ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3954 12 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (163 - MISDI - 0309) 3 March 1951
(Atchd 1st Mar Div)
| PW NAME: | LIU Yon Tsae (柳永財) |
| PW NO: | 1st M-P-4686 |
| DUTY: | Rifleman |
| UNIT: | 66th Army, 197th Div, 591st Regt, 3d Bn, 7th Co, 3d Plat |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | N of HOENGSONG (DS 0950) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 2 Mar 51 |
| CAPTURING UNIT: | 1st Marines |
| INTERROGATOR: | Pfc MATSUSHITA |
PW was seeking a chance to desert his unit up until 021200 when US Force made an attack upon their position. O/a 1200 hours 2 Mar 51, 197th Div was over-powered and withdrew north in the vicinity of DS 0950. Finding this opportunity PW escaped: stayed in this area until captured. Not recommended for further interrogation. Cooperative but information limited.
a. Mission:
197th Div mission upon entering KOREA was to help NKA fight anti-communists. O/a 28 Feb 51 - 197th Div mission was to start an offensive along with 589th, 590th and 591st Regt in the vicinity of DS 0950 and push south to capture WONJU (DS 0733).
b. Strength of Unit:
(1) Original Strength: (O/a 20 Oct 50 at ANTUNG, MANCHURIA).
197th Div - 13000 men
591st Regt - 3600
3d Bn - 600
7th Co - 120
3d Plat - 35
589th and 590th Regt original strength was approx the same as that of 591st Regt.
The following code names were used by PW unit:
66th Army - “FON HWA PU” (meaning Great Bird)
197th Div - “ER SHI PU” (#20 Unit)
591st Regt - “ER LIU PU” (#26 Unit)
3d Bn - “SAN TA TUI” (3d Bn)
These numbers were also used as APO No.
(2) Present Strength: (as of 2 Mar 51 in vicinity DS 0950).
197th Div - 6000 men
591st Regt - 2000
3d Bn - 300 (or less)
7th Co - 100 (or less)
3d Plat - 25
c. Military History:
O/a 16 Oct 50 - 66th Army left PEIPING for ANTUNG, MANCHURIA.
O/a 20 Oct 50 - Arrived ANTUNG, MANCHURIA. On eve of this date, the 66th Army crossed into SINUIJU.
O/a 5 Jan 51 - Traveling only at nights through mountains, the 66th Corps arrived KUMHWA. Did not contact any UN Forces. 66th Army stayed in mountains 8 Km East of KUMHWA, for approximately one month.
O/a 10 Feb 51 - 66th Army left KUMHWA, for South.
14 Feb 51 - Arrived HONGCH’ON (DS 0271). Received 4 or 5 air attacks between KUMHWA and HONGCH’ON (DS 0271). Heard that there were heavy casualties in the 66th Army. Wounded were sent back. After arriving in HONGCH’ON, 197th Div stayed in a mountain area 4 Km SE of HONGCH’ON. Heard that the 196th and 198th were in same vicinity. Stayed approximately 20 days.
O/a 28 Feb 51 - 197th Div arrived in vicinity of DS 0950. Here, 197th Div set up skirmish line with the 590th Regt 3 Km E of 591st Regt and 589th Regt 3 Km W of 591st Regt. From this date, the 197th Div mission was to push south and captured WONJU (DS 0733).
2 Mar 51 - PW unit engaged in a fire fight with UN Forces. At 1200 hours 197th Div started withdrawal north of DS 0950.
d. Personalities:
LIU Chen Kua (劉建國), 7th Co, CO
MA Shiao Hu (馬小虎), 3d Plat Ldr, (Platoon leader was last seen withdrawing with a wounded leg.)
e. Weapons and Equipment: 591st Regt had following weapons:
5 x 82mm Mortars (40 rd per mortar)
25 x 60mm Mortars (48 rd per mortar)
12 HMG
27 LMG (1000 rd)
All riflemen carried Japanese rifles, US M-1 Rifles and US Carbines. (70 rd per man).
One unknown make of Wireless Telephone to each Bn.
1 US Jeep in Regt
3 US 2 1/2 ton trucks in Regt.
f. Status of Supply; Route of Supply:
Ammo - Only what troops carried. Heard reinforcements were to arrive later.
Food - Procured in any area where food can be found. If villagers were present, it was procured from them forcibly.
Medicine - There are many troops with stomach trouble and frostbite. There was a medical unit attached to every rifle Co; however, they only carried medicine for internal use.
Clothing - Only what they had. No other clothing carried. Last clothing issue was in MANCHURIA.
Shelter - Shelter was taken in the mountains.
g. Other Units:
Only heard that there was NKA fighting in vicinity of HOENGSONG (DS 1049).
h. Foreign Elements:
Oct 1950, observed many Russian officers in MUKDEN, MANCHURIA. Also, in ANTUNG, MANCHURIA before entering KOREA, observed one Russian Officer in a Russian Jeep.
i. Morale:
Majority of the troops had low morale because of the scarcity of food, clothing and equipment.
j. Effectiveness of Weapons:
CCF troops feared artillery barrage the most. Air attack also feared.
For the AC of S, G-2:
UYEDA
