ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3696 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1580) 22 February 1951
| PW NAME: | CHOU, Hsu Shun (周線源) (CCF) |
| RANK: | Plat Ldr |
| ORGANIZATION: | 38th Army, 114th Div, 340th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co, 60mm Mortar Plat |
| DUTIES: | Platoon Leader |
| EDUCATION: | 7 yr |
| AGE: | 36 |
| OCCUPATION: | Professional Soldier |
| ADDRESS: | SHANTUNG SHENG CHU HSIEN, SSUCHU, HSIANG TSUN (山東省 ■縣 四區 下河村) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 121300 I Feb 51 (Hill 327) |
| INTERROGATOR: | W.T.O. |
Complained of receiving insufficient food as a UN PW. He asserted that the UN forces are not living up to their promises as expressed in leaflets. Nevertheless, PW was cooperative and spoke freely.
He was very familiar with the Military Service.
Information seems reliable.
a. Chronology:
PW was conscripted in July 32 at SHANTUNG SHENG into the CNA 51st Army.
Received 10 months of OCS training.
Commissioned 2nd Lt in 35.
Transferred to the 4th Military Police Division as a Platoon leader Jul 38.
In 1941 he was discharged from the service because of wounds received in action against the CCF.
Conscripted into the CCF “PINGHAI CHITUI,” 27th Regt, at SHANTUNG SHENG Jan 45.
The entire “PING HAI CHITUI” (Branch unit) (浜海支隊) departed SHANTUNG SHENG during Dec 45 and arrived CHIUIN SHENG the same month.
“PINGHAI CHITUI” was composed of the 6th, 13th, and the 27th Regiments and was designated as the 1st Branch Unit. The 1st Div (former 6th Regt), 2nd Div (former 13th Regt) and the 3rd Div (27th Regt) were the units within the 1st Branch Unit.
PW demoted in Jan 48 after beating a soldier.
1st Branch Unit departed CHILIN SHENG Jan 47 and began battling in the SSUPING area until reaching MUKDEN. Occupied MUKDEN Nov 48.
In 1948, while passing through the CHINCHOU (錦州) area, orders were received to change designation to the CCF 38th Army. The 1st Div was changed to the present 112th Div; the 2nd Div to the 113th Div; and the 3rd Div to 114th Division.
1st Div arrived in the TIENTSIN area 2 Dec 48 and battled until TIENTSIN was captured, 6 Dec 1948.
114th Div was engaged until Feb 49 in the TIENTSIN area.
112th and the 113th Divisions remained in the HONAN (河南) area.
114th Div battled to YUNNAN (雲南) and KUANGHSI (慶西) with another CCF division, which resulted in the annihilation of the CNA 20th and 8th Armies.
PW commissioned 2nd Lt in Feb 49.
He was again demoted in Jul 49 because of failing to produce a receipt after receiving food supplies from a farmer.
The 114th Div remained in the HUNAN area until Aug 50.
The 114th Division received orders and marched to KAIYUEN (開原), arriving during Aug 50. While here, soldiers over military age were being discharged and young recruits were being conscripted. Orders were received to prepare for battle in the ANTUNG area in Sep 50. (It was stated then that the US had bombed ANTUNG).
The 38th Army arrived at CHIAN (輯安) by train 25 Sep 50.
Crossed a bridge during the night and passed through:
| MANPOJIN | (BA7259) | 26 Sep 50 |
| KANGGYE | (BA9837) | 27 Sep 50 |
| HUICHON | (BV6968) | 30 Sep 50 |
| KAECHON | (YD4998) | 6 Sep 50 |
Engaged in a 6 day battle in the KAECHON area. The 50th Army remained in that area until 27 Nov 50 when it received orders to begin its offensive.
The 114th Division arrived at TOKCHON (BV6903) during Nov 50. It rested 2 days 16 km S of TOKCHON.
PW was appointed a platoon leader Dec 50.
The 50th Army arrived in the IMJIN River area, 38th Parallel, during Dec 50 and was engaged in a 5 day battle, proceeding southward toward SEOUL.
Arrived in an area NW of YANGPYONG (CS6649) and rested for approx 20 days.
Crossed the HAN River 27 Jan 51. Moved to a point approx 12 km S of SEOUL 2 Feb 51 and was engaged in defending positions for approx 7 days.
PW deserted on 12 Feb 51 with 6 men of his unit, carrying their weapons with them.
b. Location and Activities of Unit:
The 38th Army went into defensive positions upon arriving at their locations 6 Feb 51. The three divisions went into a triangular defensive position with the 112th and 113th Divisions in the two forward positions and the 114th Div in the rear. Approximate distance between Divisions was 4 km.
PW surrendered while the three divisions were in that position.
The mission of the 38th, 66th, and the 50th Armies was to defend the area southwest of SEOUL.
The NK I Corps, CCF 42nd, 39th, and the 40th Armies were to conduct a general offensive in the southeastern sectors from SEOUL, beginning 13 Feb 51. A few officers were heard to say that KOREA will definitely be liberated by this offensive.
Heard from his company commander just before crossing the 38th Parallel that the CCF 35th Army was located in TOKCH’ON.
c. T/O & E and Strength:
38th Army (Code, TONGANPU): 112th Div (code: TUNGAN 1ST CHITUI)
113th Div (code: TUNGAN 2ND CHITUI)
114th Div (code: TUNGAN 3RD CHITUI)
Mountain Arty Regt (code: TUNGAN 6TH BN)
Guard Bn, Signal Unit, Engr Bn, Propaganda Unit, Medical Section, and Supply section.
114th Division: 340th Regt (code: 40TH BN)
341st Regt (code: 41ST BN)
342nd Regt (code: 42ND BN)
Guard Bn, Signal Unit, Engr Bn, 2 Stretcher Units, and the Medical, Supply and rear Hq sections.
Inf Battalion: 3 Rifle Companies and 1 HMG Company.
Company: 3 Rifle Platoons and 1 Mortar Platoon.
Platoon: 3 Squads.
Squad: 10 men.
| 60mm Mortar Plat, 4th Co: | Original (o/a 10 Feb 51) | Present (12 Feb 51) |
| EM | 38 | 5 |
| Officer | 1 | 0 |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| 60mm Mortars | 3 (40 rd per) | 0 |
| Carbine | 1 | 0 |
| 4th Co, 2nd Battalion: | ||
| EM | 138 | Unk |
| Officer | 12 | |
| Total | Approx. 60 | |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| LMG | 9 (2,000 rd ea) | 4 |
| SMG | 24 (120 rd ea) | Unk |
| Rifle | 36 (100 rd ea) | |
| Carbine | 8 (80 rd ea) | |
| Bangalore torpedo | 4 | |
| Explosives | 50 kgs | |
| HMG Co, 2nd Battalion: | ||
| EM | 167 | Unk |
| Officer | 13 | 〃 |
| Total | 100 | |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| HMG (Jap) | 2 (3,000 rd ea) | Unk |
| HMG (Canadian) | 4 (3,000 rd ea) | 〃 |
| (Unk) mm Mortar | 3 (40 rd ea) | 〃 |
| Rifles, Model 38 | 8 (100 rd ea) | 〃 |
| Carbines | 6 (100 rd ea) | 〃 |
| Mausers | 4 | 〃 |
| Artillery Regt, 38th Army: | ||
| Personnel | 2000 | |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| Mountain Guns | 48 | |
| Horses | Approx 100 | |
| Trucks | 7 | |
Arty Regt was last seen in the 38th Parallel area, 2 Jan 51. Approx 16 guns were observed. Approx 48 guns were observed on the train, when PW arrived at CHIAN Sep 50.
Guard Bn, 38th Army:
Approximately 500 EM & Officers Unk
Equipment & ammo:
Same weapons as an infantry unit.
This battalion performed security duties around the Army Hq.
2nd Bn, 340th Regt, was estimated at 340 men (11 Feb 51).
340th Regt, approx 1,900.
The 114th Division estimated not more than 4,000.
d. Personalities:
LIANG, Pi Yeh (梁必業), CG, 38th Army
TSE, Chung Yu (澤仲魚), Div CG, 114th Div
CHENG, Tung Kuo (鄭洞國), Army CG, 50th Army (Former CG CNA 60th Army).
HO, Ping (和平), Equivalent to Div Comdr, Chief of Staff, 114th Division.
PENG, Te Huai (彭德懁), (Claimed to be equal to MAO Tae Tsung), Commander-in-chief of the CCF Armies and the NKA in KOREA.
Heard that subject had commanded the campaigns in the TOKCHON, KAECHON, and the 38th Parallel areas.
LO, Yung Huan (羅榮煥), Equal to LIN Piao, Political Chief, 4th Field Army.
WU, Tai (吳台), Equal to LIN Piao, Chief of Staff, 4th Field Army.
TENG, Tzu Hui (登子輝), Equal to LIN Piao, Political Dept Chief, 4th Field Army.
KUAN, Yun Shan (關雲山), CO, 340th Regiment.
CHIANG (Fnu), (nickname - “SHAZ” - means Blind), CO, 2nd Battalion (missing the left eye)
CHAO, Tso Ho (趙作和), CO, 4th Co.
After crossing the 38th Parallel, the troops frequently received canned goods, Chinese “sake” flour, salted fish, biscuits, and sugar in limited amounts.
In Jan 51, PW heard that supplies were transported from MANCHURIA to TOKCH’ON (BV6903) by trains, and by trucks from TOKCH’ON to a supply depot, located in the “CHEBONG” mountains (YC5467) (approx 56 km N of SEOUL). Heard from a person who went to depot that the entire CCF supplies were stored here. Ammunition and weapons were also stored there. Supplies were shipped by trucks to various units at the front.
December 50, UN planes had bombed and damaged the depot badly.
Supplies were all stored in tunnels 56 km N of UIJONGBU (CS2878) along the main highway.
e. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale was low due to the false promises made before entering the Korean War. They were promised tank and aircraft support and were told that adequate clothing and equipment would be offered.
Many have lost confidence.
Two meals were eaten daily, but the food was usually so mixed with dirt and trash that it affected the troops considerably. One meal was eaten during the early morning and another in the evening.
The constant marches and, sleeping irregular hours were very much disliked by the troops.
The 38th Army, when they first entered the Korean war, was promised to be sent back to MANCHURIA after the battle of TOKCH’ON. The promise was not kept and they were again promised to be sent back after the KAECH’ON battle. The troops were very much discontented with their still being in KOREA.
PW stated that the best effective way of inducing the troops to surrender, is to set up a loudspeaker and to have a PW, preferably captured from the same area, speak to the troops. He should state his name, rank, unit, etc, and to say that prisoners were not killed, as rumored, and that PW were to be returned home as soon as the war ended.
Further said that the soldier’s only wishes to live and to return home.
f. US, ROK and Other UN PW:
Approximately 300 US PW (a few colored troops) were captured by the 38th Army in the TOKCH’ON area during the latter part of November 50.
g. Signal:
Runners used by platoons and companies.
Phones were used between companies and battalions.
Phones or radios were used by regiments and above.
A few “walkie talkies” were seen in the regiment.
h. Psychological Warfare:
PW surrendered. While in CHINA, PW wife deserted him and began living with another man. When PW tried to induce his wife to come back, he was told that in a communist country, a woman may do as she pleases, and that he had no right in trying to get her back. This made the PW definitely an anti-communist.
PW did not like the idea of serving indefinitely in the CCF Army.
Saw leaflets twice in areas south of SEOUL during Jan 51.
They read: “To the CCF Soldiers:
It is not necessary for you to fight, so surrender and we will provide adequate clothing, food and housing for you. When you surrender, do not walk on small roads or during the night, and produce your leaflets when challenged.”
PW, upon reading the leaflets was induced to surrender.
PW complained that the leaflets did not live up to promises. Food was very insufficient after becoming a PW and the other PW question the truth of the leaflets they have read.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
