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CHO, Yong Chil 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 31 NO. 3175 1951-01-18
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3175 5 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1420) 26 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHO, Yong Chil (趙■七) (조■칠) (NKA)
RANK: Pvt
ORGN: II Corps, 39th Unit (PW believes this to be the Independent 7th Regt), 1st Bn, 1st Co, 3rd Plat, 1st Sqd
DUTIES: Rifleman
EDUCATION: 6 yrs
AGE: 25
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: HAMGYONG NAMDO, PUKCHON GUN, SOKRU MYON, SONGTONG-NI, #1058 (咸鏡南道 北靑郡 俗厚面 松洞里)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 181000 I Jan 51, in an unidentified village approx 4 Km due West of YOJU (CS7929)
INTERROGATOR: G.W.A.
INTERROGATED AT: HAYANG (DQ8374)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative. PW appeared to be in good physical condition. He talked freely and remembered many details about his personal and unit history in the NKA. His latest unit, the 39th NKA Unit, was a small organization, so he was constantly able to observe the activities of the unit as a whole.
Information reliable.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:(as of 18 Jan 51)
39th Unit composed of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Bn’s.
1st Bn composed of the 3 Co’s, Medical Plat, Mortar Co, HMG Co (with no HMG’s) and Rear Echelon Unit.
1st Company composed of 3 Plat’s. Each Plat composed of 3 Sqds with 3 or 4 men per sqd.
1st Bn, 39th Unit:|Original (10 Jan 51)|Present (18 Jan 51)
Personnel:
EM|100|98
Officers|Approx 20|Approx 20
Total|120|Approx 118
Equipment & ammo:
M1891/30 rifles|18 (50 rds ea)|18 (50 rds per)
US Cal .30 carbines|12 (50 rds ea)|12 (50 rds per)
US M-1 rifles|80 (100 rds ea)|78(100 rds per)
Handgrenade|1 per man|1 per man
Pistols|20|20
PPSH SMGs|10|10
81mm Mortar|1|1
Field Glasses|1|1
The Mortar Co and SMG Co are each composed of 10 men and have no platoons even though they are designated companies.
39th Unit, II Corps:
Personnel:
Total Approx|250|Approx 250
The 39th Unit has no radios or telephones and depends entirely on runners for communication.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS:
39th Unit was located at OTAN-NI as of 18 Jan 51. The units objective was TAEJON. Mountain trails were to be utilized and personnel would march at night only.
39th Unit personnel sleep during the day-time in tiny villages which have only 5 or 6 farm houses. One soldier stands guard in front of each house. When a large number of UN aircraft approaches, he warns the soldiers sleeping in the houses and they scamper up the hillsides until the aircraft have passed over.

5. PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:
PW was inducted into the NKA 30 Jul 50, at SEOUL. He received no training.
PW departed from SEOUL 2 Aug 50, marched with approx 50 other recruits led by one officer, and travelled via the following route:
Place Departed|Date|Mode of Travel|Place Arrived|Date
SEOUL|2 Aug 50|Marched|SUWON (CS2523)|Aug 50
SUWON|Aug 50|〃|TAEJON (CR5020)|Aug 50
TAEJON|Aug 50|〃|KUMCHON (DQ2197)|Aug 50
From KUMCHON, PW marched (at night only) and waded across the NAKTONG GANG (River), arriving in the mountains approx 12 Km West of WAEGWAN (DQ4581) during the latter part of Aug 50. There, he and the other 50 recruits were assigned to the 3rd NKA Div as replacements.
O/a 25 Sep 50, PW retreated with approx 500 men (remnants of the 7th Regt, 3rd Div) from the mountains approx 15 Km northwest of WAEGWAN, marched northeastward for about 2 Km and received orders from PW’s Bn CO to walk with two other recruits to SEOUL and join any NKA unit there in defense of that city. Therefore, PW and the two other recruits were separated from their regiment and walked westward over mountain trails following hundreds of other NKA soldiers who were enroute to SEOUL via TAEJON. Upon arriving in the vicinity of TAEJON, d/u, the two other recruits advised PW that it was no longer possible to go to SEOUL (PW does not know where these two other recruits received this information but believes they learned it from NKA personnel who were preceding the PW). Thereupon, PW and the two other recruits backtracked through the mountains and walked over trails through the TAEBAEK SAN mountain range, (marching with several hundred other NKA troops in groups of from three to ten men), arriving in the mountain approx 2 km east of KARYOJU-RI (CT2591) 10 Oct 50. There, PW and approx 500 other NKA personnel were organized into the Ind 7th NKA Regt. They received no additional equipment or ammunition.
PW departed with the Ind 7th Regt on 11 Oct 50, marched, and arrived in the mountains approx 12 km southeast of HWACH’ON o/a 25 Oct 50. There, the Ind 7th Regt marked time and set up a defense of the area for purposes of maintaining the regiment’s own security. Defense preparations were not elaborate and consisted merely in spreading the regiment’s personnel out to the extent that one company would take position on one hill, and a second company on the next hill, etc. Each company in turn would scatter its personnel over the hill with each of its 3 platoons linked together (see sketch).
PW departed from the mountains approx 12 km southeast of HWACH’ON o/a 6 Jan 51, marched with the Ind 7th Regt, and arrived at HWACH’ON o/a 9 Jan 51. (Enroute to HWACH’ON the Ind 7th Regt was bombed and strafed by UN aircraft reducing the regiment from 500 men to approx 250 men). At HWACH’ON the Ind 7th Regt was reorganized into 2 battalions (3 companies per battalion) and was redesignated the 39th Unit, II Corps. No additional equipment or ammunition was received during this reorganization.
PW departed from HWACH’ON o/a 11 Jan 51, marched with the 39th Unit over mountain trails in a column of twos, and arrived at OTAN-NI (approx 8 km west of YOJU) on 17 Jan 51.
On 18 Jan 51, PW departed from OTAN-NI on a reconnaissance patrol with 19 other men from the 39th Unit. After marching eastward for approx 4 km, they were fired upon by approx 25 American soldiers. PW and one other private were captured immediately while the other members of 39th Unit’s patrol scattered and escaped at 181000 I Jan 51.

6. PERSONALITIES:
LEE, Sun Sop (리순섭), Sr Lt (3 small stars), Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 39th Unit.

7. REPLACEMENTS:
The 39th Unit had received no replacements since it was organized o/a 10 Jan 51. It had not yet been engaged in any fire fight with UN forces.

8. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
39th Unit personnel move on masse into tiny villages where they confiscate all food that they can manage to carry.
The 39th Unit has received no weapons or ammunition since its organization o/a 10 Jan 51. At that time, its only weapons and ammunition were those carried by the individuals, who comprise the 39th unit, from former NKA units that they served with prior to the NKA retreat during Sep 50.

9. MORALE:
Because the combat efficiency of the 39th Unit is believed by its personnel to be poor and because the unit has never received any winter uniforms, the general state of morale of 39th Unit personnel is very low.

10. CCF:
PW observed 5 CCF soldiers walking through OTAN-NI 17 Jan 51. PW’s CO told PW that there was a CCF division in the OTAN-NI area. No other information on the CCF.
11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?
a. PW did not surrender voluntarily. He was captured while on a reconnaissance patrol for the 39th Unit, II Corps.
b. Did you see any United Nations leaflets, or hear any loud speaker broadcasts?
a. On 17 Jan 51, PW picked up a UN leaflet dropped at OTAN-NI. He was unable to read it, however, because it was written in Chinese characters.
c. Can you describe what they said?
a. No
d. What was your reaction to them?
a. Negative
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts? What did they say or do?
a. Other NKA soldiers in PW’s squad were curious as to the meaning of the UN leaflets picked up at OTAN-NI, but they were unable to read the Chinese characters that the leaflets were written in.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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