ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1369 26 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (163 - MISDI - 0098) 19 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | CHU, YONG BOK |
| PW NO: | 0503 |
| RANK: | Major |
| DUTY: | Ass’t G-3 Officer |
| UNIT: | G-3 section of the Engineer Group of the 576th Engineer Regiment, Attached to the Advanced Headquarters of the Supreme Command, North Korean Army. This advanced headquarters is at SEOUL, also having a further advanced headquarters at KUMCHON. |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | Near KIMPO (YANGHON) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 19 September 1950 |
| INTERROGATED BY: | 8 and SS |
Recommend further interrogation at ADVATIS.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:A. Chronology:
The PW was a Private in the Japanese Army in 1945 and did nothing after the Japanese left until September 1946 when he volunteered into the North Korean People's Army. The PW only attended grammar school but was very well educated for a grammar school student. The PW had knowledge of the Russian, Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages which ware self taught. The PW received basic military training in PYONGYANG for a long period of time and then was on the first wave of troops that came to SEOUL in the latter part of June 50. The PW was stationed at CHONGJU at the time he was ordered to proceed to SEOUL. The PW was stationed at Second Army Headquarters in CHONGJU and reported to the CP at the capital Building in SEOUL.
On 16 Sep 50, the PW heard about the invasion of INCHON by the US forces and on 17 Sep 50, he was ordered to take a squad of one officer and twenty men and lay mines between YONG DONG PO and SANG SA DONG (982-1646 G). The PW loaded 100 mines and mined the roads as follows:
30 mines on the main road and side road at (989-4156 O); 30 mines on the East approach to a river bridge at (988-4156 A); an unknown amount of mines at (989-4156) the following night. The PW utilized the remainder of the mines to destroy the bridge at (988-4156 A).
The PW stated that there were four groups of men that were assigned to mine the roads at various places. The PW did know, however, that the other demolition teams had proceeded in the direction of SUWON, on the main road to INCHON, and one team on the secondary road between INCHON and KIMPO. Each of the demolition teams were equipped with the box-type mines, Russian made.
B. Unit Organization and Strength:
The PW stated that there were about 60 Officers and ‘Many’ Enlisted Men working in the headquarters building where he was situated. The PW could not give an estimate of the enlisted men working in the headquarters building.
C. Unit Duties:
See Par 3a, 2nd sentence.
D. dispositions:
Unit Transfers:
As of 16 July 1950, the 235th Division, 2nd Army and the 115th Division, First Army, changed places in Table of Organization. Also, a 7th Division and a 10th Division was added to the First ARMY.
Others:
The 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions were formed from the Border Constabulary Brigade shortly after the war broke out. The 7th Di:vision went to the First Army.
E. Intentions:
The PW stated that his demolition team’s intentions were to slow the advance of the US troops toward SEOUL by placing mines on the roads and by blowing up the bridges.
F. Knowledge of Other Units:
The PW gave the Following information concerning the general numerical organization of the NK forces in South KOREA:
The Supreme Forces of the North Korean Army Composed of:
(1) The First Army; formed at PYONGYANG, approximately 10 June 50:·
115 Division
395 Division
385 Division
625 Division
(2) Second Army; formed at PYONGYANG, approximately 12 June 50:
235 Division
12 Division
13 Division
15 Division
For Unit Transfers as of 16 July 1950, see Par F (Dispositions).
G. Personalities:
Lt General VASILIEV: Over all advisor for all Korean troops in KOREA, Lt General VASILIEV was situated in KUMCHON during the latter part of Aug, 1950; PW believes that he is still there.
H. Morale and Propaganda:
Morale in and around SEOUL was very poor and troops returning from the South said the everything was very rough at the present. The propaganda said that advances were being made but the PW stated that any fool can check with the map and see that it was all lies.
Prisoner stated that be was told in PYONGYANG that there would be a military parade in SEOUL by the North Korean forces on “Liberation Day”, 15 Aug 50, to be preceded by a general elation on 4 or 5 Aug 50. The PW went from PYONGYANG to the 38th parallel for maneuvers. The PW stated that he has always believed that North KOREA started the war since he was there and saw the North Korean troops move south first. The PW was there for the maneuvers and on the morning of 25 June SO, at 0400, received orders to move South and take the peninsula.
4. GENERAL:A. American POW's:
The PW, while driving through SEOUL observed about 100 American POW's during the first part of Sep 50 at TAE PYONG LO. The PW stated that he hurriedly passed through the area so he just took a quick glimpse at the group of American POW’s. This was during the night.
The PW stated that the reason for the assassination of American POW's by the North Koreans was because they refused to answer questions and demanded their rights.
B. Russian Equipment:
The PW stated that while he was in CHONGJIN in May 50, the North Korean troops received a lot of ammunition, guns and automatic weapons from the Russian government. The PW also stated that the North Koreans received many vehicles from time to time.
C. Troop Movements:
The FW stated that the Communication Headquarters moved in the vicinity of KUMCHON during the last part of July 50.
The PW also stated that Koreans that were formerly with the Chinese 8th Communist Army had returned to KOREA to engage in combat with the UN Forces. The PW stated that there were approximately 70,000 troops in all.
For the AC of S, G-2:
UYEDA
