ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4070 17 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1694) 13 March 1951
| PW NAME: | PAK, Chan Yong (朴贊用)(박찬용)(NKA) |
| RANK: | Pvt (戰士) |
| ORGN: | V Corps, 12th Div, 3d Regt, 2d Co, 2d Plat, 3d Sqd |
| DUTIES: | Rifleman |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School, 6 yr |
| AGE: | 20 |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| ADDRESS: | KYONGGI DO, YOJU GUN, YOJU UP, NAEYONG-RI, #135 (京畿道 馬驪州郡 馬驪州邑 府龍里 135) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 091400 I Mar 51 at approx 4 km N of MUNAM-NI (DS5525) by US “G” Co, 2d Bn, 23d Regt. |
| INTERROGATOR: | CCH |
Observant, cooperative and possessed a good memory.
Information seems fairly reliable.
a. Chronology:
Conscripted into the “Volunteer Corps” at YOJU (CS7929) 2 Sep 50 and received approx 7 days of basic training.
10 Sep 50 the group retreated from YOJU and arrived at TAEDONG MYON (BA8427), via HOENGSONG (DS1049), YANGGU (DT1117), and other places, in late Oct 50. Here the 12th Div was reorganized.
8 Nov 50, transferred to the 12th Div and was assigned to the 3d Regt, 2d Bn, 6th Co, 2d Plat, 3d Sqd, where he again received 15 days of basic training.
4 Dec 50 the 12th Div (approx 8,000 troops) departed TAEDONG MYON after having been issued small arms and clothing. Marched along the east coast toward South KOREA.
24 Dec 50 the Div arrived in the vicinity of PYONGCH'ANG (DS6735), and engaged UN forces.
9 March 51 captured by US troops approx 4 km N of MUNAM-NI.
b. Location and Activities of Unit:
9 Mar 51, 3d Regt Hq was approx 2 km E of SINDAE RI (DS2959); 2d Bn CP was approx 5 km N of MUNAM-RI (DS5525); and 3d Bn CP was 2 km west of 2d Bn CP.
3d Regt was preparing for an attack by UN forces in vicinity of ANHUNG MYON (DS2050), 8 Mar 51.
However, the defense line was shattered by a heavy UN attack, especially artillery fire, 9 Mar 51.
After crossing 38th Parallel, once saw CCF troops, strength approx 1,000. They were armed with small arms and mortars. This group was approx 12 km N of MUNAM-NI (DS5525) 28 Feb 51.
c. T/O & E and Strength: (As of 9 Mar 51)
V Corps: 12th, 6th, 7th Divisions, Arty Div, Corps Hospital, and other units.
12th Rifle Div: 1st, 2d and 3d - (Code: CHANGPAK SAN) Rifle Regiments, Signal Bn, Engr Bn, Arty Bn, Medical Section, and Political Section.
3d Rifle Regt: 1st - (Code: HANKOKE), 2d - (Code: TOKOKE), and 3d - (Code: SAE'KOKE) Rifle Battalions, Signal Co, Engr Co, Political Section.
2d Rifle Bn: 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Rifle Companies, Mortar Co (1st), HMG Co (2d), Signal Plat, Engr Plat and Political Section.
6th Rifle Co: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Platoons and Antitank section.
| 2d Platoon: | Original (as of 20 Nov 50) | Present (9 Mar 51) |
| EM | 42 | 20 |
| Officer | 1 | 1 |
| Personnel losses were caused by UN arty fire. | ||
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| M1891/30 rifles | 34 (200 rd ea) | 18 (150 rd ea) |
| PPsh SMG | 6 (500 rd ea) | 2 (150 rd ea) |
| DP LMG | 3 (600 rd ea) | 1 (300 rd ea) |
| Handgrenades | 2 per man | 2 per man |
| Equipment was lost in combat. | ||
| 6th Inf Company: | ||
| EM | 120 | 60 |
| Officers | 5 | 3 |
| Personnel losses were caused by UN arty fire. | ||
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| M1891/30 rifles | 83 (200 rd ea) | 35 (150 rd ea) |
| PPsh SMG | 18 (500 rd ea) | 3 (200 rd ea) |
| “MAXIM” HMG | 3 (2,080 rd ea) | 1 (300 rd ea) |
| DP LMG | 9 (600 rd ea) | 3 (300 rd ea) |
| 3.5mm “Bazookas” (US) | 0 | 2 |
| Handgrenades | 2 per man | 2 per man |
| M-1 rifles (US) | 0 | 10 |
| Carbines, M-2 | 0 | 5 |
| “Tokarev” TT Pistols | 4 | 4 |
| Prior to capture, the PW had never seen the “Bazooka” used. | ||
d. Personalities:
LEE, Hak Kun (李學根) (리학근), Jr Lt, Platoon Leader, 2d Plat, 6th Co, 2d Bn, 3d Regt, 12th Division.
e. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
Each man carried 2 days ration and approx 150 rd of ammo for small arms. (Since Nov 50, the 3d Regiment had had one ammo issue of 100 rd per rifleman near PYONGCHANG during mid Feb 51.
3d Regiment had never received food supplies since departing TAEDONG MYON. They confiscate food in areas they travel through.
f. Signal:
Company and below: Runners
Battalion: 1 Field telephone (USSR) located in the Bn CP.
g. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale and battle effectiveness of the 3d Regiment was low because of the lack of artillery and air support; high losses during artillery attack, and shortages of ammo and food were also contributing factors.
h. Psychological Warfare:
PW surrendered voluntarily because he feared artillery fire and disliked combat.
He had not seen any UN leaflets.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
