ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3672 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S. R. 029) 22 February 1951
| PW NAME: | LI, Lan Ting (李藺亭) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63NK700385 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| AGE: | 22 |
| DUTY: | Machine gunner |
| UNIT: | CCF, 4th Field Army, 116th Div, 348th Regt, 1st Bn, 4th Co, 1st Plat |
| EDUCATION: | 2 years Primary school |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | KO RANG P'O-RI (高浪浦里) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 24 Dec 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | KIRIN-SHANG, NUNGAN-HSIEN, SANMACHIA-TSUN (滿洲 吉林省 農安縣 三馬架村) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Lt I M WU (ROKA) |
Cooperative, intelligent. Memory - fair. Judgement of distance - good. Reliability - fair.
a. Security:
(1) Against air attack; during daylight, CCF does not march. At night, PW unit was ordered to remain motionless in the presence of UN aircraft.
(2) Against ground attack; extend in case they meet a surprise attack. Normally regiment reconn plat departed approx 10 hours earlier than the main body, and each company sent 8 men about 200 m ahead as scouts.
(3) Against tank attack; upon approaching tank, 3 men from each plat creep to the last tank, if there were more than two, with packaged dynamite. Each group sticks to one tank. If they fail this mission, it is taken over by other "tank killer" groups.
b. No marching during daylight. Usually from dusk to dawn.
c. In the rear, highways were used, but near the front, the unit took mountain trails.
d. On highways, two files one on each side of the road, and over mountainous trails, a single file. Personnel kept approx 70 cm apart on night marches, but in early evening and when air attack was possible, the distance was approx 3 m. At the front, runner, and in the rear, bugles, were used for communication.
e. In case of emergency there was no halt in marching, but otherwise, there was 10 minute break for every hour of marching. No security measures taken.
a. Security:
(1) Against air attack; PW unit stayed in their foxholes.
(2) Against ground attack; 10 sentries were posted around company bivouac area (approx 100 m apart). One plat, with one US HMG (two in the company), was on duty.
b. 10 sentries were posted on the nearest hill-top, and 2 sentries on nearby roads.
c. Two meals a day (0700 and 1800) in the nearest valley. Slept from about 0700 to 1800 each day. Each man in his own foxhole.
d. Tree branches on net frames were used as camouflage.
a. Assault was conducted by the battalion commander. One battalion in front of the enemy position, and a battalion on each flank.
b. The objective for company and battalion was approx 500 m deep.
c. After reaching the objective, troops pursued, or left it to reserve units to pursue the enemy.
d. If the attack fails, troops retreat on orders of the commanding officer.
a. Troops were told not to break into the enemy positions, but after probing to retreat so as to attack from the flanks.
b. Normally, a company was used for probing attacks.
c. Probing forces return to the main body after completion of mission.
a. One platoon from the battalion was set up on the nearest hill-top along the line of march. This platoon was divided into groups if there were more than one hill-top.
b. Normally, one squad was set up on the nearest and highest hill-top in the vicinity of the front.
a. Normal depth of a company defensive position was approx 500 m.
b. The reserve if located in the rear, 5 km away from the front. The mission was to replace troops in the front, and to reinforce if necessary. After the front troops advanced, mopping up and policing were left to the reserves.
"Tank killer" was the term used in the CCF for the "tank attack group" (打戰車小組). Their instructions were to destroy the tanks, forfeiting their lives if necessary. This group, upon tank approaching, creep in from both sides. If they fail, they have to repeat the maneuver until the tank is destroyed.
a. Steamed rice was given twice (0700 and 1800) a day. During combat it was common for soldiers to carry rations for 3 or 4 days. The rations were prepared at the nearest village. Rations were plentiful in the rear. Rations were collected from local farmers.
b. Ammunition was sufficient. Regimental headquaters re-supplied ammunition to the companies. It was carried by hand from regimental headquarters to the companies. Ammunition was stored in dispersed places and covered with tree branches and long grass.
c. Quilted jackets and trousers were provided and were adequate. There was no chance to loose them, and when worn out they were repaired by the wearer.
d. Korean civilian clothing worn only by reconnaissance.
a. One radio in the battalion.
b. Each company had an American field telephone. Captured wire was used. Reliability - fair.
c. Between company headquarters and platoon headquarters, runners were used. They carried verbal messages.
d. When communication was cut off in the company, flares and bugles were used. Whistles were used in platoon, when out of voice range.
a. Approx 6 months. This training was carried out by the army, but one third of the time was devoted to political training.
b. Actual firing of live ammo was conducted about twice a month.
c. Each recruit fired three rounds.
a. No diseases were observed.
b. No immunization given.
c. One soldier in PW squad had frozen feet.
Discipline was well maintained. Killing of PW or civilians was punishable by death.
a. Attitude of North Korean civilians toward CCF was fair.
b. CCF used Korean civilians as guides only.
For the Commanding Officer:
ROBINSON
