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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3273　9 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (163-MISDI-0235)　27 January 1951

(Atchd 1st Mar Div)

PW captured by members of National Police while resting in farmhouse. PW was too weak to travel further due to loss of blood from wound in right arm.

Recommended further interrogation after progress in made on his wounded arm.

(1) Original Strength.

At time of reorganization at YANGGU, Nov 1950, estimated strength 10th Div: 8000

25th Regt - 2000

27th Regt - 2000

29th Regt - 2000

Arty Regt - 2000

Nov 50 - After retreating N of the 38th Parallel (YANGGU Area) 10th Div slowly reorganized. Stragglers from various units were taken in and several thousands civilians (age 18-30) were conscripted.

PW was among the stragglers when picked up and assigned to the 10th Div. At time of reorganization there were so few officers that all NCO were immediately promoted to rank of Jr Lt. PW, who was formerly a Sqd Ldr with the SEOUL SECURITY UNIT, was also promoted. PW heard that even officers from the 31st Div were transferred to the 10th Div to fill the vacancies. While reorganizing, 10th Div was committed against a sizable ROK force W of YANGGU. However, 10th Div was soon relieved by the 31st NK Div.

O/A 3 Jan 51 - 10th Div moved S on foot. All four Regt took different routes. 25th Regt traveled through the mountain, over trail and avoiding contact with UN forces. No vehicles were used. All four Regt were to assemble in the vicinity of ANDONG to cut off our MSR and liberate ANDONG.

25 Jan 51 - Attack on TOPYONG-DONG was staged by three companies (approx 450 men) of 1st Bn, 25th Regt. An additional Arty co (without arty but 10 x 82mm mortars) remained in reserve. Troops were told by officers that only a small number of American forces and police force were present. TOPYONG was to be secured that day and troops were to await further orders. Participating in the initial attack, PW was wounded. He made his way to ODUSAN where he could travel no further, feeling weak from loss of blood. PW spent the night at a farmhouse and was captured by the Police force the next morning.

Co: 2-3 LMG

20 Russian PPsh SMG

Rifles - Assortment of Russian, American and Japanese make. No arty pieces in the Arty Regt. Arty Regt equipped with 10 x 82mm mortars and several US Mortars. No vehicles or pack animals.

Since departing YANGGU the 10th Div had not received any food, clothing or ammo.

Food: Most of the food had been obtained from villages, but food was always scarce. Troops were permitted to eat twice daily, rice and “kimchee”.

Clothing: Troops do not have winter uniform. Many have been wearing the same uniform for months without washing.

Ammo Supply: 150 rd ea man.

100 rd for each mortar, less with US mortar.

1000 rd for each LMG.

Medical Supply: Med supplies were inadequate. No facilities to treat the seriously wounded. Wounded could not be sent to any hospital but carried along wherever the unit moved.

PW observed the NK 31st Div just before the 10th Div departed YANGGU. It was believed that the 31st Div had been reorganized near the Manchurian border. When last observed the unit was engaged with a sizable ROK force, West of YANGGU.

Discontent was noted among the troops due to lack of food and proper clothing. Further reason for low morale is the troop’s knowledge of their present disposition behind the UN line.

Before an attack is launched on any objective a NK unit usually sends out ten to fifteen men patrol to obtain information. These men are dressed in civilian clothes and line crossing is easy. Above was not carried out at TOPYONG DONG because of confidence in a quick victory.

Troops had been told that a powerful force will come to their aid soon. NK or CCF? - unk.

For the AC of S, G-2: