ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 974 11 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0725) 8 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | TO Nak Ch’il (都洛七) (도낙칠) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63 NK 674 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| AGE: | 30 |
| DUTY: | Rifleman |
| UNIT: | 1st Div, 1st Regt, 3rd Bn, 8th Co, 3rd Plt, 1st Sqd |
| EDUCATION: | Elementary 4 yrs |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | KASAN (架山) (1153.8-1454.3) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 061030 K Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HWANGHAE DO, ANGAK GUN, ANGOK MYON, SANGYONG RI, #115 (黃海道 安岳郡 安谷面 上竜里 一一五番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as place of birth |
| INTERROGATOR: | S/Sgt Harold NAKAYAMA (FEAF) |
PW was captured by Co "E", 8th Cav Regt. On 2 Sep 50 he picked up leaflets that were dropped from C-47 USAF Aircraft. It was written in Korean language stating "You North Korean soldiers were conscripted in the army by force and we feel sorry for you, so drop your weapons and surrender." He watched for a chance to surrender for 4 days but for fear of getting shot by his own men he waited till 6 Sep 50 when they went into combat against the 8th Cav Regt. He threw away his weapons and waved his cap to signify his surrender.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:PW was inducted in North Korean Army on 31 Jul 50 in SARIWON. Did not receive any basic training. Remained 4 days in SARIWON. Movements as follows:
Departed SARIWON 4 Aug 50 - train - arrived SEOUL 10 Aug 50
Departed SEOUL 10 Aug 50 - marched - arrived KUNWI 29 Aug 50
Departed KUNWI 2 Sep 50 - marched - arrived KASAN 6 Sep 50
PW surrendered to 8th Cav Regt at KASAN.
1st Div had 3 Regts, 1 Regt had 3 Bns, 1 Bn had 3 Cos, 1 Co had 3 plts, 1 plt had 3 sqds. PW's 3rd Bn - 153 men, 8th Co - 51 men, 3rd Plt - 17 men, 1st Sqd - 5 men.
PPsh M1941 SMG & PPsh M1943 SMG - 27, DP LMG - 31 MAXIM HMG M1910 - 6, RG-42 hand grenade - 600, mortar (make & size unk) - 3, M1891/30 rifle - 150.
PW's unit was 5 km NW of SINMAK (920-1740) they were ordered to leave the train and to take cover. Saw x B-25 & 6 x F-51 US aircraft bomb the airfield. Bombing lasted 40 minutes and PW saw the gas dump in flames. No NK aircraft in sight. The locomotive was also strafed.
From SEOUL to CH'UNGJU PW's unit walked on gravel road about 8 to 10 m wide. From CH'UNGJU to MUNGYONG travelled through mountain road. While traveling they used telephone for communication. Heard they used wireless but PW did not see any wireless set.
Morale:
Morale was low due to lack of food, no training, weapons or ammunition. Most of the men in the unit believed US leaflets and propaganda which seemed to be very effective. When they were inducted in NKPA they were propagandized to the effect that they were fighting a righteous and victorious war. After discovering how wrong they were, the entire unit changed their attitude toward the North Korean government arid the army. The entire unit’s morale went low when they were at the battle front with inadequate equipment, weapons, food and suffered high casualties.
Conditions causing high or low morale depends upon food, men and officers of the unit, ammunition supplies and the training received. PW’s unit did not receive any training, therefore, they lacked confidence. However they were told that they will be taught to use the weapons when they arrive at the front.
In regards to psychological warfare PW feels that if the UN forces drop more leaflets describing the treatment of PWs in South Korea by using some PW officer’s name and unit he was attached to, there will be greater number of men surrendering. Photographs of PW’s quarters, how fed and clothed will also help cause the enemy troops to surrender.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
