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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3240　6 February 1951

The following information was obtained from recovered American military personal, who were interrogated upon arrival in JAPAN from KOREA by Central Interrogation Center, ATIS. Interrogation was conducted at Camp Drake by Lt FUSCO.

Source with three (3) other Americans evaded capture behind enemy lines for 25 days, from 1 November to 25 November 1950.

The enemy had accomplished successful flanking and encircling movements surrounding approximately two companies near UNSAN. During the fire fight, the Commander of Co G was wounded. Source attempted to evacuate the Company Commander with the help of five other American soldiers. They took turns carrying him from 2100 to 2100 to 2400 hours, at which time they were fired upon from behind by enemy forces. The Captain was placed in a culvert and the other six men, including source, scattered so as to draw fire away from the wounded Company Commander. In order not to disclose their own positions, none of the six men fired. Two of the men were hit and checked to make sure they were killed. The enemy then fired a few bursts of their burp guns with the hope of hitting anyone else that might be in that immediate vicinity.

Between 0400 and 0500 hours, source believed it was safe to see what was left of the group. Four of the men including himself were unhit. The Captain was still alive in the culvert. Two of the enlisted men decided to stay with the Company Commander. Source and Cp1 BRANDON, James of Co G decided to take off to see if they could find their way back three other members of Co G, whose names were:

Lt TROLLOP, H

Cp1 KADIKANA, Shigeo

FURTADO, FNU (Rank unknown)

The five men proceeded in a southern direction until surprised by a North Korean patrol. They scattered and when the patrol passed through, the group got together again. It was impossible to find FURTADO who had disappeared. After waiting for a while they decided to take off again in the same general direction. While waiting, the four men took an estimate of the situation and arrived at some conclusions as to the best way to get back to friendly lines. They could see that the Chinese Communist Forces were advancing to the south. The fact that no firing was heard indicated to them that the American forces were withdrawing. They were therefore falling farther and farther behind enemy lines. They decided:

1. They would travel along high commanding ground as much as possible so that they could observe the enemy without the enemy observing them.

2. They would proceed in a south, southwestern direction towards the Yellow Sea hoping to make their way to SINANJU.

All during the daylight hours of 3 November, the American Air Force carried out strafing and bombing missions forcing the group to keep under cover. This was a further indication that no American units were in the vicinity.

In the early morning of 4 November they started off again, Whenever they approached a village or came upon any enemy troops, the group avoided them by circling widely.

On 5 November they came upon a position which formerly had been occupied by American troops. From the equipment and gear found, the unit that had been there was identified as Co K of the 8th Cav. The group realized that they were just, three or four miles from their original company position and thus were travelling in the proper direction. What was even more important than this assurance was the fact that, they found just what was required by people in their circumstances. They found on 30A 53S, sleeping bags, weapons, ammunition, outer and inner clothing and cigarettes. But most important of all, they found food. They had not eaten for 4 days since 1 November. They were able to collect 12 C-Rations, coffee, sugar and milk. They were greatly bolstered by this stroke of good luck. They stayed near this position for the remainder of the day and night. They improvised a panel spalling out the word “HELP” from toilet paper which they carefully kept for us when slower travelling airplanes like artillery liaison planes and helicopters went over.

On 6 November, they started off again towards the Yellow Sea. From their position they could see a considerable movement of the civilian population going in both directions. The group decided that it would be too dangerous to travel. They tried to get in touch with American units by using their SCR 535. This was completely unsuccessful because the Koreans and Chinese were using the same channel that the Americans used. In fact, the source stated, they were unable to get anyone except Koreans or Chinese. Source even used Cpl KADIKANA to speak Japanese to the Koreans. They got no satisfaction at all so they destroyed the radio and kept the aerial which they used as a cleaning rod.

On 7 November, the group was pinned down because the Air Force strafed and bombed that area from 0300 to 1730 hours. The group rolled out their “HELP” sign but the planes were going too fast to see them.

On 8 November, the four men started off again. They were now down to 4 cans of food. They came upon a deserted village and scoured it for food. They found none. Fortunately they met a South Korean civilian named CHANG KYU LEE who had been living in a cave. LEE was an interpreter who spoke perfect English and had been working for the American Army as interpreter for the S-2 of the 2nd Bn of the 8th Div. Prior to the war in KOREA, he had worked for a Mr. BACON of the American Red Cross in SEOUL. With hie knowledge of Korean, he was a welcome addition to the group. He brought the group up to data on what had happened. He told them that many Americans had been captured and taken north by the Chinese. The equipment that was captured was put into American trucks and prisoners were used to drive them. He told them that he saw the Chinese shooting American prisoners who were wounded and unable to walk. LEE then told the group that he had escaped and was able to get by because a friendly family in an adjoining village was supplying him with food, That night LEE was able to get food for all.

From 9 November to 14 November, the group decided to stay in that same general area since their food supply was assured. For the first time, on 9 November, American artillery was heard in the distance. This indicated to the group that an American advance would follow and perhaps eventual liberation. They felt sure that an American attack would be successful because the Chinese, who were going into their positions, had small arms but no tanks or heavy equipment with which to stop an attack. The Chinese who were moving supplies up and who came under air attack would simply leave the carts and duck off to the sides of the roads where there were many foxholes already dug during previous engagements in that area. On 11 November a C-54 flew over making a broadcast in Chinese to the enemy. LEE said it was not Korean so he concluded it must have been Chinese. Their panel was again either not seen or ignored. On 13 November, the group could hear the artillery coming closer from the southwest. They could also hear small arms being fired. This indicated that the advancing Americans were joined in battle.

On 14 November, Chinese soldiers demanded food from the family who up to this time was supplying the group. Because it was too dangerous to go there anymore it was decided to move out. Their plan was to move to ridges which had previously been strafed and napalm bombed so as to avoid being subjected to wither. This plan worked well.

On 15 November they received 2 or 3 days supply of food from civilians in a small village. They decided to lay low for a while to give the advancing troops and tanks some time to resolve the battle that was going on. They stayed in this general area for 5 days.

On 20 November, the group moved south about 3 or 4 miles. They found 4 North Korean boys 18-23 years old living in a cave. These boys had been hiding in the cave since February 1950 when the Communists started their build- up in North KOREA. They had lived at UNSAN and decided that they would not fight for the Communists. These boys had a source of food in the nearby village and when asked to procure some for the group, did so. Source stated since he had 2 extra weapons and much ammunition, he gave these weapons to 2 of the North KOREAN boys. They worried for fear that these boys would turn them in or disclose their position.

On 21 November, the North Korean boys told the group that the Chinese were supposedly warned that the United Nations had issued an ultimatum to the Chinese to withdraw from North KOREA in 7 days or the atomic bomb would be used.

From their vantage point, source was able to see the tactics of the Chinese in the attack. He saw that they usually spread their troops in a very thin line and then advanced. They had no mortars or anti-tank guns. 75% of them carried small arms such as rifles and grenades. 25% were not armed. Their ammunition supply was continuous. Their food supply was pillaged from the local populace who were also forced to fight for them. Their defense was predicated on the principal of ambush and successive roadblocks.

On 22 November, source could see American tanks approaching and from their position realized that the friendly troops were just 3 or 4 miles away.

On 23 November, the group decided to lay plans for getting through the enemy lines. They realized that they had to depend a great deal on the 4 North Korean boys. These in turn were anxious to get through the Communist lines. The boys went into the village to see what could be done. There was a river that had to be crossed beyond the village. On the other side of the river was another small village. When they returned a plan was agreed upon.

On 24 November, three of the boys were to go to the first village as scouts. They were to get food and find the best route through the village and across the river. The fourth boy was to cross the river, scout around, try to get a guide and be at a certain point on the other side of the river where he was to meet the entire group, at 1830 hours. The 4 boys left early so as not to arouse suspicion.

That day, American jets came and napalm bombed and strafed both villages. Their attack meant to the group that the UN forces intended to come through these villages and also that the ground troops were fairly close. Their coming also meant that their plans for penetrating the enemy lines might be jeopardized if their North Korean boys were hit. Source buried all equipment other than sleeping bags, weapons and ammunition. At 1600 hours they started down the mountain. They arrived at the village, met the 3 boys and by 1800 hours they were at the river. They waded across the river with ice floating in it with the water up to their hips. Promptly at 1830 hours they were met on the other side of the river by the fourth boy who was not able to procure a guide but did have a hot meal ready for them. After eating, they started off again. Their attempts at getting a guide proved futile so they commandeered an old man at rifle point to lead the group to the UK lines. Contact with the UN forces was finally established during the morning of 25 November.

Source stated that his experience as an Eagle Scoot had come in very handy during his 25 days behind enemy lines. But there are other basic factors such as good judgement, common sense, resourcefulness and patience that are required in such a situation. To evade capture, source stated, certain rules had to be followed. For example:

1. Travel as much as possible on high ground to permit you to see the enemy without him seeing you.

2. When there are no bombing or strafing missions in the area, move during daytime when your visibility is greatest,

3. Fires are to be made only during daylight hours-never at night.

4. Fires should be made with hard, dry wood to avoid excessive smoke.

5. When choosing a night position, try to find one to which there is but one avenue of approach and from which you can see or hear an intruder at a distance.

6. When moving towards your lines, it is best to move to commanding ground of hills or mountains recently bombed because there is small danger of the same place being napalm bombed again.

For the CO, TIS: