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KIM P’yo Jon 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 10 NO. 1520 1950-09-22
    소위 고등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1520 30 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0940) 28 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: KIM P’yo Jon (金表銓) (김표전)
PW NUMBER: 63 NK 6921
RANK: Jr Lt (少尉)
AGE: 21
DUTY: Radio Plt Leader
UNIT: 13th Div, 23rd Regt, Signal Co, Radio Plt
EDUCATION: P’yongyang Technical College (3 yrs)
OCCUPATION: Student
PLACE OF CAPTURE: TABU-DONG (多富洞) (1140-1460)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 22 Sep 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: PYONGAN PUKTO, CH’ONGJU GUN, KALSAN MYON, SOSAN RI, #253 (平安北道 定州郡 葛山面 西山里 二五三番地)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: TAKESAKO (FEAF)


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was of average intelligence and certainly had no will to fight. He was cooperative and extremely talkative.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
Training of officer candidate at No 1 OCS (第一軍官學校) P’YONGYANG.
Normally, men who make a superb showing in training are selected as officer candidates without regard to educational background on the average of one man per battalion. Since the outbreak of war, however, the requirements have dropped considerably to the extent that men were almost picked at random as long as they: were politically reliable. The average course in peacetime was one year but this has been reduced to about one month. When PW attended this school (Jul 50) the total. number of students had increased to more than 4,000 from a peacetime peak of less than 3,000.
The students were assigned to various school bns depending upon their background, i.e., Heavy Weapons Bn, Engineer Bn, Artillery Bn, Infantry Bn, Signal Bn. Each course has been reduced to two to four weeks. PW was assigned to the Radio Company, Signal Bn. PW's is training covered subjects such as radio and wireless operation and wire communication in Morse code. Practically all the studies were conducted with the P 5 M set. The course of the radio Co, numbering 100 officer Candidates, was two months, but after 1 month, 26 days of study when PW was commissioned about 65% had already been graduated. Students were commissioned after two weeks study.
As a result of this drastic reduction of study, a good percentage of the later graduates (with the exception of those from the Signal Co in that most had previous experience and training) went to the front lacking in self-confidence as far as the technical phases of their mission was concerned. Most were commissioned Jr Lt upon graduation but many with political. backing were able to obtain commissions as hight as Sr Lts (大尉). The PW saw two or three Soviet Lt Colonels advisors with the Signal Bn.
Disposition of PW's own unit as of 20 Sep 50 and subsequent events:
As of the evening of 20 Sep 50 the 13th Div occupied a front covering approx 3 km just 2 km south of TABU-DONG (多富洞) in the following order: 23rd Regt on the right flank, 21st Regt in the center, and the 19th Regt on the left flank. On 21 Sep 50, the PW learned that the 3rd Div on the right flank of the 13th Div and the 1st Div on the left flank and already withdrawn. On 21 Sep 50 the 23rd Regimental Commander, learning that the 21st Regiment had begun to withdraw ordered the 23rd Regt to begin a withdrawal although no such orders had come down from DIv Hqs. As of 22 Sep 50, the date of PW’s capture, there was no effective force and certainly no line facing the enemy.

For the Commanding Officer;

WEELDREYER

Executive

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