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YU, Chang Sun 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 32 NO. 3217 1951-01-21
    하사 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3217 7 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1449) 30 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: YU, Chang Sun (柳昌淳) (유창순) (NKA)
RANK: Sqt (下士官)
ORGN: Ⅱ Corps, 2nd Div, 4th Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co, 1st Plat, 2nd Sqd
DUTIES: Sqd Idr
EDUCATION: High School, 2 yr
AGE: 21 yr
OCCUPATION: Student
ADDRESS: HAMGYONG PUKTO, HOERYONG GUN, HOERYONG MYON, SONCHON RI, 43 (咸鏡北道 會寧郡 會寧面 城川里 四三番地)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 211200 Ⅰ Jan 51, at YONCHON MYON (DS5803)
INTERROGATOR: WTO
INTERROGATED AT: HAYANG (DQ8374)

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW cooperative and gave info freely. He was alert and fairly familiar with the military service.
Info seems reliable.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:
Ⅱ Corps: 2nd, 9th, 10th and, 31st Div.
2nd Div: 4th(Code No104), 6th, 17th Rifle Regt and Arty regt, Engr Bn, Sig Bn, Trans Bn, Med Section and Recon Co.
4th Regt: 3 Rifle Bn, Trans Co, Sig Co, Med Co, and Engr Co.
Inf Bn: 3 Rifle Cs, HMG Co, AT Plat, Sig Plat, Med Plat, and Engr Plat.
Inf Co: 3 Rifle Plat.
Inf Plat: 3 Rifle Sqd.
Inf Sqd: 5 or 6 men.
1st Plat; 3rd Co:Original (5 Jan 51)Present (20 Jan 51)
 Personnel
  EM107 or 8
  Off11
  Total118 or 9
 Equipment & Ammo
  SMG4 (300 rd ea)3 (150 rd ea)
  Carbines (US)3 (100 rd ea)Unk
  M1891/30 RiflesUnkUnk
  Grenades3 per manUnk
  AT Grenades1 per Sqd LdrUnk
HMG Co, 1st En
 Personnel
  EM5020
  Off44
  Total5424
 Equipment & Ammo
  HMG (Russ)2 (2 cases ea)2
  HMG (US)22
  SMGUnkUnk
  M1891/30 RiflesUnkUnk
  Pistol11
  Plat Ldr unarmed because of the lack of weapons.
Engr Co; 4th Regt;
 Personnel
  EM4020
  Off44
  Total4424
 Equipment & Ammo
  Tank mines4010
  AT Grenades1 per manUnk
  Shovels & PicksUnkUnk
  M1891/30 RiflesUnkUnk
  Most trp armed with M1891/30 rifles. Approx 30 antitank mines were laid on a road, while enroute.
Sig Co; 4th Regt:
 Personnel
  EM3020
  Off44
  Total3424
 Equipment & Ammo
  Field Telephones5km5km
  SMGUnkUnk
  M1891/30 RifleUnkUnk
  Wireless Set11
  Wireless set was not used because no electriciy was available. Telephone wire abandoned by UN troops was picked up while enroute
Med Co; 4th Regt:
 Personnel
  EM2720
  Nurses33
  Medical Off44
  Total3427
 Equipment & Ammo
  MercurochromeUnkUnk
  LaxativesUnkUnk
  BandagesUnkUnk
  Hypodermic NeedlesUnkUnk
1st Bn; 4th Regt:
 Personnel
  EM & off10070
4th Regt:
 Personnel
  Em & off600400
 Equipment & Ammo
  82mm Mortars (Russ)2 (5 rd ea)2 (5 rd ea)
 2nd Division strength was formerly (Dec 50) 4,500 troops.
 Before PW was separated from his unit (10 Jan 51), an estimated 500 casualties were suffered by the div, mostly caused by aircraft. About 10 know deaths were attributed to sickness or over exposure to the weather.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES:
PW heard 2nd Division arrived at TONGDAE RI, YONGHUN MYON (DS5803) on 7 Jan 51 and engaged US unit in general area of TANGYANG (DR3988). A two day battle was fought with casualties before 2nd Division with drew N, 9-10 Jan 51. The div traveled E through SOBAEK mountain range following a river.
PW heard (19 Jan 51) that the 2nd div upon reaching TONGDAE RI, will continue withdrawal N, following a river. US unit was in pursuit of the div.
31st Div was approx 1 or 2 km rear of the 2nd Div ever since their advance from the 38th parallel, acting as a reserve unit. 31st Div was not committed at TANGYANG, but retreated N for the 2nd Division (19 Jan 51).
PW left his unit 10 Jan 51 at TONGDAE RI due to frozen feet. When captured, PW was trying to locate his unit in the general area.
PW heard that the 2nd Div first objective was TANGYANG, with ultimate objective, PUSAN. The div was to travel through the mountains on the E coast and conduct guerrilla warfare until PUSAN was reached.
31st Div objective was the same. It was in reserve of the 2nd Division.
PW heard from a 10th Div PW (28 Jan 51) that the 10th Div has already reached their objective, ANDONG (DR7647).

5. PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:
Conscripted 25 Sep 50 at HAMHUNG with 50 other students.
No training was received since the students had received basic military training (1 hour each day, for approx 1 year while in school).
PW and the 50 recruits departed HAMHUNG by train on 26 Sep 50 and arrived at CHUNCHON (CS8994), o/a 1 Oct 50.
PW hospitalized 1 week while the others departed on foot for the NAKTONG River.
O/a 15 Oct 50 PW assigned to 2nd Division, which arrived at CHUNCHON from the S.
2nd Division departed CHUNCHON o/a 20 Oct 50 marched through the main highway, day and night, and arrived at PYONGYANG o/a 25 Oct 50.
Departed the same day, utilized the main road. and arrived at KANGGYE (BA9837) o/a 30 Oct 50.
2nd div remained in. KANGGYE for approx 15 days before departing for the 38th parallel.
2nd div was issued winter clothing, weapons and approx 300 rd of ammo each at KANGGYE.
The unit marched through the main road, passed through YONGWON (BV9812) and arrived at HWACHON (CT8718) o/a 28 Dec 50.
2nd div, from HWACHON, traveled only during the night, using mountain trails, and crossed the 38th parallel o/a 30 Dec 50.
In Dec 50, PW heard that the 2nd Division was made a part of the Ⅱ Corps.
2 Jan 51, 31st Division began following 2nd Div S.
The div, using only mountain trails arrived at TONGDAE RI 5 Jan 51.
Two-day battle was fought before 2nd Division withdrew N, 9 or 10 Jan 51.

6. PERSONALITIES:
CH’OE, Hyon (崔賢), CG, Ⅱ Corps.
Formerly 2nd Div CG. At KANGGYE, Now 50 he assumed command of Ⅱ Corps.
PW heard that he was in MANCHURIA for a long period before coming to KOREA.
LEE, Ho (李虎), Maj Gen, 2nd Div, CG.
Formerly 4th Regt CO, was promoted to major general at KANGGYE, Nov 50 and given command of the 2nd Div.
Said to be from MANCHURIA.

7. FOOD, AMMO AND OTHER SUPPIES:
No food carried by the troops. Food was procured locally in insufficient amounts.
Average of 1 meal per day. Officers were adequately fed.
Meals eaten only at night.
No ammo supplies. Supply was by capture.

8. SIGNAL:
Runners employed between co. Bn and higher echelons used telephones.
PW heard that clear conversation could be held over the phones.

9. MORALE AND BATTLE EFFECTIVENESS:
Troops constantly complaining about poor food and insufficient amounts received. Long night marches and constant aerial attacks lowered morale considerably.
PW believed the troops battle effectiveness was poor.
Troops were heard to say that they would rather die on the battlefield than be killed at the hands of their captors. Frequent propaganda of atrocities committed by the captors to North Korean. PW was administered by the officers to the troops.

10. MEDICAL:
Approx 50 men of 4th regiment suffered of frozen feet. No treatment received because of lack of supplies. Serious cases were left in farm houses in care of civilians.
Some troops suffered from coughs.
No treatment or medicines received.

11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. Did you surrender voluntarily?
a. PW was captured while trying to locate his unit.
b. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear UN loudspeaker broadcasts?
a. Negative.
c. Can you describe what they said?
a. Negative.
d. What was your reaction to them?
a. Negative.
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts?
a. Negative.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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