ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3690 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1573) 21 February 1951
| NAME: | CHANG, Hung Pin (張鴻彬) (CCF) |
| RANK: | Co CO |
| ORGN: | 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 114th Div, 342nd Regt, 3rd Bn, HMG Co |
| DUTIES: | Co CO |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School, 4 yr |
| AGE: | 33 |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| ADDRESS: | CHILIN SHENG, YING CHI HSIEN, SAN CHIU, ERH CHIA TZU (吉林省 永集縣 三區 二家子) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 101600 I Feb 51 KYONGAN NI (CS4541) |
| INTERROGATOR: | CHS |
Very cooperative. Information seems reliable.
a. Chronology:
Conscripted into the CCF CHILIN SECURITY GUARD BN 27 Oct 45 at CHILIN (吉林省). Received no training, and performed guard duties.
After having attended the Military Government College in May 49, PW was assigned as Co CO of a Guard Co in the 38th Army.
38th Army left HUNAN SHENG, LIN LI HSIEN on foot in Sep 49 and arrived KUANG HSI SHENG, TIEN TUNG HSIEN (廣西省 田東縣) 10 Nov 49.
Left KUANG HSI SHENG, TIENTUNG HSIEN on foot in Dec 49 and arrived YUN NAN SHENG, MENG TZU HSIEN (廣西省 蒙自縣) 20 Jan 50.
Left YUN NAN SHENG, MENG TZU HSIEN 25 Jan 50 by train and arrived YU NAN SHENG, CHIEN HSUI HSIEN (雲南省 建水縣) 28 Jan 50.
Left HUN NAN SHENG, PAI YUAN HSIEN (湖西省 䄻園縣) 25 Mar 50.
Left HU NAN SHENG, PAI YUAN HSIEN Jun 50 by train and arrived LIAO HSI SHENG, LAO KAI YUAN (遼西省 老開園) 23 Jun 50. Here it underwent combat training.
At LAO KAI YUAN, 1 Sep 50, the Guard Co, was redesignated as 38th Army, 114th Div, Eng Bn, 3rd Co.
38th Army left LAO KAI YUAN by train 19 Sep 50 and arrived CHIAN HSIEN (輯安縣) 20 Sep 50.
Left CHIAN HSIEN 22 Sep 50 on foot and arrived KUJANG DONG (XE2934) 7 Oct 50.
A mixed unit of Bn strength left KUJANG DONG 15 Oct 50 on foot and arrived PILTONG (YC5780) 10 Nov 50.
While traveling from PILTONG to KYONGAN NI, the following places were passed:
| Place Departed | Date | Mode of Tvl | Place Arr | Date |
| PILTONG | 10 Nov 50 | Marched | SUNCHON | 7 Dec 50 |
| SUNCHON (YD5267) | 7 Dec 50 | Marched | SAMDUNG | 10 Dec 50 |
| SAMDUNG (BU5620) | 14 Dec 50 | Marched | KODONG NI | 27 Dec 50 |
PW Co rejoined 38th Army at KODONG NI.
Entire 38th Army left:
| KODONG NI (CU4714) | 31 Dec 50 | Marched | 38th parallel | 31 Dec 50 |
| 38th parallel | 31 Dec 50 | Marched | NAEGONG NI | 31 Dec 50 |
| NAEGONG NI | 27 Jan 51 | Marched | YANGPYONG | 4 Feb 51 |
| YANGPYONG | 6 Feb 51 | Marched | KYONGNA NI (CS4740) | (8 Feb 51) |
PW became the HMG CO at NAEGONG NI 12 Jan 50.
Captured 10 Feb 51.
b. Location and Activities of Unit (10 Feb 51):
While at KUJANG DONG Oct 50, heard that the 4th and 2nd Field Armies were in KOREA while elements of the 3rd Field Army, were coming from the rear.
38th Army Hq was located at TONG NI (CS5746).
50th Army was located approx 3 km W at KYONGONG NI.
340th Regt, and 342nd Regt of the 114th Div. were located at KYONGONG NI.
112th Div was located 2 km E of KYONGONG NI.
Elements of NKA were located SSW of KYONGONG NI.
66th and the 50th Armies were independent armies, the others were all 4th Field Armies.
LIN, PIAO (CG of the 4th Field Army) was now at HANKOU, CHINA.
Between 11 Jan 50 and 11 Apr 51, the CCF will recuperate at their present position and defend the HAN River while awaiting replacements. At present, the CCF are fighting because the UN forces were attacking.
c. T/O & E and Strengths:
Code: 38th Army CG: PING SHAN PU (平山部), 51
PW claimed that there were 4 field armies (1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th).
4th Field Army: 4 Army Groups (13th, 14th, 15th & 16th), Arty Div, Guard Regt, Engr Regt, Med Dept, Army Supply
13th Army Group: 38th, 39th, & 40th Armies, Arty Div, Guard Bn, Engr Co, Med Unit, Army QM
14th Army Group: 41st, 42nd and 43rd Armies
15th Army Group: 44th, 45th and 46th Armies
16th Army Group: 47th, 48th and 49th Armies
38th Army: 112th, 113rd & 114th Div, Arty Regt, Guard Co, Engr Co, Med Unit QM
114 Div: 340th, 341st and 342nd Regt, 2 Arty Mt Gun Bn, Med Unit, Guard Co, Engr Co, Rear Service (QM), Litter Bearer Co
342nd Regt: 3 Bn, 2 Mt Gun Btry, Litter Bearer Plat, Guard Co, Med Sqd, Rear Service Unit
Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle Co, HMG Co, Med Sqd, Sig Sqd
Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Plat
3 Rifle Sqd
HMG Co: 3 Plat
3 Sqd
| HMG Co: | Original (12 Jan 51) | Present (10 Feb 51) |
| EM | 114 | 30 |
| Off | 13 | 9 |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| HMG (US) | 4 (2,000 rd ea) | 1 |
| 82mm Mortars (US) | 2 (39 rd ea) | 2 |
| Rocket Launchers (US) | 2 (24 rd ea) | 0 |
| Carbines (US) | 12 (150 rd ea) | 8 |
| Pistols (US) | 9 (200 rd ea) | 5 |
| Pistols, 45 (US) | 3 (100 rd ea) | 3 |
| Rifle Co: | ||
| EM & Off | 130 | |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| Mortars | 2 | |
| Rifle Bn: | ||
| EM & Off | 700 | 400 |
| Equipment & Ammo | Unknown | |
| 342nd Regt: | ||
| EM & Off | 3,000 approx | 1,700 |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| Bangal or Torpedoes | 25 | |
| Arty Btry: | ||
| EM & Off | 130 | |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| Mt Guns (Jap Caliber 2½”) | 2 | |
| 82mm Mortars (US) | 4 | |
| 114th Div | ||
| EM & Off | 13,000 | 6,000 |
d. Personalities:
PENG, Te Huai (彭德懷), CG, 1st Field Army.
LIU, Pai Cheng (劉伯成), CG, 2nd Field Army.
CHEN, I (陳義), CG, 3rd Field Army.
LIN Piao (林彪), CG, 4th Field Army.
TI, Chung Yu (■忠用), CG, 114th Div.
SHIH, Ku Chien (石克檢), CO, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt, 114th Div.
FUNG, Chun Chia (■春甲), CO, 2nd HMG Plat, HMG Co, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt.
CHANG, Tzu To (張之德), CO, 1st HMG Plat, HMG Co, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt.
CHIANG, Tsai Te (蔣在德), CO, 3rd HMG Plat, HMG Co, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt.
CHOU, Hsien (周見), Political Officer, HMG Co, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt.
e. Replacements:
22 Jan 51, at NAEGONG NI, PW sent two assistant Plat leaders to ANTUNG to get replacements for his company. Believed other units are doing the same.
f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
No ammo came in from the rear. They utilized ammo which were left behind by the UN forces.
Received a pair of winter shoes 25 Jan 51 at NAEGONG NI.
Believed 1/3 of the food came from CHINA while 2/3 gotten from farmers in KOREA.
g. Armor, Artillery and Aircraft:
Saw 6 rocket launchers (Russian make) at KUJANG DONG Oct 50.
Saw 6 US Howitzers near the 38th parallel of drawn by trucks Dec 50. Believed that they were the guns which had been captured from American troops.
h. Signal:
Bn and above used telephones, while below Bn level, runners used.
Regt and above also utilized wireless.
Flags were used during day light for long distances.
Bugles were used during daylight for short distances.
Flash lights were used at night for short distances.
The horn, bugle, flash lights were not used to unnerve UN troops but to communicate with each other.
i. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale was low because, they lacked food, warm clothing, and slept in the mountains. They heard that planes and tanks would arrive, but never saw any. They heard that UN troops ride in jeeps, and heard that they have ample food and clothing, ammo, tanks and planes.
j. UN PW:
PW was one of the men who took 2,200 ROK and 3 US PW to the YALU River area to PILTONG 15 Oct 50 from KUJANG DONG. ROK PW were to be turned over to the NKA, while the US PW were sent to CHINA.
Saw more than 1,000 US PW at TOKCHON in Dec 50.
In Oct 50 at KUJANG DONG, heard that half of the wounded US PW, after having been given food and good treatment, were to be returned to US lines for propaganda.
k. Medical:
There were no contagious diseases in PW unit.
Did not receive any immunizations while in KOREA.
In his company more than 80% of the men had frost bitten feet. Jelly-like medicine was applied to the feet, but it did not aid materially.
Severe cases were sent to the rear hospitals.
l. Psychological Warfare:
Voluntarily surrended because he thought back to what his brother had said, who was a prisoner of the CCF: “You will have an opportunity to runaway in KOREA. Surrender to the US troops and go to TAIWAN to join the CNA.”
Saw UN leaflets at various places.
The leaflets stated, in general: “CCF soldiers, surrender to the UN forces! The treatment is fine; we have warm food and clothing. You are not fighting for the true cause.”
Believed in the leaflets after reading it.
Believed soldiers other than the political officers believed in the leaflets, too.
As an improvement, PW suggested: “You CCF soldiers, we will give you sufficient food and clothing. If you surrender to the UN forces, we will save your life and send you back to your homes and to your families.”
PW urged not to mention TAIWAN, because they will start wondering that “how can they feed so many men in such a small area?”
m. Combat Tactics:
The envelopment tactic of the CCF was that if the UN forces advanced with one Div, one CCF Regt would face it, flanked by two CCF Div on both sides. The one CCF Regt would withdraw to a desired position, so that the UN Div would be flanked by the CCF Div. Then the CCF Regt would hold, while the flanking Div would annihilate the UN Div.
Similar tactics used that if the CCF units observe a UN Div advancing, one CCF Regt would meet UN Div and hold it, there by enabling two CCF Div on the flanks to surround the UN Div.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
