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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3661　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 029)　22 February 1951

Intelligence, cooperation, memory, and physical condition, good. Reliability - good.

a. Security:

(1) When on the march and under aircraft attack, troops deploy off the road and take cover. In the event of a bombing attack, troops do not fire on aircraft. However, if it’s a direct strafing attack, the heavy weapons section goes into action, including small arms fire from the troops.

(2) When under ground attack, PW unit always had a security force the size of a platoon as the “point” with the “advance party” about 100m behind, and the “main body” following about 20m behind. When contact with the enemy is made by the “point”, a warning shot is fired and if there is enough time, a runner is dispatched to the rear with a report of the contact. The “advance party” deploys in battle formation as skirmishers, with the “main body” attempting to establish position on high ground straddling the road. The “point” immediately retreats and joins the skirmishers.

b. Marches took place at night only, from 1830 - 0400.

c. Marches conducted over main roads, trails, and cross country.

d. PW unit moved in one column. Messengers were used between columns for communication.

e. PW unit had a 10 minute break for every hour of marching. However, when close to the front, no rest periods were allowed. Usually, no security guards were sent out during rest periods because of the measures taken in establishing a security “point.”

When troops were ordered to move out, Korean interpreters brought from MANCHURIA acted as guides. At times, civilian guides were used. When the unit leaves the area familiar to the civilian guide, the guide is released and the Korean interpreter is sent out ahead to scan the area, and if possible, to procure another guide from the area ahead. In the meantime, the troops were ordered to rest, but to be on the alert.

a. Security:

(1) In bivouac areas, individual foxholes are dug for protection against air attack.

(2) Against ground attack, troops were informed in advance as to where to assemble and how to deploy. Usually, the area designated is some nearby mountain or hill.

b. Sentries were posted approx 1,000m to the front and to the flanks. Each post consists of one guard. A single shot fired as a warning.

c. If civilian houses were available, troops used them for quarters, otherwise sleep in foxholes. Food was eaten in foxholes and, if in a mountainous area, food eaten in the open, under the cover provided by trees.

d. Natural vegetation used for camouflage.

a. Assembly areas are used. Final bivouac areas were occasionally as far back as 8 or 9 miles from the front. The distance varied according to the terrain and the situation. Usually, assembly areas were about 800 - 1,000m from the active front.

b. If the columns are strung out too far and time is essential, multiple columns are used in movement to assembly areas.

c. Assembly is ½ - 1 hour before H-hour.

d. In the assembly area final instructions are given to platoon leaders. These include objectives, location of supporting units, and the formations to be used from the “line of departure.”

e. Formation used in moving out of the assembly area is as follows: the 1st platoon moves out as skirmishers, the 2nd platoon echelons to the left, and the 3rd platoon echelons to the right, with all 3 platoons forming a wedge. Once committed, formations do not change, and scouts did not precede formations.

a. Assault by the platoon was by bounds up to about 40 - 50 yards from the objective. At this point hand grenades were used and, in the final charge, fixed bayonets.

b. Company objective was about 50 - 60m deep.

c. If the casualty list was not too great, a small holding force was left behind and the rest of the unit pressed the attack.

d. If the attack failed, headquarters was notified, and reenforcements, sometimes of battalion strength, brought up. On the committing of units to engagements with the enemy, the following ratios generally prevail: one battalion vs one US company, and one regiment vs one US battalion. All these units are not committed at one time, but fresh reserves can be drawn at will.

Troops usually dig in when they stop due to fear of UN air activity.

a. Daylight patrols used. Strength: 4 - 12 men. Mission, to determine the enemy’s location, strength, types of weapons if possible, and location of artillery positions. These units are sent out from regimental level. Sometimes they are dressed in civilian clothes.

b. Usually guerrilla units make contact with the patrols, instead of the patrols making the contact, the guerrilla forces having better knowledge of trails and terrain.

OP are set up in front of defense positions, usually on high ground.

a. One type of defense used is as follows: Companies are strung out in platoon wedge with soldiers digging individual foxholes. (See sketch below).

b. The individual soldier digs his own foxhole with pick and shovel.

c. Troops were ordered not to fire at bombing aircraft for fear of giving their position away.

a. Divisional troops were deployed in such a manner as to provide a two-fold plan of attack.

(1) If orders were received to move ahead, two battalions move out to the right and left respectively, each in a wide arc, and execute a flanking movement. Once the enemy’s rear has been cut, the third battalion then makes a coordinated frontal attack.

The number of units used for flanking movements, depends on the “recon” report as to the size and strength of the enemy’s reserve in the immediate area.

(2) In the case of a retreat by the front line units, the retreat could be converted into a trap for the attacking force. (Note reason for a corridor 1 to 2 miles wide in sketch No. 1). The defensive tactics, used during a retreat, are characterized by the “leap frog” pattern. Once the 1st battalion passes between the 2nd and 3rd battalions, these two battalions pick up the fire fight and intentionally retreat towards the rear, in the direction of division headquarters. When the attacking force penetrated close to the vicinity of the 2nd and 3rd regiments, a flanking movement is executed by both of these units, with the 1st Regiment regrouping rapidly, and making an about face and joining the fight with a frontal attack, thereby closing a trap on the attacking force. (See sketch No. 1).

b. To block all routes of escape. PW unit never left a hole in the encirclement.

a. PW unit ran out of the usual ration of rice, millet and kaoliang. Troops were then fed sweet potatoes taken from civilians. If possible, food was prepared in civilian houses. Otherwise, it was prepared in the open. When food was inadequate, troops had to go on short rations.

b. PW unit had sufficient ammo. No other information.

c. One cotton padded winter uniform. Uniform was adequate. If uniform was lost, soldier would have to provide his own remedial measures. Torn uniforms were mended by the individual.

d. Civilian clothes are used by spies to infiltrate UN lines. Also the recon units used civilian clothes when working close to enemy lines.

a. Radios were used from regimental level up. Types, range, and reliability unknown.

b. Runners were used up to regimental level. Between companies, verbal messages were used. From company to battalion, written coded messages were used. Maximum distance for runners about 1½ to 2 miles.

c. Buglers were used for all military calls and also for signalling between companies. Whistles were used as means for signalling between platoons. Flares were used also for signalling at night.

a. PW received 2½ months of training in mountain combat prior to entering into KOREA.

b. PW did have training in actual firing.

c. No training received since entering KOREA.

d. At time of training, ammunition was sufficient.

Discipline good.

Attitude of Korean civilians toward the CCF, fair.

Korean civilians were used as guides.

For the Commanding Officer:

A TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE DEFENSIVE