ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1710 9 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1008) 3 October 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS| PW NAME: | KIM, Ch'ang Ik (金昌益) (김창익) |
| RANK: | Jr Lt (小尉) |
| AGE: | 20 |
| DUTY: | Communications Officer |
| UNIT: | 3rd Div, Signal Bn, 1st Co, Radio Plt (Transceiver) |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 years) Postal Communication (6 mos) Middle School (3 years) |
| OCCUPATION: | Student |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | HWA RYONG JANG (化寧長) (1090-1500) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 28 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HAMGYONG-Nam-Do, HAMHUNG-Shi, NAMHUNG-Ni #141 (咸鏡南道咸興市咸興里一四一番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | HAMGYONGPUKTO, CHONGJINSI, MINJU-R1 #11 (咸鏡北道淸津市民主里十一番地) |
| INTERROGATOR: | S/Sgt NAKAYAMA (FEAF) |
PW was very observant and had a good memory. Was intelligent and spoke freely and did not show any sign of hesitation. He was in a position of responsibility as a communication officer. PW showed no indication of being a Communist sympathizer. He surrendered because he believed that the NKPA is fighting a losing war without any support from RUSSIA, Information is reliable. Further interrogation is not recommended.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
30 Nov 48 - Inducted in NANAM (羅南) and received basic training which consisted of dismounted drill, combat tactics, political indoctrination for 8 months. PW was assigned to 9th Co, 6th Regt, 2nd Div. Total strength of 2nd Div on this date was 12,000-13,000 men.
20 Jul 49 - Thirty men were transferred to P'YONGYANG and assigned to War Ministry, Signal Bn, 2nd Co. PW received further training again, consisting of combat tactics, dismounted drill, political indoctrination, calisthenics and radio telegraph operation. Learned codes and basic electricity, key, and basic maintenance. PW was trained for 7 months in radio telegraph operation and was able to receive 18 words a minute of 5 letters random codes and able to transmit 18 words per minute, The training was the old method and no modern equipment was used. Homemade oscillators of one or two tubes were used for keying and receiving. 25 men of 3rd Plt, 2nd Co, Signal Bn, War Ministry were trained through table not. PW was commissioned Jr Lt here.
25 Feb 50 - PW was sent to P'YONGYANG (平壤) to instruct 34 new students as radio-telegraph operator for 4 months. All the students were able to take fourteen 5 letter random codes a minute, PW and 34 men, upon completion of course, were sent to hills near 380 Parallel. Equipment consisted of 6 x LBEM (P6) transceiver and one LSEBE (PC6) transceiver. LSEBE (PC6) was mounted on a ZIS-5 truck.
LSEBE (PCS) had a transmitting range of 40 km and LBEM had a range of 8 km. Both used 2.8 meter 34 meter antenna.
25 Jun 50 - PW as assigned to 3rd Div, Signal Bn, 1st Go, Radio-telegraph Plt. The Signal Bn had 250 men, All infantry units advanced prior to Signal Bn's departure from P'YONGGANG.
15 Jun 50 - Signal Bn arrived in TAEJON, The Signal Bn was reorganized and 250 men were assigned to various units. 15. men were assigned directly to Div Has as signal men, 6 men assigned: ISEBE, 5 assigned to regiment as regimental signal men, 224 men assigned to other subordinate units. The 3rd Div engaged in battle for 3 days and 40 men from Signal Bn were killed.
19 Jul 50 - 3rd Div, Signal Bn, 1st Co, Radio-Telegraph Plt arrived in YONGDONG (永同), PW engaged in battle for one day. 6 men killed from Signal Bn.
24 Jul 50 - PW and unit arrived in KUMCH'ON (金泉) and engaged in battle for approximately 10 hours. Reorganized the entire Signal Bn.
4 Aug 50 - In YANGMOK (若木) the radio-telegraph Plt 1st Co, Signal Bn, 3rd Div engaged the UN Forces. This engagement was primarily an artillery duel. It lasted for a month and estimated losses in that battle were approximately 100 men in Signal Bn. The total strength as of 4 Sep 50, dwindled to 104 men, 70 replacements without any knowledge of communications were received from N, KOREA.
7 Sep 50 - 3rd Div arrived in PAKKOK-TONG (朴谷洞). 13th Div was holding a position in TABU-DONG about 12 km E of PAKKOK-TONG. 20 men were killed in an artillery duel. Approx 2 km S of WAEGWAN ( ), the 105th Tank Div was holding their position.
20 Sep 50 - The UN Forces combined aerial, artillery, tanks, and infantry attacked the 3rd Div. The 3rd Div could no longer hold its positions and was ordered to retreat to SANGJU (尙州). 3rd Div Hqs was then located in TABU-DONG (多富洞).
154 men withdrew to HWARYONG-JANG (化寧場). At HWARYONG-JANG, PW and subordinates surrendered to ROK and US soldiers.
Composition of Unit:
| Unit | Code No | Original Strength | Present |
| 3rd Div | 395 | 12,000 - 13,000 | 600 |
| Signal Bn | 359 | 250 - 300 | 50 |
| 1st Co | 100 | 30 |
Unit History and Personalities:
3rd Div CG: LEE, Yong Ho (李永鎬)
Maj gen (少將)
45
Served in Chinese Communist Army for approx 10 years,
Home address, P'YONGGANG (平康). Married.
Signal Bn Co: OM, Se Jong (嚴世鐘)
Lt Col (中佐)
23
Graduate of TOKYO Radio-Telegraph School. Home address, P’YONGGANG (平康).
1st Co CO: YANG, Chu San (揚周山)
Lt (中尉)
23
Educated in P'YONGYANG #1 OCS. Graduated with the rank of Lt. Served in NKPA approx 2 years prior to war.
Other Unit:
I Corps OG: MU, Chong (武亭)
Lt Gen (中將)
Served in CCF. In 45, returned to P’YONGYANG. While the Russian occupied N. KOREA, Lt Gen Mu, Chong organized to NKPA.
C/S I Corps: CHANG, P’yong San (長平山)
Sr Col (總佐)
35 (approx).
Served in CCF, Trained in Russian Army.
Equipment:
| Communication Battalion: | Present |
| 8 x LBEM Radio-Transceiver | 0 |
| 1 x LSEBE Radio-Transceiver | 1 |
| 50 x Field Telephones | 20 |
Unit Duties:
Duties of Signal Bn, 3rd Div was to send and receive messages from the I Corps, Div Hqs, and Regt Hqs. Also to communicate with II Corps.
Communication:
Sig. En utilized Radio-Telegraph. The LBEM and LSEBE were their primary equipment. They also had field telephones for inter-division communication.
The LBEM (P6 M) was a 9 tube set and had a range of 8 to 16 km. It was a transceiver. For some reason tubes failed quite frequently. The LBEM (P6M) used three CO-257 tubes in the transmitter and the receiver used five 2K2M and CBE-242 (C6-242). Sufficient replacement parts were always on hand.
The LSEBE (PC6) was much more powerful than the LBEM but gave more trouble. Tubes and parts are unknown to PW. When equipment shows any indication of losing transmitting power, it was sent to a rear area maintenance shop directly attached to Signal Bn, 3rd Div.
LBEM (P6) Radio-Transceiver covered the frequency range of 1750KC (kilo-cycle) to 6000 KC. Output of radio frequency is unknown. Transmitters changed frequency every day. The Signal Bn only transmitted and received messages from Div and Regt. PW did not do any inter-divisional transmission. Only listening device was car-phones. The 1,8 motor vertical fish polo antenna and 34 motor horizontal antenna were used with the field radio transceivers.
Transmitter used 2,5 v. A-battery and 200 v. B-battery. The B-batteries are 60-80 connected in series to produce 200-240 V LBEN (P6) model utilized 200 v instead of 240 v to prolong the life of detector tube, rectifier tube and amplifier tube, All replacement parts are carried with the equipment.
Supply:
When PW’s unit was in YANGMOK they transmitted a message in code to divisional supply in KUMCH’ON for more food and ammunition. The message was sent o/a 30 1000 Aug 50, and the items requested arrived approx 30 2300 Aug 50, Due to UN aerial activities they were transported during the night.
Present Disposition as of 27 2400 Sep 50:
3rd Div was in PAKKOK-TONG Area. 7th, 8th and 9th Regts, 3rd Div were located on SUAM Mt, 8 km S of WAEGWAN. Communication Bn, 3rd Div was located in YANGMOK, 1st, 2nd Co and Training Co’s were located in YANGMOK. 3rd Div Arty Regt was located in SUAM Mt (수암山).
Other Units: 13th Div was located in TABU-DONG. 105th Armored Div was located 12 km S of WAEGWAN.
Effectiveness:
Training and Experience:
All personnel were well trained as radio-telegraph operators and performed minor repairs such as replacing tubes and batteries and periodic inspections to keep equipment operable. All capable of handling LBEM (P6).
Morale:
Since induction, PWs morale was high until 24. Jul 50, when the unit was in KUMCH’ON. All the engagements were successful and he was sure that the NKPA would win this war without too much effort considering the rapid advance of the NKPA.
4 Sep 50, in YANGMOK the morale of PW dropped considerably. Since he was an officer, he had some knowledge of how the UN Forces had built up reinforcements and equipment. When the 3rd Div was unable to advance any further and started to take to the defense and no supply came through, PW realized that the NKPA was fighting a losing war.
Psychological Factor:
20% of NK soldiers have the wi11 to fight to the finish. Most are officers who believe in Communism.
The weapons most feared by PW's unit were planes (F-80 jets) 105-mm arty guns, and carbines.
Leaflets:
PW read a leaflet in SANGJU, 26 Sep 50, the first he had seen and was impressed by it. He took this leaflet and surrendered to UN MP's in HWARYONG-JANG MP Hq on 28 Sep 50.
Effect of UN Air Activity:
The UN air activity was so effective that transportation was nearly impossible during daylight. The damage inflicted on NK cities and occupied areas and the number of casualties sustained in strafing and rocket attacks was so great that it is beyond estimation.
Extent of Physical Exhaustion and Disease:
When nows of malaria in neighboring units was received all personnel from Regt down were given inoculations. A high percentage of personnel suffered from intestinal disorders.
Vehicles:
3rd Div had 40 x GAZ-51 trucks. None at present.
Sig Bn - 4 x GAZ-51 trucks.
All vehicles were destroyed in YANGMOK.
Percentage Killed in Combat.
As of 27 Sep 50: 3rd Div had approx 2,100 men out of original strength of 12,000 men. Approximately 4,500 were wounded in combat, 4,800 killed and 2,700 either deserted or taken prisoner.
FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
WEELDREYER
Executive
