ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3098 1 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MISD - 0217) 18 January 1951
| NAME: | WU, Suu Yuen (武四元) |
| AGE: | 38 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| DUTY: | Ammo Bearer |
| UNIT: | CCF 38th Army, 112th Div, 336th Regt, Mortar Co. |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE, DATE: | Captured 161400 Jan 51, at NOGONG-NI (CS5329) |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| EDUCATION: | None |
PW did not know place names or directions too well. The following information is considered fairly reliable. He is not recommended for further interrogation.
a. Chronology:
After crossing into KOREA from MANCHURIA and engaging the UN Forces in the TOKCHON area, the 38th Army advanced southward passing through the outskirts of P’YONGYANG and arrived in the vicinity of an unknown river above the 38th parallel.
The army then engaged the UN Forces and bypassing SEOUL, crossed the HAN River on or about 10 Jan 51, at a point approximately 1 km upstream of a damaged bridge located south of SEOUL. After marching south from crossing point for a distance of 40 km the 113th and 114th Divisions separated to the right and left respectively (destination unknown), while PW’s 112th Div continued south to a point 4 km N of P’YONGCH’ON (CS533279), where the 336th Regt’l Hq was located. The 335th Regt Hq, which PW personally observed, was located 8 km N of his 336th Regt Hq.
He heard from the Company Political Officer that the 112th Div Hq was located 3 km N of the 335th Regt Hq while the 334th Regt Hq was said to be located 8 km N of the 112th Div Hq.
At the time of capture, PW and 3 others were out seeking food in NOGONG-NI approximately 4 km NW of the 336th Regt Hq. (Interrogator’s Note: Unlikely that he was out seeking food but for some other purpose.)
b. Unit Organization:
38th Army under the 4th Field Army is composed of the 112th, 113th, and 114, Divisions. 112th Div consists of the 334th, 335th, and 336th Regiments. Its present strength is approximately 5,000 men, while the present strength of the 336th Regt 1,400 men. Attached to the 336th Regt are a Mort Co of approximately 100 men, a Security Co of approximately 100 men, a Mountain Gun Bn of 130 men, a Med Plat of 80 men, and a Svc Sod of 10 men.
No replacements were received after entering KOREA.
c. Intentions:
PW did not know the mission of his 112th Div, however, he was told by his Company Commander that the unit would remain in the area for some time. However, all of the soldiers were kept busy in clearing weapons, collecting food and hauling up ammunition. He did not know as to whether or not this was indicative of preparation for an attack.
d. Weapons:
About 20% of the troops of the 112th Div were unarmed. Those with weapons such as rifles, automatics, and SMGs, had about 30 to 200 rounds of ammunition per man. Each Bn had 3 x 2.36 bazookas, 2 x 82mm mortars. Each Co had 4 HMGs and each Sqd had 1 IMG. There were 5 mountain guns in the Mt Gun Bn.
Originally there were 4 x 82mm mortars in PW’s Mort Co. Since two of these were destroyed at KUJANG-DONG by UN air strikes there are only two at present. There were 10 rounds to each mortar.
e. Food:
Presently food, rice, rye, and corn, is abundant. These were either confiscated or gathered from local villages.
f. Vehicles:
Prior to capture there were 5 trucks which he observed being used for hauling food and ammunition. He observed that during the daytime these trucks were parked in defiles, covered with grass and a layer of snow thrown for camouflage purposes.
g. Other Units:
On or about 10 Jan 51, PW and 9 other soldiers remained behind to deliver a document to the 39th and 40th Armies which were following the route of the 112th Div. After delivering the document, a map or sketch showing routes, the 39th and 40th Armies (there were so many at the time it was impossible to quote the number) started in a northerly direction for an unknown destination.
h. Personalities:
CO 336th Regt: RI Chung Chen, age 30
CO 82mm Mort Co: PE Chin Go, age 20
i. Foreign Troops:
PW learned from a Korean interpreter with his company that each CCF Army had one NK Division attached to it. He also heard from the same Korean that the NK units were to be deployed to the front of the CCF troops for the purpose of reconnaissance and gathering intelligence. Recently PW noticed that the presence of a company of North Koreans in his regimental area. For identification purposes these North Koreans had white towels wrapped around their necks or arms, and if one of them did not carry such identification, he was an immediate subject for questioning.
j. Morale:
PW noticed that the troops of his unit signs of fatigue and that the morale was low as far as the individual was concerned. However, this did not lower the fighting efficiency of the CCF since all the troops moved with one command.
k. Propaganda:
The political officers have repeatedly told the troops that the UN superiority in heavy guns can be easily overcome by massing troops in the attack. PW’s personal experiences have borne out that there is much truth to this indoctrination, and that the soldiers are becoming much more confident in overwhelming heavy firepower by human-wave tactics.
For the AC of S, G-2:
IIDA
