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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3659　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1590)　24 February 1951

Cooperative and answered all questions very freely.

Information is considered to be reliable and accurate.

The PW walked into an American outpost and surrendered.

Conscripted by the CNA in Dec 38, and sent to the HUANGPU(黃浦) Military Academy at KU■MING(巨明).

In Oct 49, graduated from the military academy and was commissioned 2nd Lt. Upon receiving his commission he was assigned to the 21st CNA Div, until Oct 48.

Oct 48, the 21st CNA Division defected to the CCF and was redesignated as the 149th Division of the 50th CCF Army at CHIUTAI(九台).

Between Oct 48 to July 49, underwent political and basic training, along with supervising conscription of replacements.

In July 49, the 148th, 149th and 150th Divisions of the 50th Army moved by rail to HONAN SHENG (河南省).

At HONAN the 50th Army received two months of combat training prior to departing for HUPEI SHENG (湖北省).

Between Aug 49 and Oct 49, the 50th Army was issued new weapons and ammo in preparation for combat.

In Oct 49, was attacked by the CNA and successfully defeated the CNA Forces. From HUPEI, pursued the CNA Forces to SSUCHUAN SHENG (四川省).

Between Oct 49 to Feb 50, the 50th Army performed occupation duty in SSUCHUAN SHENG.

In Feb 50, returned to HUPEI. Between Feb 50 and Sep 50, worked on state-controlled farms.

The PW unit first went into combat at HABONCHON.

7 Feb 51, deserted his unit to surrender.

7 Feb 51, 450th Regt was in MORI (CS4815).

7 Feb 51, 449th Regt was approximately 10 miles northeast of MORI. Dug in on the slope of a mountain.

7 Feb 51, 448th Regt was on the mountain to the east of the 449th Regt. On the same date Regt retreated north because its manpower had been reduced to one third of original strength.

7 Feb 51, 150th Division Hq retreated north from KARLHYON-NI (CS4143). The PW believes that the Division Hq has moved to the 38th CCF Army zone.

7 Feb 51, 50th Army Hq was located at KWANGMYONG-NI (CS1048) (approximately 4½ kms southwest of SEOUL).

As of 7 Feb 51:

148th Division’s sector was between INCH’ON (BS0945) and SUWON (CS2526).

150th Division’s sector was from SUWON to a point 3 miles East of SUWON.

149th Division’s sector was from MORI (CS0511) west to within 3 kms of SUWON.

38th Army and one division of the 39th Army were deployed on the left flank (East) of the 50th Army.

39th Army was in the rest area located near KOYANG (CS 1475).

40th and 42nd Armies were being held in reserve north of SEOUL.

PW heard that 3 Armies of the 3rd CCF Field Army were in North KOREA along the East coast.

4th Field Army: 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd and 53rd Armies, Rear Services Unit, Artillery Division.

The 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd and 50th Armies, the Rear Services unit, and part of Artillery Division are presently in KOREA.

The 52nd and 53rd Armies are presently stationed at CHIAN (輯安), South CHINA.

The 41st, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, and 51st Armies are reported to be stationed in the HUPEI, HUNAN and KUANG HSI Provinces.

The 50th, 51st, 52nd, and 53rd Armies were formerly Chinese Nationalist Armies.

50th Army: 148th, 149th and 150th Infantry Divisions, Artillery Regt, Hospital Unit, Security Guard Bn, Signal Bn, Recon Co, Political Section and Supply Section.

50th Army Hq: Section #1 OPERATIONS, (G-2, (OP - OB), and G-3)

Section #2 EDUCATION, (Army education concerning war machine, tactics, etc)

Section #3 SIGNAL, (Function similar to US Signal Sec)

Section #4 GENERAL AFFAIRS, (Billeting officer, Special Services, I.G., etc)

CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT SECTION (Function similar to US Army)

SECRET AFFAIRS SECTION.

7 or 8 men comprise this section who come directly from 4th Field Army Hq. These men are specially trained. Every piece of secret material for the 50th Army is handled by these men. Occasionally, these men are rotated back to the 4th Field Army.

Hq at each echelon from Battalion up follow a similar organization scheme.

148th Division: 442nd, 443rd, 444th Infantry Regiments, Signal Co, Security Guard Co, Artillery Co, Recon Plat, Supply Section, Medical Section, and Political Section.

149th Division: 445th, 446th and 447th Infantry Regiments (other units same as above)

150th Division: 448th, 449th and 450th Inf Regiments (other units same as above)

450th Regiment: 1st, 2nd and 3rd Rifle Battalions

The following “PRESENT” strengths are PW estimate:

TSENG, Tae Sheng (曾澤生)

Lt Gen

CG

50th Army

HSU, Wen Lieh (徐文烈)

Asst CG

50th Army

SHU, Hsiang (舒行)

Chief of Staff

50th Army

HO, Yun Hung (何運鴻)

Army Political Officer

50th Army

CHEN, Yui Chen (陳玉振)

CG

148th Division

CHIN, Chen Chung (金振鍾)

CG

149th Division

WANG, Chia Shan (王嘉善)

CG

150th Division

LI, Kuan Yuan (李冠元)

Asst Div CG

150th Division

YANG, Pin (楊浜)

Chief of Staff

150th Division

TIEN, Ko Tsung (田克宗)

Political Officer

150th Division

HO Erh Shou (何爾寿)

Regt CO

449th Regt, 150th Div

CHOU, Ching San (固慶三)

Regt CO

450th Regt, 150th Div

LI, Chung Hai (李宗海)

Regt CO

450th Regt, 150th Div

LIU, Feng Cho (劉鳳卓)

Regt Staff Officer

450th Regt, 150th Div

YANG, Pao Ch’un (楊報春)

Political Officer

450th Regt, 150th Div

Almost all officers in the 50th Army are ex-nationalist officers.

The 50th Army although down to 50% of its original strength, has not received replacements. Casualties have been replaced with unarmed troops in the 50th Army who had come to KOREA with the 50th Army as ammo bearers, medics and horse tenders.

When the 50th Army crossed the YALU River into KOREA, each man was issued 3 days ration. Since then the troops have been living off the land.

Each company usually has between 4 to 5 men whose duty is to confiscate food from the civilians in newly occupied territories.

At the time of capture (7 Feb 51), the 50th Army had about 7½ tons of rice which was adequate to feed one division three meals. The PW believes that the 50th Army’s food supply has been exhausted.

Prior to a general offensive, troops are dispatched to villages to confiscate enough rice to feed the troops 3 days, and, in unusual cases, 5 days. There is no time limit for the collection of rice.

The 150th Division on only one (30 Jan 51) occasion received fresh supplies of ammo brought from the Army Hq. The amount received was 2 x 2½ truck loads and 4 horse drawn wagonloads. Approximate weight of the munitions was 5 tons. 3 tons of the ammo received were handgrenades. The other 2 tons consisted of 100 rd of 60mm mortar rd, 20 to 30 Russian box type mines, TNT (½ ton) and 10,000 rd of rifle ammo.

Whenever the CCF advances or over-runs US positions, special details are formed for the purpose of collecting ammo to weapons left behind by the retreating UN troops. Captured ammo and weapons are the main source of CCF ammo and weapon supplies. Damaged weapons are not repaired or shipped to the rear because technicians and facilities for repair are not available.

New weapons (unknown to CCF) when captured are taken to the rear (usually Army Hq) for operational study. They are then shipped to the front line troops for use.

PW believes that a large percentage of supplies flowing to the front lines are destroyed by UN aircraft.

There were 16 to 18 x 2½ ton trucks and 5 jeeps in the 50th Army. The 38th Army was believed to have had no more than thirty trucks. The trucks are utilized by the army supply section only.

Jeeps are used by the Army commander and other high ranking general grade officers.

No trucks are assigned to Divisions; they were all under Army control.

One of the chief means of transporting supplies was the use of wagons and horses. Three horses were assigned to one wagon to pull a one ton load (normal capacity).

Although Army supply trucks often go as far forward as Regiments to deliver supplies, horses and wagons are more commonly used.

The Army vehicles (trucks) usually operate within a radius of 15 to 20 miles from the Army Hq.

In extreme cases, Army supply has available to it a pool of trucks which is operated independently under Field Army Hq. It is believed that this pool was constituted of approximately 3,000 trucks. The base of operation of this pool was not known to the PW. It could be contacted only by wireless.

The average weight or amount of supplies necessary to maintain a division in one day’s attack is:

3,000 rifles, (8,000 troops, 60 to 100 rd per rifle)

60 LMG (1,000 rd per)

US HMG (3,000 rd per)

54 x 60mm mortars (40 rd per)

12 x 81mm mortars (60 rd per)

85 Bangalore torpedoes

TNT 1 ton (½ lb block TNT)

20,000 handgrenades

Rice 7½ tons

Approximately 7½ tons of rice are required to feed a division while in the assembly area daily.

Armor is controlled at the Field Army level, but the exact disposition and strengths were unknown. The tank unit of the 4th Field Army at present is in CHINA. PW believes that there are no CCF tanks in KOREA (not even captured tanks).

An Artillery Division of the 4th Field Army is presently in KOREA. This division has been broken down into batteries (1 battery to each Inf Regt). PW believes that there might possibly be more artillery divisions in the 4th Field Army.

The pieces used by the artillery units are 75mm pack howitzers. Prior to arrival in KOREA, each piece was issued 80 rd.

The pieces in the 50th Division had never been used up to the date of capture. It was believed that because of the critical ammo shortage, these pieces were expected to be used only when it became absolutely necessary.

Artillery ammo was hauled by horse drawn carts (12 to 18 rounds per cart).

On 10 Jan 51, the PW saw his divisions’ guns moving north.

Enroute to KOREA the PW saw between 20 to 30 conventional fighter planes at the SUNYANG Airfield, MANCHURIA.

Company to Battalion: Runners

Battalion to Regt: Field phones

Regt to Division: Field phones

Div to Army: Wireless and field phones

Flares: Red, yellow and blue.

The significance of each flare is determined by the division commander.

Bugles and whistles were used at company level only for mess call, retreat, assembly, etc.

The 50th Army’s morale and battle effectiveness are very low as compared to the time of their arrival in KOREA. The reasons are:

(1) Fatigue

(2) Lack of food, ammo, clothing and medical facilities.

The troops fight only because they are forced to do so by superior officers.

The troops are not able to desert their units because a special guard unit is attached to each regiment. These guards watch the troops and at the first sign of desertion, the man attempting to desert is shot.

The morale within the various elements is low or high, according to the respective groups into which the individual falls. These two groups are listed beginning with the lowest, next lowest, etc, or highest, less high, etc, represented by numbers from 1 through 6 as follows:

CCF Morale in KOREA

The relationship within the various inter-mingling elements listed above fall into more or less opposing groups as follows:

(1) Communist Party vs KUO Min Tang

(2) Officers vs Enlisted men

(3) Party members vs Non-party members

(4) Elements of Youth Group vs Elements of Youth Group

(5) High ranking officers vs Low ranking officers

(6) Active elements vs Passive elements

The degree of low morale between the passive elements and KUO Min Tang is negligible. He is a KUO Min Tang member.

PW heard that captured prisoners other than ROK are sent to ANTUNG for internment.

As of 7 Feb 51, there were more than 300 troops who were suffering from a variety of illnesses in the 150th Division.

The prevalence of illness are in the following order, according to the numbers so afflicted.

(1) Frozen feet

(2) Malnutrition

(3) Dysentery

(4) Typhus

Dysentery cases are troops who became ill by eating all sorts of dirty things. These troops would rather be sick and evacuated instead of fighting.

The 150th Division received typhus shots in Dec 50 at SINANJU.

No other shots were given in KOREA.

Surrendered voluntarily because he was anti-communist and because he did not volunteer to join the CCF. Felt that if he surrendered and announced his reasons, he would be able to join the CNA.

Heard UN loudspeaker broadcasts once.

Remembered only fragments of the leaflets, such as:

(1) MAO’s (66th) 3 year Economic Rehabilitation Plan.

(2) CHOU En Lai’s statement that CHINA was working for peace.

(3) UN statement - why are the Chinese Forces in KOREA.

Upon reading the propaganda leaflet felt that it was best for him to surrender than die for the communist cause.

The leaflet was addressed to enlisted men only, and he wanted to know why it was not addressed both to officers and enlisted personnel. For a while, PW thought that UN Forces had no respect for CCF officers who tried to surrender.

In Feb 50, the CCF 8th Route Army, 20th Army Group (兵団) with a strength of 15,000 was deactivated. In April 50, 5,000 men were integrated into the CCF 8th Route Army, 167th Div at HUPEI SHENG (湖北省).

The 167th Div o/a 20 Oct 50, was redesignated as the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, 150th Div at HAILUNG, MANCHURIA (海龍).

Mail to and from CHINA is intercepted and processed. All mail is processed by the political section at each echelon. It was asserted that no mail ever reaches CHINA because of political and logistical reasons.

The 149th and 148th Divisions had between 7 to 8 x 2.36 US Rocket launchers each. Ammo for the bazookas was exhausted and no fresh supplies have been available from the rear.

(1) How many vehicles are in each convoy?

a. There are no specified number of vehicles to constitute a convoy.

(2) What interval is maintained between vehicles?

a. 100 meters.

(3) What method is used for signalling vehicles to put out their lights?

a. At every 9 mile interval along the highway, guards are posted to warn vehicles of UN aircraft at night. When aircraft was in the vicinity, 1 rifle shot was given to signal the truck drivers to turn off their light.

(4) Where do convoys bivouac?

a. During daylight hours, the trucks generally stop at villages enroute. The trucks are kept in barns (or make shift barns) for concealment.

(5) Are convoys moved at any particular time?

a. Truck convoys operate only undercover of darkness.

(6) Do vehicles move singly at anytime? When?

a. Yes, both during day and night.

(7) What routes are followed?

a. The routes taken by truck convoys generally follow the route taken by marching troops.

The following is a schematic diagram of an arrangement of supply points:

DIV SUPPLY POINTS ON DEFENSE OR OFFENSE

DISTANCE BETWEEN BN SUPPLY POINT AND LINE COMPANIES VARIES FROM 1 TO 2 KM DEPENDING ON THE TERRAIN.

PW STATES THAT THE CCF SUPPLY SYSTEM IS ALMOST AN EXACT COPY OF THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM.

Whether on defense or offense, the supply point disposition is the same.

Army to Division supply points follow the same pattern as above. The only difference is that the distance is about 30 km (Army to Div).

Supplies are transported by the Rear Services Unit (directly under the Field Army) upon requests of the Army or division commanders as far as Regiments. From Regiments to Battalion, supplies are transported by horse-carts. Between Bn to company supplies are generally carried by troops.

The average amount of small arms ammo issued to the troops is between 60 to 100 rd per rifleman, depending on its availability.

Supplies handled by each echelon are very limited. A limited amount of clothing (winter) was received by the PW division.

In establishing a supply point, the following points are considered:

(1) Between Army to Regiment level, condition of roads and the shortest route available determine.

(2) Regt to Bn, width of trails and condition of roads which horse drawn carts can utilize are considered.

(3) Bn to Company, shortest trails to front line companies determine.

Supply installations, if located in a mountainous region, are generally caves at the base of a steep hill or mountain adjacent to the road. The entrance is camouflaged with grass or tree branches.

Should the supply installation be in an open field, it is located adjacent to a highway and is camouflaged as a hay stack. Tire marks from the highway to the camouflaged supply point are not erased.

Vehicles (all types) and heavy equipment, during day-light hours, are hidden in barns or houses in villages. When using a house to camouflage vehicles, the side walls of a house are cut out to permit vehicles to enter.

When camouflaging vehicles in the fields, grass and tree branches are utilized. Vehicles, whenever possible are parked underneath trees or in buildings prior to camouflaging.

Captured supplies are generally used by the capturing unit to make up its deficiencies.

Captured weapons, if damaged and in unusable condition, are shipped to the Army Hq where the undamaged parts are salvaged to make new weapons. Damaged parts are shipped to the SHENYANG (瀋陽) Arsenal, MANCHURIA for repair.

There had been a few instances during the early part of the war when captured weapons (new) were shipped directly to SHENYANG for study.

Evacuation of captured stocks, if unusable by the capturing unit, are shipped through channels to higher headquarters.

The troops have only one set of clothing. Although the PW division has received a limited amount of clothing, this was not adequate to replace worn out clothing.

Ammo ea rifleman is between 60 to 100 rd; mortar about 40 rd; and HMG, about 1,000 rd.

Fuel supplies are brought from MANCHURIA via SINUIJU (XE1893) by the Rear Services Unit.

Each Army receives fresh fuel supplies once a month. Fuel was inadequate, but if the vehicles are used everyday without replenishment, it will be exhausted in about 2 weeks. Consequently, usage of vehicles is limited to hauling supplies.

All supplies coming from MANCHURIA are from the SHENYANG and HARBIN Military Arsenal. Supply dumps are generally in each echelon Hq area. Supplies are built up to about 5 days ration.

Chinese troops have not been issued chemical equipment and ammunition other than that captured from UN Forces.

The CCF does not have protective equipment against chemical warfare.

Experiments of poison gases are being conducted in PEIKING, jointly with Russian scientists and technicians (Hearsay from high ranking officers, Field grade).

(1) Maps:

Maps used by the CCF in KOREA are all former Japanese military maps. The scale of the map is 1:50,000. Maps with a larger scale are hand-drawn and not accurate.

When reading the 1:50,000 maps, the map is read in Japanese fashion. The maps do not employ a grid system. Each map comes in sections (similar to the US 1:50,000) marked with North, South, East and West. To locate a given point on the map, a land mark is marked with a red pencil then the location is found.

None of the maps in use by the CCF were printed in CHINA.

Maps are distributed through channels from Field Army down to Bn Hq.

1 complete set of 1:50,000 maps is issued to each Bn, Regt, Div and Army.

(2) Mines:

The only type of mine employed by the CCF is the standard Russian box type. When the box type mines are not available, Bangalore torpedoes are used.

When using a bangalore torpedo as a mine, it is buried and an extended wire is attached to the firing pin. In order to activate this type of mine, a hidden-trooper is some where nearby to pull the wire.

Mines, when available, are planted on roads most likely to be used by tanks.

(3) Illustration:

One mine is placed on the right side of the road and one on the left side. The clearance between mines is the width of the tanks’ tracks and its approximate length.

Anti-personnel mines are employed only when there is an abundance of grenades.

Anti-personnel mines are actuated by a trip wire attached to the firing mechanism of the grenade.

Almost all of the bangalore torpedoes are of Russian origin. There are no proof marks, etc., on bangalore torpedoes.

The Russian box type mines are distributed whenever available from the Field Army down to the front line units through supply channels.

Each infantry division before going into combat is issued between 20 to 30 box type mines. If the supply is exhausted, new issues are made only when available.

Because of the scarcity of mines, they are employed only when necessary upon orders of the division commander.

(4) Camouflage:

Vehicles, in general are placed in barns or under trees covered with vegetation for concealment. In open fields, they are covered with rice straw or dry grass to give it an appearance of a hay stack.

Camouflaging individual emplacements are made by the use of whatever natural vegetation is available in the vicinity.

Individual emplacements, when constructed on a slope of a hill, are generally fox holes dug adjacent to boulders.

Camouflaging materials are not issued except for white sheet material which is very limited in quantity.

(5) Fortification:

Fortifications generally consist of simple fox holes and caves dug on the slopes of mountains or hills overlooking strategic positions.

Concrete is not used for fortification purposes. Gun emplacements in defensive positions consist of dug outs reinforced with logs and sand bags (Sand bags are straw sacks filled with dirt).

No engineer equipment is used for the construction of fortifications.

(6) Equipment:

The only type of equipment available are picks and shovels other than captured equipment.

Medical equipment used by the CCF is a combination of Chinese, Japanese, and American.

Medical supplies are very limited and almost exhausted. There has been no attempt to replenish the dwindling supplies. At present, the only type of medicine which is plentiful is powdered drug for head and stomach aches, and morphine.

Medical supplies used by the CCF are either captured Nationalist’s stock or Japanese. A limited amount is manufactured in MANCHURIA.

In peace time each town in which the Army was stationed had a town hospital used both by civilians and military personnel.

Each Army has its own hospital (mobile).

An Army hospital has a capacity of between 400 to 500 bed patients.

Patients other than surgical cases are cared for by the town or city hospitals.

Every civilian hospital is under the control of the Army wherever the Army moves.

Malaria has the highest percentage of all known diseases in the CCF Army.

There is no determined source of drinking water. Water is purified only during the summer months with chlorine. Since arriving in KOREA, drinking water has never been purified.

There has never been an instance of contaminating water during retreat because this will raise anti-communist feeling among the people.

Captured UN tanks and vehicles are used only when there are personnel that can operate them. If there are no operators, the captured vehicles are left on the spot until such time that technicians are available.

Most of the damaged vehicles are not repaired because of the scarcity of technicians, parts, and fuel to operate them.

The PW has no knowledge concerning samples of US equipment being shipped to RUSSIA. The PW believes that unusual or new equipment that are captured are shipped to the SHENYANG ARSENAL, MANCHURIA for study.

Approximately 20% of the ammo supplies that they use are expected from captured enemy stock. Occasionally, a unit is ordered to battle for the purpose of capturing arms and munitions.

Technical Intelligence Teams are employed at Army level only. Their mission is to study the functions of captured weapons, and, in turn, train the front line troops who are to use them.

The highest technical intelligence level is at the SHENYANG ARSENAL, MANCHURIA.

Clothing & Equipment:

The following clothing items are issued to each soldier:

Remarks: Comforters are issued only when available. During the summer season, winter clothes are turned in for one (1) complete set of summer uniforms. The service and combat uniforms are the same.

No soldier is allowed to keep extra clothing.

PW suggested that the UN make a study of clothing worn by CCF PW, because that is the only type of clothing available to the CCF troops.

Officers’ uniforms between the ranks of the platoon leader on up to Bn Commander is made of the same type of material used by enlisted troop (appearance same, except for the red piping at the collar, cuffs and along the seams of the trousers).

The Regt Commanders’ uniform is of the same type; the only difference is that the material is of better quality (Same for Division Commanders).

No rank insignias are worn by officers or enlisted personnel.

Outer garments worn by troops are not water-proofed.

The one set of clothing that is issued will be worn until such time that summer uniforms are to be issued.

The only type of sleeping material, if available, is a cotton quilted comforter.

Rations:

Normal ration issued to troops is whatever is available in newly captured territories.

The Chinese do not have individual combat rations.

Each company has about 5 men who prepare the company food. When the troops are on the line, the 5 men cook and make rice balls, which they take to the troops.

An individual never prepares his own meal.

The method employed by the CCF for Signal Supply is similar to that of flow of ammo and food supplies (Army to Div, down to lower echelon units).

Unserviceable signal equipment is repaired by the operator if parts are available.

Damage to signal equipment is caused mostly during transit.

Captured US field phones to wireless sets are in wide use by the CCF.

There are no repair parts for captured signal equipment.

Cryptographic material is handled by 5 specially trained men who are attached to each Army Hq. These men are from the 4th Field Army Hq.

Very limited signal supplies are received from the Russians, and the route of shipment is secret. The CCF has been unable to get needed signal equipment.

There is no signal supply dump.

A limited amount of GERMAN Signal equipment is in use.

Rail transportation is not utilized in KOREA because the PW believes that the damaged tracks have not been repaired. If used at all, it is very restricted.

PW has no knowledge concerning the laying of mines in Korean waters or plans for submarine warfare.

Railroads North of SEOUL have never been repaired. No attempts to repair it have been made because of the lack of material.

The CCF has a Rear Service Unit which handles almost all transportation. The operation of the Rear Services Unit is similar to that of the Russian Stof Taylor (phonetic).

When the CCF retreats, rail and bridge destruction will be limited because they do not possess adequate supplies of explosives.

Railroads might be damaged by taking the rails apart.

Roads are not expected to be destroyed because it does not take long for UN forces to repair it.

Traffic regulation and control are handled by the North Koreans.

The CCF does not have a Provost Marshal or Military Police system in KOREA.

The Political Officer of each echelon performs the function of the US Provost Marshal.

The CCF does not have trained military policemen in KOREA; consequently, North Koreans (Chinese-speaking) are utilized.

Traffic signs are made and posted by North Koreans.

Traffic signals (hand signs) are similar to that of the US.

The CCF does not use the motor park system. The parking of vehicles is left to the discretion of the individual operator.

For the AC of S, G-2: