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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3197　6 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1422)　26 January 1951

PW was quite at ease during interrogation. He was confused with dates and names of places. Information seems fairly reliable.

4th Field Army: Negative

42nd Army: 124th, 125th, 126th Div

126th Div: 377th, 376th, 378th Regt, Cav Troop

Code # 377th Regt: 108

376th Regt: 107

378th Regt: 109

377th Regt: 3 Rifle Bn, Guard Co, Cav Plat, Arty Btry

Code # 1st Bn: 501

2nd Bn: 502

3rd Bn: 503

3rd Bn: 3 Rifle Co, Hvy Weapons Co

Code # 7th Co: 679

8th Co: 680

9th Co: 681

Hvy Wpn Cop: 682

9th Co: 3 Rifle Plat

2nd Plat: 3 Rifle Sqd

2nd Platoon:|Original (Nov 50)|Present (19 Jan 51)

Personnel:

EM|22|13

Officers|1|0

Total|23|13

|Original (Nov 50)|Present (19 Jan 51)

Equipment & ammo:

Model 38 rifles|8 (70 rd ea)|6 (70 rd ea)

HMG|2 (800 rd ea)|2 (800 rd ea)

Grenades|1 or 2 per man|

Many troops were unarmed and performed labor duties. PW claimed his unit had not been committed to combat since they crossed the YALU River in Nov 50. There has been a great reduction of personnel, largely caused by frostbite and disease.

9th Co:

Personnel:

EM|Approx 100|Approx 80

Officer|6|5

Total|106|85

Equipment & ammo:

M3 SMG (US)|2 (90 rd ea)|2 (90 rd ea)

Mausers|3|3

Bugle|1|1

The strength of personnel in the platoon and company varied because platoon T/O & E was not stable; it ranged from 25 to 30 men.

Heavy Weapons Co:

Personnel:

Officers & EM|Approx 120|120

Equipment & ammo:

HMG (make unk)|6|6

82mm Mortars|3|3

Rocket Launchers (make & caliber unk)|2|2

3rd Bn:

Personnel:

Officers & EM|Approx 450|Approx 400

Equipment & ammo:

Arty Btry:

Equipment & ammo:

92mm Mortar (make unk)|3|?

Mortar (caliber between 82-92mm, make unknown) hearsay||?

Cavalry Platoon & Cavalry Troop:

Number of personnel, horses and equipment unknown.

PW heard from men in his Bn that the Cavalry personnel were couriers between Bn to Regt to Div. In rare cases, the Cavalry was used between Div to Army and Army to Field Army. This echelon used wireless. Telephones were used between Bn to Regt.

PW claims that the Cavalry did not have combat missions.

4. FOREIGN ELEMENTS:

Before crossing the YALU River there was one North Korean interpreter in each company. They were either EM or NKA officer.

PW stated that while his unit was in CHINA there were 3 Japanese soldiers in the Regt, however, after crossing the YALU River, PW did not see or hear of them.

5. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS: (as of 19 Jan 51)

Mission of the 42nd Army as of 19 Jan 51 was to recuperate and wait 2 months for food supplies around the YANP’YONG area.

9th Co C.P. was 4 km NW of YANP’YONG and the 3rd Bn C.P. was located over a mt N of the Co C.P. (exact location unknown).

As of 19 Jan 51, by order of Bn CO, 6 soldiers were ordered to located the CCF 125th Div which was SE of YANP’YONG in a village called IPORI (CS7059) and deliver a letter to the CG. However, two of them were captured before they arrived at the 125th Div. Others ran way with the letter. Contents of letter unknown. Before going on the mission, PW CO also told him to learn of the food situation at the 125th Div. If they found some food, they were to bring it to the Company.

When PW left the 9th Co, he did not see any preparations for defense positions.

6. PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:

Inducted into the CNA Peace Preservation (保安) #2 Brigade at HSIN HISANG HSIEN in Jan 49. Received one month of infantry training at HSIN HSIANG HSIEN.

7,000 or 8,000 soldiers were captured by the 42nd CCF Army at ANYANG HSIEN (安陽縣) 10 Apr 49, and were taken to CHANG TSOU. Apr to Jun 49 at CHANG TSOU, PW were indoctrinated and did odd jobs.

Jun 49 all these PW were placed into the 4th Field Army at CHANG TSOU. PW was placed in the 42nd Army, 126th Div, 377th Regt, 3rd Bn, 9th Co, 2nd Plat, 5th Sqd.

Received no training.

126th Div departed CHANG TSOU on foot Jul 49, and arrived at TAI PAI SHAN (大台山) in Aug 49. PW fought with the 42nd Army against the CNA at TAI PAI SHAN for approximately 6 months.

126th Div departed TAI PAI SHAN Mar 50 on foot and after 7 days arrived at HSINYANG HSIEN (信陽縣). The Div departed on a train and arrived at HEILUNG ■IANG SHENG, KUSHAN HSIEN (黑龍江省 克山縣) Apr 50.

The Div cultivated land and raised vegetables for approximately 5 months.

126th Div left KUSHAN HSIEN Sep 50 by train and arrived HAILUNG HSIEN (海龍縣) Sep 50. While at HAILUNG HSIEN, troops underwent close order drill and no specific combat training. Before leaving HAILUNG HSIEN, the Co CO stated that they were to go to CHIAN HSIEN. No unusual combat movement was observed by the PW.

377th left HAILUNG HSIEN Nov 50 by train and arrived at CHIAN HSIEN.

Nov 50 PW saw approx 500 soldiers crossing the wooden bridge over the YALU River from CHIAN (MANCHURIA). After 2 days in NORTH KOREA, PW heard from the Co CO that the entire Division had come to NORTH KOREA.

3rd Bn arrived at the vicinity of YANP’YONG in early Jan 51.

Route taken between CHIAN and YANP’YONG was unknown. However, most of the time they travelled on a 5 meter wide dirt road without entering any larger town. PW was captured 20 Jan 51 12 km southeast of YANP’YONG (CS6750)

LIN, Piao (林■), CG, 4th Field Army.

LI (吳), CG, 42nd Army.

HU (胡), CG, 126th Division.

CHU (朱), CO, 377th Regiment.

KAO (高), CO, 3rd Battalion.

SHEN, Tai Tsai (宋載才), CO, 9th Company

Ammo was last issued at HAILUN SHIEN Nov 50.

Before crossing the YALU River Nov 50, individual soldiers received 3½ days emergency rations. Since the food came from the rear they ate this emergency ration shortly after entering KOREA. When these were gone, they confiscated food from villages.

The morale in PW unit was low because the shortage of food and also because of frostbitten hands and feet.

PW saw 10 ROK PW heading north on foot with Chinese guards before crossing the 38th parallel at an unknown place, date unknown.

11. GENERAL INFORMATION:

PW unit did not undergo any amphibious training.

The Chinese Communist did not have Militia and Public Security Units in addition to their regular troops.

PW received 7,000 yuan per month while in CHINA, but once he received 190 won of North Korean money when he was in KOREA, so he believed that 7,000 yuan was equivalent to 190 won in North Korean money.

PW did not know of any paratroop training nor of paratroop units in the CCF.

PW did not know what happened to former Nationalist soldiers and equipment captured in MANCHURIA.

As a rule, the CCF troops sleep in farm houses, but if they are forced to, they dig holes and camouflage them with grass, and sleep in quilts.

1. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?

a. PW voluntarily surrendered to the 5th RCT because he was disgusted with the war.

2. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?

a. PW did not see any UN leaflets nor had he heard any broadcasts.

3. Can you describe them?

a. Negative

4. What was your reaction to them?

a. Negative

5. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts? What did they say or do?

a. Negative

13. SECURITY:

As aircraft security, when aircraft approached, troops would cover themselves with white sheets which they all carried, or would turn their jackets inside out (inner lining, white).

Units will start marching between 1700 and 2000 and cease at 0400 or 0500.

Units travel through mountains, main roads, and trails, according to the situation. However, they avoided large towns and cities because aircraft usually bomb them.

PW’s unit usually travelled single file. Liaison was effected by relaying messages through each man. On special conditions, messages were sent by the cavalry.

Unit’s rest periods were usually 10 to 20 minutes. There were no definite rest periods for any definite time of marching.

Before the column started marching, they usually had 3 scouts 10 to 20 meters in front of the main column.

During rest periods, there was no flank security; however, the point of the column was away from the main body.

Soldiers camouflage themselves with grass or branches or sleep under large trees.

In a Company bivouac area, usually two men were posted on the highest point.

During daylight hours, the men sleep. When there is snow, they camouflage themselves with white sheets, and when there is no snow, they sleep under trees or camouflage themselves with branches and grass.

14. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:

There are no set plans for assembly areas. When the CO sends a messenger to the squads to assemble, they come to the designated area. PW believes the method to be similar in each level.

The assembly area is usually reached between one and one half hours before H-hour.

In an attack from the assembly area, one company would go out first, then the 2nd and the 3rd making it a “V” shape with the 3rd Co I the center and to the rear. This formation is supposed to surround the enemy, but it usually depends on the time and situation. Scouts usually precede the formation, but it also depends on the time and situation to when and how many to send.

The platoon is also a “V” formation.

Mortars and HMG are always in the rear (distance unknown).

15. ATTACK:

The company usually attempts to take the nearest high spot first. If the enemy retreats, they occupy it. The Battalion is behind the Company, the Regt back of the Bn, attack in depth. (No specific distance.) When they reach the objective, only the Company assembles and pursues the enemy. However, if the Company cannot contact other friendly forces, the pursuit will stop, and then start digging foxholes.

If the attack fails, they would retreat by platoons leap-frogging backward by fire and movement.

16. PROBING ATTACKS:

Mission is worded “CH’IEN WEI TUI” (前■■).

When an unknown strength enemy is sighted, a platoon with a LMG is sent out by the Regt, from a Rifle Company nearest to the enemy to force an attack. If the enemy retreats, the platoon comes back, and if the enemy does not retreat the platoon remains and sends a messenger back to find out what action is to be taken.

17. PATROLLING:

There is no daytime patrolling.

The Recon Platoon, of the Regt, 30 men strength, usually does the patrolling by sending out two or three men with civilian clothes.

18. OBSERVATION:

CP for the Company was usually situated on the highest hill in the vicinity.

19. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:

Foxholes are dug in specified areas and mortars or HMG’s were emplaced in order to defend any position. Depth of foxhole: 1 meter deep.

20. AMBUSH AND ENCIRCLING TACTICS:

Ambush is usually organized by Companies. They usually place men on a hill or high spot, where the road cuts through them.

Rifles and grenades used.

21. COMMUNICATION:

Bugles: PW believed bugles were used in all-cut attacks.

22. MEDICAL:

Malaria was most prevalent in his unit. While in KOREA, most of them had trouble with their stomachs; they cannot eat, probably due to long marches and sleeping in the cold.

No immunization since they came to KOREA.

Practically all the men in PW unit had frostbitten feet. However, only 4, from his platoon, were so severe that they were taken back to the rear.

Lack of food and frostbites have greatly restricted the movement of troops.

23. MISCELLANEOUS:

There was only one case of desertion in his unit. They cannot desert because they do not know where to go.

The officers constantly told the EM that if the UN forces captured them they will be killed and if anyone was caught reading leaflets, their food ration was confiscated.

Although PW cannot understand Korean, he felt that the North and South Koreans did not appreciate the CCF troops, because, when they tried to borrow spoons or chopsticks by motion, even if they understood, the people did not lend them.

For the AC of S, G-2: