ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3982 13 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MIDI - 0310) 25 February 1951
| NAME: | PAI Ting Hsi (白亭喜) |
| PW NO: | 16455 |
| AGE: | 32 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| DUTY: | LMG Ammo Bearer |
| UNIT: | 42d Army, 126th Div, 378th Regt, 3d Bn, 7th Co, 2d Plat, 6th Sqd |
| NATIONALITY: | Manchurian Chinese |
| PLACE & DATE OF CAPTURE: | Surrendered 221200 Feb 51 at vic of (CS823232) to US 5th Cav Regt |
| OCCUPATION: | Paper Hanger |
| EDUCATION: | None |
Cooperative during interrogation. Due to low rank, low intelligence, and lack of observation, information was vague and limited.
a. Chronology:
126th Div crossed the YALU River from CHIAN, MANCHURIA o/a 25 Oct 50, and marched south, crossing the 38th parallel o/a 1 Jan 51. Prior to crossing the 38th parallel, PW remembered passing through MAENG Mt (BU8692) o/a 5 Dec 50. O/a 12 Feb 51, the 126th Div arrived NA Mt (CS7069). 378th Regt separated from the Div 161800 Feb 51 when it departed NA Mt, proceeded in a SW direction for 20 Km and arrived at an unknown Mt. While enroute there, Regt crossed a railroad, a main road and a river in close succession. Arriving at the Mt 162200 Feb 51, the regt area was attacked by UN tanks, arty, and air beginning 17100 Feb 51.
171900 Feb 51, the regt began withdrawing from the area and assembled back at NASAN 180700 Feb 51. The remainder of the 126th Div had already moved from the Mt at that time. 181800 Feb 51, the 378th Regt departed the Mt, traveled in a SE direction and arrived in the vic of hill 469 (CS812548) 190300 Feb 51. 221200 Feb 51, UN Forces began attacking the area with air, artillery, and small arms fire. Feb 51, the 7th Co was sent to reinforce the 9th Co positions on the hill. Upon arrival in the 9th Co area, PW deserted, descended the hill and surrendered to UN forces. (CS823532) 22 0900 Feb 51.
b. Organization and Strength (present)
124th, 125th and 126th Div composed the 42d Army. 126th Div included the 376th, 377th and 378th Rifle Regt. A 92mm Gun Bn was attached to the 125th Div. Did not know whether or not this unit followed the division across the 38th parallel, since he observed it last in an unknown location near the parallel, o/a 28 Dec 50. In addition to the 3 rifle bn, the 378th Regt had an attached 82mm mortar co. 3d Bn, 378th Regt, consisted of the 7th, 8th and 9th Rifle Co and 3d Hvy Wpn Co.
As of 22 Feb 51, 7th Co had a strength of 104 men. 3d Bn consisted of approx 400 men and the 378th Regt had approx 1,500 men.
126th Div had only minor engagements since entering KOREA and therefore casualties were light. No replacements were received by PW company since entering KOREA.
c. Deployment of PW Own Unit:
3d Bn Hq was in a small village on the E foot of Hill 469 (believed vic of CS828547). 7th Co CP was approx 400m S of the Bn CP (believed vic of CS824543). 9th Co area was approx 600m SW of the 7th Co CP (believed vic of CS821530). Heard from a solider of the 7th Co signal unit that 21 Feb 51, the 378th Regt Hq was 4 Km N of the 7th Co CP.
21 Feb 51, conversed with soldiers of the 377th Regt in vic of Hill 469 and heard that the regt was deployed on the E flank of the 378th Regt.
d. Status of Arms and Ammunition:
7th Co had the following weapons and ammo 22 Feb 51:
6 LMG 800 rd each.
2 x 60mm mortars 14 rd each.
27 US M-1 rifles (brought from MANCHURIA) 100 rd each.
2 Canadian automatic rifles 200 rd each.
2 pistols (carried by officers).
3 “potato masher” grenades per man.
2 anti-tank explosive charges containing 3.5 Kg of dynamite each.
1 anti-tank mine (Soviet)
Hvy wpn co of the 3d Bn had 3 x 82mm mortars 20 rd per mortar and 6 HMG 2000 rd per HMG.
Mortar Co attached to the 378th Regt had 3 x 82mm mortars. Ammo was carried on horseback.
O/a 28 Dec 50, near the 38th parallel, observed 4 x 92mm infantry guns which belonged to the Gun Bn attached to the 126th Div. All pieces were dismantled and carried on the backs of 5 horses.
e. Status of Food and Clothing:
O/a 20 Dec 51 at MAENG Mt, men of the 126th Div received one pr of shoes each.
Food, mainly rice, was fairly sufficient at all times.
f. Mission and Intentions:
Heard from Co CO and political officers o/a 18 Feb 51, that the primary mission of the 38th, 39th and 42d Armies was to defend and hold their sectors until reinforced from the rear, at which time an offensive would begin.
g. Personalities:
SHI Shan Ku (許相閣), 30, CO 7th Co, 3d Bn, 378th Regt
SUI Woun Hwa (徐文華), 32, Political Officer, 7th Co
h. Physical Condition of Troops:
Between 1 Jan 51 and 12 Feb 51, 10 men, some afflicted with sore backs and legs and others with typhus, were sent to the rear from his company.
As of 22 Feb 51, about 30 men in PW co were suffering from slight case of frostbite, sore legs and backs, and some fever.
i. Armors
Observed no CCF or NKA tanks or arty pieces (other than above mentioned 92mm Gun) since entering KOREA. Heard from political officer o/a 12 Feb 51 that a mechanized army group or groups would arrive in KOREA from CHINA. However, most of the men did not believe this, since they were told the same thing many times before without such a unit actually materializing.
j. Engr (land mine):
Sphere shaped (black metal)-6”-7” in diameter.
Cylindrical fuse, about 1½” in diameter, protrudes about 2” from sphere, weight; approx 3 Kg (probably Russ make). Employed, apparently as AT mine, 50 Kg pressure will detonate mine. String may be attached to fuse, which can detonate mine from as great a distance as 200 m. Information obtained from Co CO and Political Officer.
Told that this mine had been received very recently. There were two of these miens in his Co (one in his plat). Saw one mine being planted (buried) during his unit’s withdrawal, NE to NASAN. It is not clear whether this mine was buried only for demonstration, however, one or both of the mines were carried by PW company to place of his capture (CS823532).
k. Any Significant Tactics of Warfare Employed by the Enemy:
Saw no road signs or markers for his Unit. However, at road forks, a straw sack standing upright or other obstacles were placed on the road, which indicated that the road without such obstacles was the route to follow.
l. Propaganda and/or Surrender Leaflets:
Despite the fact that officers constantly reminded the soldiers that they would be killed by the enemy should they surrender, most of the soldiers did not believe in such propaganda, since most of them were former CNA members, who had actual contact with the American Army in CHINA.
For the AC of S, G-2:
IIDA
