ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3682 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1564) 19 February 1951
| NAME: | HU, Yu, Yuan (胡魚元) (CCF) |
| RANK: | Plat Ldr |
| ORGN: | 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 112th Div, 336th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co, 1st Plat |
| DUTIES: | Plat Ldr |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School, 2 yr |
| AGE: | 36 |
| OCCUPATION: | Carpenter |
| ADDRESS: | SHANTUNG CHENG, PINGTU HSIEN, HANCHIA TSUN (山東省 平度縣 漢家村) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 141000 Feb 51 in KWANGJU (CS4049) |
| INTERROGATOR: | CHS |
PW cooperative.
In good physical condition, and mentally alert.
Information seems reliable.
a. Chronology:
Inducted into 38th Army (CCF), 112th Div, 336th Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co in Jan 46 at TUNGHWA.
Received training for 15 days at CHILIN SHENG HSIN CHAN (吉林省新站).
Between Jan 46 to Jul 50, the 38th Army engaged the CNA and cultivating land on state-controlled farms.
Div, left HONAN, CHENG GANG HSIEN on foot Jul 50 and arrived ANTUNG (安東) Aug 50.
Left ANTUNG 2 Oct 50 by train via TUNGHWA to CHIAN (輯安).
While traveling from CHIAN to KWANGJU, passed:
| Plane Departed | Date | Mode of Tvl | Place Arr | Date |
| CHIAN | Oct 50 | Marched | KUJANG DONG | Nov 50 |
| KUJANG DONG (39° 52’ - 126° 00’) | Nov 50 | Marched | KWANGJU | 5 Feb 51 |
Captured 14 Feb 51 at KWANGJU.
b. Location and Activities of Units:
14 Feb 51, heard that the 38th Army Hq was located N of the HAN River.
1st Bn Hq was located in the KWANGJU Area.
336th Regt was to rest and regroup in the KWANGJU Area for 2 or 3 months, since they lacked clothing and ammo. PW did not hear of any supplies arriving from the rear. Heard from the Co CO that, when the weather becomes warm, they will start an offensive.
Saw 39th Army, N of the 38th Parallel 17 Jan 51.
In Dec 50, while in KOREA, heard from his Plat Ldr that 39th, 38th, 42nd and 50th CCF Armies were in KOREA.
During an attack on a hill defended by PW unit, each type of weapon was used successively as the UN unit closed in; as follows:
(1) 60mm mortars were used when at a distance of 1000-1500 m and only when 10 or more men bunched together in a group.
(2) HMG were used at a distance of approx 800-1000 m.
(3) LMG opened fire within 300-500 m range or closer when the slopes of the hill permitted observation.
(4) Rifles commenced firing within 100 m.
(5) SMG commenced their fire at 200 m.
(6) Grenades were hurled when the enemy approached to within 30 m.
Foxholes were dug 3 m apart in staggered positions on uneven terrain and 10 m apart on level terrain. The sqd ldr position was at the center of the sqd, with his foxhole located 3 m behind the rear line of foxholes. The asst sqd ldr was either to the left or right of the sqd. The sqd ldr and assistant sqd ldr carried SMG.
The distance between sqd was 30 m on uneven terrain and 50 m on level terrain.
c. T/O & E and Strength:
4th Field Army: 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, & 42nd Armies.
38th Army: 112th, 113th & 114th Div
112th Div: 334th, 335th & 336th Regt
336th Regt: 3 Rifle Bn, 81mm Mortar Co.
1st Bn: 3 Rifle Co, HMG Co.
2nd Co: 3 Rifle Plat, 60mm Mortar Plat.
1st Rifle Plat: 3 Sqd
| Rifle Plat: | Original (Nov 50) | Present (14 Feb 51) |
| EM | 35 | 12 |
| Off | 1 | 1 |
| The difference in personnel was due to casualties from ground combat and strafing. | ||
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| 38 type Rifles | 30 (50 rd ea) | unk (15 rd ea) |
| SMG (US) | 2 (200 rd ea) | 2 (50 rd ea) |
| LMG (Canada) | 3 (600 rd ea) | 1 |
| Grenades | 4 ea person | |
| Mortar Plat: | ||
| EM & Off | 26 | 8 |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| 60mm Mortars (Chinese) | 3 (40 rd per) | 1 (60 rd) |
| 2nd Co: | ||
| EM | 130 | 31 |
| Off | 8 | 4 |
| T/O & E: | ||
| HMG Co: | ||
| EM & Off | 130 | Unk |
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| HMG (Maxim) | 4 (1,000 rd per) | Unk |
| 81mm Mortars | 2 | Unk |
| 1st Bn: | ||
| EM & Off | 500 approx | 150 |
| 81mm Mortar Co: | ||
| Equipment & Ammo | ||
| 81mm Mortars | 5 | Unk |
| 336th Regt: | ||
| EM & Off | 1800 approx | 600 |
d. Personalities:
CHANG, I Hun (蔣一草), Political Off, 2nd Co
WANG, Kuo Ying (王克英), Co CO, 2nd Co
e. Replacements:
PW heard from his Co CO in Feb 51, that replacements would come into his unit. No details were available as to places, numbers, and dates.
There has been no replacements in the PW unit since arriving in KOREA.
f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
An 120 man group was sent to gather food at HAKPONG-MYON 25 Dec 50, PW group of 22 men from the 336th Regt was told to obtain 200 tons for regiment. Only 35 tons, however, were actually obtained, 2/3 of the food consisted of rice, the remainder corn. This food was obtained from farmers, who received receipts for the amount given and were informed that such receipts could be deducted from their yearly food taxes imposed by the NK government. After the food was gathered it was cached in a cave in the HAKPONG MYON area.
Prior to rejoining his plat 2 Feb 51, he was fed twice daily. After this, however, his plat was usually fed once daily during combat, and it was insufficient.
Men in his Bn were supplied with a pair of shoes 12 Feb 51 at Hill 578. No other clothing received since entering KOREA.
g. Signal:
Bugles used during combat.
When a unit approached, buglers would give a long call. If the approaching unit was friendly, it would answer by two long calls.
h. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale was very low because of the many casualties, scarcity of food, and the cold weather.
i. Medical:
There were no diseases in the PW Co.
Had not received immunizations since coming to KOREA.
Most of the men in 2nd Co had frostbitten feet but they could walk.
PW showed the interrogator a medicine which every soldier had for frostbitten feet. It smelled like “Vicks” and looked the same. It was called “frostbite medicine. Characters:
(凍■膏) 華北製藥廠天津衛生材料■
(NORTH CHINA PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT, TIENTSIN MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT)
j. Psychological Warfare:
Voluntarily surrendered because he was disgusted with the lack of food and clothing, and was afraid of aerial attacks.
Saw UN leaflets Feb 51 in the KWANGJU area.
Leaflet stated, “Why are you fighting in KOREA when you know you have insufficient food? If you come to our side we will give you warm food and clothing.”
Believed the leaflet so he surrendered.
Did not know the opinion of others because he never had the opportunity to discuss it.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
