795.00/6-352: Telegram
The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State
secret
niact
Pusan, June 3, 1952-midnight.
1259. Rptd info CINCUNC, EUSAK Advance DIP 263 by other means. Two Embassy officers called on Prime Minister Chang at 1300 today, arriving just as Prime Minister returned from Cabinet meeting at President’s residence. Chang told them with sigh of relief that President had backed down on threat dissolve National Assembly. Chang reported Cabinet session with Pres as follows:
Pres continued insist Cabinet endorse his plan dissolve National Assembly. Most of Cabinet members refused support plan. After long and fruitless discussion, meeting interrupted by Lightner’s arrival (to deliver Pres Truman’s letter of June 3 [2]).
註01 As Rhee left room he told Cabinet that if they cld not accept dissolution National Assembly, they must devise other means accomplish his ends.
Upon returning to Cabinet meeting, with Pres Truman’s letter in hand, which he refused to show to Prime Minister even though requested to do so, Rhee asked Cabinet what suggestions they had to make in lieu of dissolving National Assembly. Home Minister Yi Pom-Sok came up with remarkable suggestion that all Assemblymen be arrested and “put in stockade”. Prime Min stared at Yi with amazement and said, “What a fine set of brains you have! You are 52 years old. Is that all you have to contribute?” When no one else produced alternative plan, Rhee then launched into tirade. He reminded Cabinet that “thousands, perhaps millions” of people are streaming toward Pusan to demand dissolution Assembly. He said there would be terrible disorders “in two or three days” and Assemblymen’s lives wld not be worth much before demonstrators’ wrath. Pres turned to Home Minister Yi and ordered him not to prevent flow of these people into Pusan.
Prime Min previous to this Cabinet meeting had been trying devise plan to forestall Rhee’s attempt dissolve Assembly and to placate Rhee enough to give Assembly breathing spell permitting continued functioning of Assembly. To this end Prime Min had drafted “compromise” constitutional amendment for submission by Rhee to National Assembly. Central provisions this draft amendment:
1. Direct election Pres.
2. Prime Min nominated by Pres and confirmed by National Assembly; Prime Min be removed at any time by two-thirds no-confidence vote of National Assembly.
3. Pres can only nominate Cabinet Ministers proposed by Prime Min for confirmation by National Assembly.
When Rhee said Cabinet must devise means to prevent bloody disorders, Prime Min proffered above draft amendment. Pres read draft and, making no reply, closed his eyes and sat head in hands “for full ten minutes”. Slowly raising his head, Rhee asked Prime Min, “Do you think you can push it through?” Chang promptly said, “I can”.
After hearing PM’s account of Cabinet meeting, Emb officers asked PM if Rhee’s apparent acceptance of “compromise” amendment means that arrested Assemblymen would be released. Chang said that, since President’s promise on June 2 to release four of them had not been fulfilled, he felt that arrested Assemblymen would remain in prison, and that in fact more Assemblymen would probably be imprisoned.
Emb officers asked PM how “compromise” amendment was going to resolve crisis in view of fact that even if amendment introduced today it could not constitutionally be acted upon by National Assembly for one month, whereas under constitution Presidential election must be held by June 23. PM made some vague reference to postponement election until middle of July. When pressed on apparent constitutional restrictions prohibiting such an act, PM refused to discuss it further, saying National Assembly would cross that bridge at appropriate time, inferring that he had some stratagem to circumvent this problem. He said primary consideration now is to get time and opportunity for Assembly to continue its functions, and that was his only motive in proposing draft amendment. He said this move would not totally solve current polit imbroglio, but only countered Rhee’s attempt dissolve National Assembly.
At this point Emb officers showed PM letter from Truman, which Rhee had previously refused show him. Upon reading letter and expressing pleased amazement that US Govt had acted in such timely fashion, PM commented “Then it must have been this letter that made Rhee change mind about dissolving Assembly.” PM added he had about reached end of his resources last night but that Truman’s letter gave him new hope and determination once again.
Emb officers asked PM if he thought Assemblymen would accept “compromise” amendment, and he said they would not accept it. PM was then asked if he was going to sponsor proposed amendment, and he replied, “Of course not”.
Emb officers received impression during conversation PM that prior to reading Truman’s letter he had believed he was reduced to staving off imminent disaster posed by Rhee’s ultimatum and ordered “compromise” amendment as move of desperation. However, after learning that US Govt would consider dissolution of National Assembly “irrevocable act” on Rhee’s part, and gaining renewed hope thereby that US Govt had no intention give up pressure on RheePM seemed greatly encouraged.
Lightner