포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3256　8 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (528 LDI - 0164)　24 January 1951

PW appeared to be in good physical condition. Prior to induction into the NK Army, PW employed by the Forestry Bureau of the South Korean Government. On 22 Jan 21, PW and 2 others were preparing their meals in a village approx 2 km NE of OSAN and heard from villagers that the UN troops were entering the village. The 2 other soldiers escaped and PW was left behind, however, when the UN soldiers began to search the house, he realized that he could not fight alone and came out with his hands up. PW was cooperative and of average intelligence. Info fairly reliable. Recommended for further interrogation.

The I NK Corps composed of 8th, 47th and unk Div.

The 8th NK Div (Code Name: 415 KUN BUTAI) composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regt, Recon Co (Code Name: KANGCHUL) (Meaning “steel”) a Sig Unit, and a Med Unit.

Recon Co composed of four Plat, one of which was dressed as civilians to obtain information by posting as refugees. Men posing as refugees wore no military uniform nor carried any military identification.

PW heard from officers that the 8th Div is a reconstituted unit which participated in ANDONG (DR7546) Battle and retreated to CHOSAN (YF3524) for reorganization. Reorganization took place at CHOSAN o/a 30 Oct 50 and consisted of stragglers from NK units.

PW unit was under constant attacks from UN air strikes and arty and few casualties were suffered. Approx 20 men from PW Co did not return from their patrol mission during the period 3 Dec 50 - 21 Jan 51 and were presumed to be deserters since they were South Koreans in the NK Army.

PW Plat had one pistol, one LMG, two US carbines and the rest SMG. Originally two hand grenades per man and 210 rd of ammunitions per weapon were issued, but present supply was less then one hand grenade per man and less than 100 rd of ammunition per weapon. No additional issue of ammunition was received.

The civilian clad plat was armed with pistols.

The Recon Co had one portable radio transmitter, details unk.

Infantry Co at time of PW training (Sept 50) had two HMG twelve LMG (one per Sqd), twelve SMG (one per Sqd Ldr), two hand grenades per man, and the rest were armed with Russian rifles.

PW heard form Co CO at SEOUL o/a 9 Jan 51 that the 8th Div objective was SUWON (CS2527), details unknown.

PW Recon Co was to make a reconnaissance of the enemy and report to Div by means of messengers or telephone. Info to be obtained from the villagers on the enemy troops, tanks, artillery and trucks. The unit was given specific instruction not to engage the enemy, but to retreat upon encounter. The civilian clad plat made their way behind enemy lines in groups of three posing as refugees. They were gone between one to seven days, depending on the mission. They either returned posing as refugees along the regular travelled routes or at at times they travelled over mountain trails.

O/a 19 Jan 51, PW heard from the Sqd Ldr that the terrain south of SUWON was flat and unsuitable for infantry without armored unit support. Both the CCF and NKA were resting and waiting for the arrival of armored units when the air force is also to emerge.

210300 Jan 51, the Hq of the Recon Co located in a village of 30 houses 8 km N of SUWON and 2 km NE of the MSR (See attached sketch).

Noon 20 Jan 51, 8th Div Hq located in HULIGONG (CS188504).

2nd Regt located vic of Div Hq.

3rd Regt located vic of SIHUNG (CS1546) 21 Jan 51.

Last known location of 1st Regt was vic HAEJU (YC 3813), 20 - 30 days ago.

47th NK Div departed SEOUL for INCHON o/a 10 Jan 51, also the 8th NK Div departed SEOUL for SUWON.

Over 10 days ago, an unk CCF unit, believed to be over Div strength, observed heading N at ANYANG (CS1641). Observed several hundred pack horses, no tanks or arty. One CCF soldier asked PW in Japanese the direction and road to ANSONG (CR4696). There were several other CCF soldiers who spoke Japanese but the PW opinion was that they were not too fluent. They also spoke Korean, but not fluently.

O/a 10 Jan 51, heard from a CCF soldier that one CCF Div was located east of SUWON and one to the west.

Method of communication between Plat and Co was by messenger and sometimes by telephone. PW Co communicated by radio and courier to Div Hq.

PAK, Pyung Kil (박병길) Plat Ldr - 2nd Plat, Recon Co, 8th Div

LEE, Hang Rae (이항래) CG　- 8th Div Rear Hq

HAN, Yong Su (한영수) C/S　- 8th Div

PW heard from a fellow soldier (Pvt U, Jung Ho) while at SEOUL that three UN tanks were repaired by Koreans approx 15 km north of KAESONG (BT8604) alongside that MSR.

Morale was low because there were no air or mechanized ground units to support the infantry, but morale rose when told that mechanized and air units would be used south of SUWON although some South Koreans remained skeptical because it has not been used so far.

PW conscripted into the NKA on 11 Sep 50 at SEOUL and received one month of basic training at HAEJU with the 97th Regt, 4th Bn, 3rd Co, HMG Plat. After finishing training, the 4th Bn marched north to CHOSAN (YF3624) but enroute the Bn became disorganized due to UN air attacks. PW Sqd Ldr assembled his men and proceeded to CHOSAN arriving there o/a 30 Oct 50. Upon arrival, PW Sqd was integrated into the 8th NK Div. PW was then sent to a NCO School in CHOSAN (3 months course), but after attending for one month it was inactivated 20 Nov 50 because the school was unnecessary. Graduates became NCO and were sent to Regt. (Peacetime course was 6 months). Three companies (Anti-tank, infantry, and HMG) at the school. HMG Co had 100 men and the Inf Co had more than 100 men. After the school’s inactivation, PW was assigned to his present unit. 8th Div departed CHOSAN 3 Dec 50 and marched to SEOUL via ANJU (YD2888), PYONGYANG, SARIWON (YC4065), KAESONG (BT8604). Travelling was done along the MSR during the night and during the day the troops hid in foxholes in the mountains.

No additional food or ammo were received since departing CHOSAN. Food was procured locally. Ammunition was insufficient and was supplemented by searching the villages and police stations. Oxcarts were used for transportation.

No replacements were received by PW unit. Wounded were sent to the rear for medical attention and at the discretion of the individual, they were sent back to their original units or other units. In case they are lost they try to contact MP who will direct them to their units and when that is impracticable they join adjacent units until such time they are able to return to their original units.

PW did not surrender voluntarily but came out with his hands up because he was trapped. PW did not hear any UN aerial broadcasts but read UN propaganda leaflets which said that the CCF did not come to save KOREA but to make it a satellite country. The reactions of PW and other South Koreans, who composed 60% of the unit, were favorable because of their experiences in democracy and actions of the CCF who confiscated food from the villagers. The reactions of the North Koreans were unknown as they did not reveal their emotions because of their communist indoctrination.

PW observed five ROK PW at CHOSAN who were put to work in PW unit in Nov 50.

PW heard from his Sqd Ldr at SUWON that the CCF Navy has occupied INCHON, PUSAN, MOKP’O and other ports and that only a small area is left to be conquered.

PW heard from his Sqd Ldr that he heard from CCF troops that mines were being laid in vic of ANYANG (CS1641).

No immunization was received. Common colds were most common in PW unit and medicine was received occasionally. There were a few cases of frostbites.

PW was previously interrogated by the 25th Div IPW Team. “Incorporating 25th LDI No. unknown dated 23 Jan 51.”

For the AC of S, G-2:

Sketch Map of Recon Co CP, 8th Div (As of 210300 Jan 51)

AREA: OJON-NI (CS2236)

(Sketch Map not to Scale)