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CHANG, Shun I 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 41 NO. 3670 1950-11-04
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3670 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 029) 22 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHANG, Shun I (張順義)
PW NUMBER: T100030
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 21
DUTY: Arty Man
UNIT: CCF 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 2nd Bn, Arty Btry, 3rd Plat
EDUCATION: 5 yr of Primary School
OCCUPATION: Railway Worker
PLACE OF CAPTURE: DOKCH'ON (德川)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 4 Nov 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHINA, HOPEI-SHENG, TANGSHAN, WAFANG-CHIEH #8 (中國 河北省 唐山市 瓦房街 八号)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Lt I.M. WU (ROKA)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Intelligence and cooperation fair. Reliability - Fair.

3. MARCHES:
a. Security
(1) Against Air Attack: Usually marched during the night and dispersion was the only measure.
(2) Against Ground Attack: When a regiment is marching, approx 3 platoons were sent out about 20 minutes earlier in three directions; one in the front, the others to the flanks.
Runners were used between patrol and main body.
(3) Against Tank Attack: As active means of protection,
a. 2.36 bazooka, 60mm anti-tank gun and "bangalore torpedo" were used.
b. CCF was limited to marching only at night from approx 1800 to 0500 hours.
c. In the approach to the front, used mountain trails and, in the rear main roads were used.
d. Two files on main roads and single file over mountain trails.
In marching, communication between columns was by runners.
e. Close in the front, no halts were made. In the rear, PW Arty Btry had about 6 minutes for every hour and no security measures were taken.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. Against Air Attack: All security measures were passive means of protection. All CCF stuck to their air raid shelter, covered with grass and leaves. Capacity - 2-4 men.
b. Against Ground Attack: Each Bn posted sentries all round bivouac area.
c. Against Tank Attack: Bazookas and AT guns were used.
d. Sleep from approx 0800 to 1700 in trenches or foxholes.
e. Eating: Breakfast approx 10 o'clock and supper around 1700 hours in the evening. There was no definite place to eat.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
a. Approx 7 km away from bivouac area was the assembly area (Sic).
b. Assembly area approached in single file.
c. At assembly area, Bn CO explains tactical plans and give instructions to Co CO.
d. No scouts preceded formations.

6. ASSAULT:
a. In the assault, usually attempted to envelop the enemy's flanks.
b. CCF took up the pursuit after reaching the objective.
c. Retreat if the attack fails.
d. Troops dig in when they have to stop more than an hour.

7. OBSERVATION:
One Sqd is posted around main Bn assembly area.

8. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. Trenches were dug.
b. Trenches were dug with shovels and picks.
c. For counterattack, concentrated fire was planned. Attack both enemy flanks.
d. Defense located approx 500m back and their mission was to replace combat troops when tired.

9. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
37mm anti-tank guns and 2.36 bazookas used.

10. AIRCRAFT:
a. Antiaircraft guns are used against UN aircraft.
b. Model 92 Japanese antiaircraft guns were used in CCF.

11. SUPPLY:
a. Steamed rice and fried dough were the rations. Prepared at farm houses. Rations were sufficient.
b. There was not sufficient ammunition. Trucks were used in transporting ammunition. Stored mostly in air-raid shelters.
c. Quilted jackets and trousers were adequate. When lost or worn out, they were replaced.
d. Reconnaissance troops used civilian clothing.

12. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. In Regt Hq, radio was used.
b. Field telephone was used in every Co Hq. Reliability was good. There was sufficient wire.
c. Runners carried written or verbal messages. In marching, runners were used.
d. Bugles were used to signal assembly.

13. TRAINING:
a. PW received 2 months training.
b. Actual firing using live ammunition was included in training problems.
c. Training was conducted in rear areas.
d. Sufficient ammunition was used for training.

14. MEDICAL:
a. 7 men in PW Co had malaria.
b. About 10 men had frozen feet in the 2nd Bn.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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