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KIM SUN HO 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 1 NO. 615 1950-08-08
    의용군 고등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 615 19 August 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - FEAF LN TEAM NO. 0113) 10 August 1950
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 475)

Name: KIM SUN HO (金淳鎬)
Rank: Volunteer corps.
Age: 24 years old.
Address: SEOUL SHI YUNGSAN WARD, WONYHOU RO SAMKA 217. (京城市 龍山 元曉路 3街 217)
Education: 6 years elementary: 1 year communication school.
Previous occupation: Wireless operator.
Length of service: 1 month, 8 July 1950.
Military speciality: Communications.
Foreign languages spoken: Japanese.
Date of capture: 8 August 1950.
Palce of capture: ANGE MYON, about 8 miles east of SANGJU.
Interrogated by: YAMASHITA.


Unit:
1st Division, 2nd Regiment, 1st Battalion, 3rd Company, 3rd Platoon, 3rd Squad. Names of unit commanders unknown.

Movement of Unit:
PW was forced to join the Volunteer Corps when a quota was assigned to his workshop on 8 July. His Volunteer Corps was incorporated into a guard unit, PW being assigned to the Signal section on 13 July. Between 8 - 13 July, PW as a part of a volunteer unit of 500 members marched from one elementary school to another, six in all, in SEOUL. The reason for this movement from place to place was unknown, except that as there were many other volunteer units doing the same thing, it might have been just a show to impress the public. While at the schools, the men were told occasionally of the current battle’s situation and the successor of the Red Army. Between 13 - 16 July, some training in communication was given, Peoples Army songs were learned; preparations were made for the movement to the front. PW’s unit, the 18th Independent Battalion of the Guard unit, began its march southward on 16 July, passing through ICHON, CHANGHOWON-NI, CHUNGJU, NYONGYONG, HAMCHANG, then detoured SANGJU. The unit joined the 1st Division, 2nd Regiment on 6 Aug in the mountains about 5 miles SE of HAMCHANG.
As of 8 Aug 50 the 2nd Regiment of the 1st Division was just east of the NAKTONG River, about 8 miles east of SANGJU. The 2nd Battalion was about 2 miles SE of the 1st Battalion. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd Company were deployed in that order, moving southward over mountains.

Circumstances of Capture:
On the 8th of August, the 2nd Battalion which was proceeding about 2 miles ahead of the 1st, made contact with South Korean forces about mid-morning. The 1st Battalion entered the front lines about 1400 hours. At 1500 hours the 1st Battalion was ordered to charge enemy positions about 800 meters to the south. Rifle, machine gun and artillery fire took a heavy casualty toll. At a point about 150 meters from the nearest enemy position, PW and a buddy decided to surrender so they sought shelter of high river bank. They threw their guns in the river and hid. As the tide of battle turned against them, the Koreans began a disorderly retreat. The two North Koreans were captured about 1600 hours, 8th August 1950.

NK Political and Subversive Activities:
Propaganda Media and Propaganda Themes:
On 28 Jun, SEOUL was captured. From the following day, a widespread propaganda campaign began by use of leaflets, radio and workshop speakers. In the leaflets, which were hand distributed by the volunteer groups it was claimed that South KOREA was being sold down the river to the US for unmarketable sugar and luxury items, and that North KOREA must save South KOREA and unify all of KOREA. These leaflets were printed by a group of leftist labor union in SEOUL and the South Korean Labor Party.
As of 16 July, radio broadcasts in SEOUL contained a considerable amount of propaganda. War news of victorious North Korean Army received much attention. Premier KIM IL SUN broadcast nightly for one-half hour speaking about land reform, equality of sexes, high labor standards in North KOREA and the reasons for the war. Premier KIM appealed to everyone, from the children to the aged, to give their utmost support and work in gaining the independence of all KOREA.
Workshop speakers, who were generally radical leftist political or labor leaders released from jail after the arrival of lecture the assembled workers. In PW’s place of work, the Communication Bureau, all of the workers who could be spared, were assembled onve a day at two o’clock and made to listen to lectures as well as encouragement to joins the volunteer units. The greatness of North KOREA, the military successes of North Korean forces, and the need for manpower were stressed.
Another medium for propaganda were the meetings held by the block (political sub-division) offices during the early evening hours. The residents of the block were encouraged to attend these meetings where lectures were delivered, principally for the audience that couldn’t be reached at the workshops. These block meetings were regularly held, perhaps once or twice a week.
Also frequently seen were posters and wall newspapers posted in conspicuous places such as walls and telephone poles along busy thorough fares. These publications were printed by labor unions and the labor party.

Electricity Supply in SEOUL:
North Korean forces entered SEOUL on 28 June and within two days electrical power supply became available again. Power was supplied 24 hours a day. About 5 July 1950, UN forces bombed a power plant and portions of the city had to undergo blackout. The supply was resumed in about a day.

Radio Control Measures in Occupied SEOUL:
As of 15 July, PW knew of no restrictions on listening to free South Korean broadcasts, although one of his neighbors was afraid to listen, saying that encopers might hear them and make trouble.

Conscription withing Occupied SEOUL:
PW claimed that there was no conscription system as far as he knew. In his personal case, political and military speakers came to his office to give recruit volunteers on three different occasions. PW having been rejected for physical reasons by the South Korean Army previously: did not volunteer the first two times, when 15 persons were recruited. Office employees numbered around 400. On the third time a quota of 70 persons was given his office by a representative of the Labor Party. The idea was to fill the quota regardless of circumstances so everyone in the office between 18 and the early 40’s was practically compelled to go into the service of the Volunteer Corps. A person could theoretically refuse to volunteer. However, in practice, there were means for preventing such section. Thus, in effect the voluntary enlistment method was actually compulsory.

Police measured in Occupied SEOUL: (as of 15 July)
After the North Korean Army occupied SEOUL, the Peace preservation units came into being. Men of these units, acting as police, were formerly active left-wing political and labor people. They wore no uniforms but carried rifles, Japanese 99’s. PW believed that they were engaged in regular police duties and not necessarily political.

Living Conditions in SEOUL:
Food was exceedingly scarce, due to the haphazard rationing method. Between 10 July and 16 July when the PW entered the Volunteer Corps, there was no rice at all. Stores were out of most foodstuff. There was some wheat flour, some vegetables, which could be purchased for at least twice what it formerly cost. Currency used was South Korean, although some North Korean currency came into appearance when Red Army personnel made purchases in their currency. Prices of articles other than food remained substantially the same. Labor Party representatives ordered the people to register for rationing purposes before 10 July, because from that dated there would be ample foodstuff brought in form North KOREA. Workers and their families were to receive the foodstuff first. Then the general public would be given rations as more food became available. Yet as of 16 July, no food was rationed, the reason given being that UN forces had bombed and disrupted the transportation facilities, thereby preventing food from reaching SEOUL. When PW left his office, a government official told him that an allowance would be paid his family while he was away at the front.

Effectiveness of Propaganda Activities in Occupied SEOUL:
PW could not give any definite opinion, however, he estimated that about one-half of the people remaining in SEOUL believed the N. Korean propaganda.
In the communications office when PW was working there, he estimated that there were over 150 persons who had previously been discharged for having radical leftist tendencies. These people came back into their jobs after the North Korean Army occupied SEOUL.

UN PW’s:
PW observed two truck loads of prisoners being taken to the CHUO-CHO, national government building, in SEOUL on 5 July 1950, at 1300 hours. One truck had about 40 US soldiers wearing khakis, while the other had South Korean PW’s. Unit identification of the prisoners could not be made.

Signed TARKENTON/WALKER

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