupply.
b. Equipment:
Each infantry company had 9 LMG’s, three 60mm mortars, and rifles. Squad and ass’t squad leaders were equipped with SMG, platoon leader, political officers, and company commanders, with pistols.
PW stated that field phones were used for communication at and above Bn level. Runners were used at or below company level.
PW said all equipment was carried by the troops on their backs.
6. ENEMY LOSSES:PW saw 6 destroyed trucks on roadside (location unknown).
7. MISCELLANEOUS:a. Method of Movement:
PW stated that all movement was done under darkness in company formations. While travelling toward' the front line he stated each company had a North Korean guide (soldier) who spoke Chinese.
b. Method of Camouflage:
After moving up to the front, foxholės were dug usually in a wooded area so that it could not be detected from the air.
c. Morale:
PW stated morale was low among troops because many of them have not seen their families for a long time and desired very much to go heme.
For the AC of S, G-2:
IIDA
