포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3674　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S. R. 029)　22 February 1951

Intelligent and cooperative.

a. Security:

(1) Air Attack: Against air attack, no fire was returned. Troops remained in sitting position until aircraft disappeared.

(2) Ground Attack: Troops crawled to take cover; using the terrain to the best advantage.

(3) Tank Attack: When tanks approached within 200 m distance, a "tank killer team" was sent out with 15 lb mines.

b. After having had supper, troops marched from 1700 hr to 0400 hr.

c. Marched over trails.

d. Single file and column of two's were commonly used in troop movement. Between company and Regt, mounted messengers were used for communication. Between Regt and Field Army, American made SCR 600 radio-telephones were used. Between squad and company, bugle calls.

e. 15 minute halts were taken at three hour intervals of marching. No security measures were observed.

a. Security

(1) Air Attack: During air attack, no one was allowed to fire or move in the foxhole.

(2) Ground Attack: When the enemy approached within 200 m distance, LMG and HMG were put into action. Rifles were not fired until enemy approached within 30 m.

(3) Tank Attack: US made bazooka was commonly used against tank attacks, but mines were also employed. No rifleman was allowed to fire against tanks.

b. 3 sentries posted on the top of mountains. Several posts were set up on the bivouac perimeter. Each post had 2 sentries.

c. Men slept and ate in the bivouac area where shelters were set up. This was their schedule:

0400-0530 foxhole digging

0530-0600 breakfast

0600-1700 sleeping hours

1700-1730 supper

1750-0400 march

No noon meal served.

d. Shelters were made of wood and camouflaged with pine branches.

e. No specific camouflage measures taken in bivouac area.

a. Assembly area was 500 m (sic) from the enemy position. They reached the assembly area in three columns from center, right and left.

b. Multiple columns were used in movement to the assembly area.

c. Approx 40 minutes in advance of the attack.

d. CO gave brief explanation on battle situation and preparatory instructions.

e. Column of files used in the moving out of the assembly area. The column files deployed to wedge on line of skirmishes. One Plat of scouts preceded the formations by 400 meters.

a. The assault was directed by Bn CO. One company attacked the enemy rear. The other companies in line of skirmishes 400 m distance from the enemy.

b. Company and battalion objectives were 400 meters deep. 600 meters for regiments. 800 meters deep for divisions.

c. After reaching the objectives, the unit pursued the enemy.

d. If the attack failed, unit retreated under HMG and LMG covering fire.

e. Troops dig in when they halt.

a. A platoon from the Bn was sent out for probing attack. They usually attacked the enemy's front then immediately withdrew in order to lure the enemy from his position.

b. Approx 150 men were normally used.

c. The probing forces drew the enemy out of its position as much as possible, and coordinated with attacks on the enemy's flanks.

d. These missions were accompanied by no pre-planned supporting fire.

Patrols were sent out by order of Regt and Div Hq.

Regt deployed when in combat (See attached chart)

a. No fortifications were used in the organization of a defense position.

b. Details of the 348th Regt of the CCF 39th Army used when it was in combat are as follows:

(1) Organization; 348th Regt, 116th Div. 1st and 2nd Plat of 1st Bn, 1st and 2nd Plat of 2nd Bn, and two Arty Plat (sent from the Regt Hq) were deployed along the OPLR. 1st Bn Hq, 2nd Bn Hq, 3rd Plat of 1st Bn, and 3rd Plat of 2nd Bn were located 1,000 meters to the rear of Arty Plat. 3,000 meters from the front line, two Regimental Arty Btry were located. 3rd Bn and 348th Regt Hq were established at 2,000 m distance from the regimental Arty Btry. Divisional Arty Bn located 10 km from the OPLR and the final protective line was established on the same line.

(2) Number of troops - 4,000.

(3) Types of weapons used - Japanese 6.5 mm model 38 rifles; US automatic rifles, M-1 rifle; 45 cal. SMG; carbines; model 79 LMG; US HMG; US bazookas; US 60mm mortars; Japanese 82mm guns; 15 lb. anti-tank mines; Japanese model 99 (1932) armor piercing mines with fuses (approx 3 lb); Japanese Bangalore torpedoes (approx 10 lb); Japanese model 97, 81-mm mortars; Japanese model 99, 81-mm mortars; US 150-mm mortars (sic); Japanese model 94, 37mm guns; Japanese model 92, 70mm howitzers; Japanese model 91, 105mm howitzers; US 155mm howitzer; Chinese "potato masher" hand grenades; US hand grenades and dynamite sticks.

(4) The location of OPLR was established 3,000 m front of MLR.

(5) Patrols were sent by Regt Hq.

(6) Trenches, foxholes, heavy weapons and equipment were camouflaged with pine branches. White clothing was used in snow-covered fields. No anti-personnel mine fields were used in the combat area.

c. No specific tools and equipment were used in erecting fortification.

d. The normal depths of a defensive position was 10 km and another defensive line was formed within 2 km distance.

e. Mines were used against tanks.

f. LMG, HMG, and 60mm mortars were used by the covering forces.

g. No reserve in this unit.

h. Troops were ordered not to fire until the enemy was within effective range.

a. Several 15 lb anti-tank mines were used. US bazookas were used buy they were not effective against US heavy tanks.

b. "Tank Killer" teams for so-called "suicide missions" were formed with 12 men from a company. The anti-tank tactics follow:

(1) "Tank Killer" team should hide by the side of road or utilize natural terrain.

(2) When tank is approaching, throw a mine (15 lb) on the idlers and one under the front of the hull of tank.

(3) If one fails to destroy tank, the next man takes over and repeats same tactics.

c. No mine fields were laid.

One unit attacks the enemy front position, and deliberately retreats in order to draw the enemy out of its position. Meanwhile the right and left flank take up the attack. If the frontal unit had completely drawn the enemy out of its position, then radio messages would be sent to the flank attacking units to encircle the enemy. After that, the front attacking unit again would bear down upon the enemy. No hole would be left in the encirclement.

a. No defensive measures were taken against UN aircraft.

b. US AA Guns were used.

a. When PW unit entered KOREA they brought kaoliang, rice, millet, cookies, and canned goods from MANCHURIA by truck. When PW unit arrived at TOKCH'ON (德川), P'YONGAN NAMDO (平安南道), KOREA, on 6 Nov 1950, there was no food left. Canned goods were destroyed by the US Air Force. The North Korean People's Republic Government supplied food (millet, rice and kaoliang) to PW unit. Chicken, cabbage and other produce were purchased from the Korean farmers. The CCF paid in North Korean currency when purchasing groceries. Two meals were served to each soldier per day. Four bowls of rice, millet, or kaoliang and a bowl of soup were sufficient for the PW. In bivouac and combat areas, each soldier carried ½ lb of Chinese dried cake; 5 lb of steamed cake (MANTOU 饅頭); 5 lb of fried corn.

b. The following quantities of ammunition were given to each man upon departure for the assembly area:

Supply came from rear by trucks. PW heard that ammunition was stored in the mountains where the 4th Field Army Hq was located (place unknown).

c. No new clothing was issued in KOREA but a pair of Chinese cloth shoes (issued to each soldier at P'YONGYANG 14 Dec 50). When soldiers lost their uniforms, they were replaced immediately, but limited only to the combat area.

a. "Walkie Talkie" SCR 300, SCR 600 radio-telephone, and Japanese "walkie talkie" were used from company up to Field Army. Their range was approx 2 miles.

b. American wire equipment, seized from CNA, was used. Some wire equipment was captured from UN forces by the CCF.

c. Runners and mounted men were used (squad up to regiment) to carry written or verbal messages.

d. Bugles, whistles, and flares (Japanese) were used for combat signals. One Chinese signal pistol was issued to each platoon leader, company commander, and battalion commander.

a. PW received three months of training at SSUP'INGKAI (四平街), MANCHURIA, in 1948.

b. The normal training period was not regulated.

c. Actual firing using three live rounds was held everyday during the three months' basic training.

d. No training conducted in forward area in KOREA.

All soldiers had taken typhoid vaccine and tetanus toxoid before their departure for KOREA.

Concealment was not a problem for CCF soldier because any number of troops were able to conceal themselves utilizing natural features. However, they remained still during an air attack.

Discipline was well maintained among the soldiers because of the strict supervision of their commander. The following instructions were given when they entered KOREA:

(1) Military discipline should be maintained at all times in KOREA.

(2) In the Korean market, you must pay civilian prices for all purchases.

(3) One who commits rape upon a Korean woman will be punished as a first-class criminal.

(4) The CCF soldiers are not allowed to enter Korean houses or private property.

(5) Enemy PW should be well treated under any circumstances.

The attitude of Korean civilians toward the CCF was uncooperative. They were forced to engage in road construction by the North Korean People's Republic.

For the Commanding Officer: