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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1516　30 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0936)　28 September 1950

PW was cooperative and intelligent but lacked tactical information. PW was in good mental and physical condition. Reliability - good.

Apr 36 - Went from home address to TU MEN (圖們), MANCHURIA, to attend the Japanese supervised higher Primacy School.

Apr 36 -Mar 38 - Attended above school

Dec 36 - Dec 42 - Attended LUNGCHUNG (龍井) Middle School.

Dec 42 - Aug 45 - Attended Military Medical School in HARBIN, (Japanese) as an NCO.

10 Aug 45 - Taken prisoner by the Independent. 8th Regt (Dan equivalent to regiment) of the 8th Route Army. Upon being taken prisoner, PW was forced to serve as a medical officer of 8th Regt.

10 Aug 45 - Aug 47 - Served as a medical officer, without rank, in the Independent 8th Regt in HARBIN.

Aug 47 - Designation of the Ind 8th Regt changed to “Korean CHIDAE (支隊) equivalent to regiment). There were approximately 1,400 Koreans in the unit. It was an all Korean unit. Served as a medical officer with the Korean CHIDAE until May 48. Strength of the organization remained unchanged. Stationed in HARBIN.

May 48 - PW was transferred to the 490th Regt, which was then stationed in CH'ANGCH'UN (長春), MANCHURIA. Strength of the organization was approximately 2,000 men, all Koreans.

May 48 - Jul 49 - Served as a medical officer of the 11th Div, 490th Regt. The 11th Div was composed of the 490th, 491st and 492nd Regts. Of the approximate total strength of 8,000 men, about 6,000 men were Koreans. In Oct 48, the 11th Div participated in the battle of CH'ANGCH'UN. Losses sustained were negligible.

O/a 10 Jul 49 - Without any previous word or explanation, the estimated 6,000 Koreans of the 11th Div were loaded on trains at CH'ANGCH'UN. The travel was performed under strict secrecy and all of the window shutters were lowered. PW did not know the destination of the unit, but vaguely sensed that they were to be repatriated to N. KOREA. All of the men carried their individual weapons which for the most part were Japanese Model 99 rifles.

O/a 15 Jul 50 - The 6,000 men from CH’ANGCH'UN arrived at NANAM, and were immediately organized into the 5th NKPA Div.

O/a 15 Jul 49 - Mar 50 - PW with the 10 Regt, 5th Div at NANAM. Other Regts of the 5th Div, the 12th, 13th and Div Arty Regts were also stationed in NANAM. There was no appreciable gain or loss in personnel. The men underwent orientation and were restrained to conform with the NKPA system. PW was given rank of Capt.

10 Mar 50 - PW was transferred to 13th Div, 19th Regt which was then stationed in SINUIJU (新義州).

10 Mar 50 - 20 Jun 50 - PW served as a medical officer with the 19th Regt. 21st Regt was situated in YONGAMP’O and the 23rd Regt was located in South SlNUIJU. The 19th and Div Arty Regts were located in SINUIJU. The units ware understrength and each of the rifle regts had an average of 2,000 men. The 13th Div was activated o/a 1 Mar 50 at the above locations. With the exception of the officers and NCO's all of the men were raw recruits conscripted between 1 Mar 50 and 30 Apr 50. The majority of the company and field grade officers of the division were graduates of the NKPA Military Academy. The greater part of the NCO’s were repatriated soldiers from MANCHURIA. The men were largely recruits between the ages of 18 and. 23 who had received sane military training under the compulsory military training program. Between 10 Mar 50, and 20 Jun 50, the division underwent basic training. Until May 50, the division was following the normal training schedule laid out for the entire year. In mid May 50, the training program was completely revised and accelerated, covering only the training necessary for combat. By 15 Jun 50, all of the men had fired the rifle familiarization course. During the period from 15 Jun 50 to 20 Jun 50, the men were issued individual weapons, ammunition, grenades and other necessary equipment.

Since PW was the Regtl medical officer, he was responsible for the preparation of medical equipment and supplies. Because of the lack of supplies, the regtl medical stock consisted of only the following items at time of departure from SINUIJU on 20 Jun 50:

Aspirin - 500 grams

Sodium Bicarbonade - 1,000 grams

Caffein Nutrium Benzoicum - 40 ampules

Camphor - 80 ampules

Cough medicine - 500 grams

Bismuth - 500 grams

Adsorbine - 500 grams

Tincture of Iodine - 1,500 grams

Mercurochrome - 500 grams

Bandages - 50 dressings

Gauze - 30 meters

Scissors - 2

First Aid lits - 2

There were no other supplies including stretchers or ambulances.

20 Jun SO - Entire 13th Div departed SINUIJU by rail and arrived at YONCH'ON on 23 Jun 50.

23 Jun 50 - Upon arrival, marched south.

25 Jun 50 - Crossed the 38° Parallel following the advance of the 1st Div.

O/a 30 Jun 50 - Arrived SEOUL. Route of march was via MUNSAN and UIJONGBU. Upon arrival at SEOUL, there were no other NKPA units.

O/a 30 Jun 50 - o/a 5 Jul 50 - remained in SEOUL.

O/a 10 Aug 50 - Crossed the NAKTONG River at NAKTONG-Ni. Route of march was via ICH'ON (利川), CH’UNGJU (忠州), MUN’GYONG (聞慶) and SANGJU (尙州). 13th Div fought its first engagement at MUN’GYONG where the 19th Regt lost approx 400 men. When the 13th Div crossed the NAKTOKG River, the strength of the 19th Regt was about 1,500. PW heard that the strength of the 21st Regt was about 1,000 men.

O/a 21 Sep 50 - 19th Regt was located in the KASAN (架山) Castle. Strength of the unit was 80 men. PW promoted to Maj.

21 Sep 50 - PW was ordered by the CO, 19th Regt, to remain at KASAN castle and attend the wounded. PW recruited civilians in the area to evacuate all wounded.

23 Sep 50 - PW arrived at SANGJU. Enroute he commandeered a ration truck with the intention of surrendering to the Americans man he heard were in SANGJU. Upon arrival at the town, PW surrendered.

The 13th Div, as of 21st Sep 50, was not an effective combat unit. The Div was completely decimated and could not possibly be reorganized judging from the remnants or the 19th Regt, numbering about 80 men, and the chaotic conditions which prevailed throughout the area, 21 Sep 50, PW believes that at present if there are any men left from the division, they are scattered and without organization.

The morale of the troops, during the first month of the war, was extremely high. The second month of fighting showed a noticeable decline in morale due to the intensity of enemy aerial activity and superior fire power. PW believes that morale hit the lowest point in the latter part of the second month and that it has not risen since then. From this period to date, the men had been driven forward only by the fear of being shot by their own officers and the more fanatical NCO's. The principal causes of demoralization are listed in the order of their effectiveness: 1. Strafing and rocket fire from low flying aircraft. During this type of attack, even during the first month of the war, the men could not be budged from their concealment by even the most vicious threat of their superiors. Although casualties from this type of attack were negligible, psychological. effect was considerable.

2. Artillery and mar tar fire: This was also a great demoralizing factor because of the great number of casualties it caused. PW estimated that 99% of the unit casualties resulted from enemy artillery and mortar fire.

3. Napalm bombs: Because there was no defense against Napalm bombs and the men in the area were invariably killed, the men as well as the officers always became disorganized under this type of attack.

4. Dead bodies: The NKPA dead were left unattended for days and the men knew that it they should be killed in combat their bodies would be left where they fell. More than this, it raises the primitive instinct of fear of death and after viewing the bodies littered about him, the soldier begins to question the purpose of war.

5. Propaganda Leaflets: Propaganda leaflets have been least effective in causing low morale. The primary reason is that the majority of the men are not able to read and comprehend the contents of the leaflets. The secondary factor is that the majority of the men are kept from reading the leaflets because their officers are invariably alerted during a leaflet drop. Finally, the leaflets fall on the front lines where the troops are too busy fighting. PW believes that to correct this last factor, leaflets should be dropped in the rear of the units. PW believes that loud speakers would be infinitely more effective than leaflets. The troops commanders, i.e. the regimental and battalion commanders have lost all will to fight because of the large number of men who have been wounded or killed under their command. They always speak of the handful of men remaining from the original unit to express their guilt. This was most noticeable during the last week prior to PW’s capture.

The CG of 13th Div departed to II Corps Hqs for a conference o/a 14 Sep 50, and has not been heard of since, consequently, the officers of the division with the exception of the Cultural officers felt that they had been left to die.

Since 15 Sep 50, the 13th Div has not received any supplies. The men had no rations and the lack of food has caused the majority of the men to desert. The remainder of the men were living on wild berries and roots. There was no artillery ammunition. PW heard that the 13th Div had 100 hand grenades on 21 Sep 50.

T O & E, Medical:

Each Rifle Co. - 1 NCO (Med. Tech) and 4 aid men, 1 x First Aid Kit.

Each Rifle Bn - 1 Med Off, 2 NCO (Med Tech) and 4 aid men. 1 horse, emergency First Aid equipment (bandages, morphine, iodine mercurochrome, etc.).

Each Rifle Regt - 1 Medical Off, 3 Administrative Off, 8 NCO (Med Tech), 20 litter bearers, 5 litters, 16 horses, 6 wagons, 8 drivers. Emergency First Aid equipment (equipment necessary for amputation, medicinal goods, bandages, etc).

Actual Organization, 13th Div Medic:

Rifle Co - 1 NCO (lied Tech) only. No equipment.

Rifle Bn - 2 NCO (l:ed Tech) only. No equipment.

Rifle Regt - 2 Medical off, 4 NCO (Med Tech), 20 litter bearers, no issue litters, no horses, no wagons, no drivers. Emergency first aid equipment, less surgical instruments.

The number of personnel assigned to Regt was not sufficient to evacuate or give medical attention to all of the wounded. The front line soldiers were not permitted to carry their wounded to the aid stations. Consequently, it was necessary for all of the medical personnel regardless of rank to collect, attend and evacuate the wounded. The shortage of personnel usually delayed the evacuation of wounded to division hospitals an average of 3 days after being wounded. During this period, only the most serious cases were attended to.

There were no vehicles at regimental level, so farmers were recruited to carry the wounded in make-shift litters to the hospitals. The wounded were evacuated only at night due to air attacks.

Soldiers with flesh wounds were returned to the front immediately after being treated.

PW estimated that the number killed was about the same as the number wounded because of the inadequate medical facilities and personnel. Approx 80% of the men who died of wounds could have been saved if adequate means had been provided.

Most of the medicinal goods were of Korean manufacture. However, most of the modern medications such as penicillin were of American origin. Bandages were for the most part Russian.

Most of the surgical instruments used within the 13th Div were obtained men the unit remained in SEOUL. These were American. A small portion of the instruments were confiscated material of the Japanese Army.

There was an acute shortage of medicinal goods and the amount on band was not sufficient to treat one-half of the patients. Although requisitions were sent to Div Supply, the requests were not acted upon. This was because Division Supply had no source where medical goods could be obtained.

No blood plasma was available in the NKPA medical system. A large number of deaths could have been prevented if it. had been available. Aside from direct transfusion, which was rarely employed, there was no other means of replacing blood.

13th Div - 715

19th Regt; - 717

CH'OE, Yong Jin (崔龍鎭) (최용진)

Maj Gen

40

CG, 13th Div, Soviet Citizen

LEE, Tong Guk (李東國) (이동국)

Lt Col, Medical

32

Division Medical Officer, 13th Div

PAK, Yong Mo (朴英模) (박영모)

Lt Col

29

Cultural Officer, 19th Regt.

Foreign Elements:

l. PW estimated that there were only about two (2) divisions of Koreans who were serving with the CCF. This figure includes the 11th Div to which PW was assigned.

2. PW believes that RUSSIA will not intervene in, the Korean War because to do so would precipitate World War III.

3. PW believes that. the CCF will not participate in the war. There have been no indications either way but it was generally agreed upon among the officers that it is highly improbable.

4. PW was ordered to give cholera immunization shots to all of the men in the 19th Regt in mid-Sep 50. PW did not know the reason for such an order so did not comply.

5. In the summer of 49, there was an epidemic of Japanese "B" Encephalitis in N. KOREA. PW heard that there were 20 deaths in the NKPA. PW has not heard of any immunization shots, experimental or proven, far the disease.

6. The NK Government neither has the facilities nor the personnel to conduct bacteriological warfare research. PW heard that the Russians have made extensive advances in preventive medicine but has not heard anything about the progress of bacteriological warfare research.

For the Commanding Officer;