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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3070　30 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (528 MISPI-0157)　16 January 1951

PW appeared to be in good physical condition at time of interrogation. PW was a farmer prior to entering the service. PW was cooperative and of average intelligence. Information obtained is considered fairly reliable. Recommended for further interrogation.

PW volunteered for CNA on 3 Jan 42. PW captured by CCF at HAINAN Island in Feb 50 and was integrated into the 40th Army, Arty Bn, 2nd Arty Co, LMG Plat. The entire 40th Army crossed the YALU River at ANTUNG, utilizing the bridge and by boats during the night. The 39th and 50th Armies followed the 40th Army in crossing the river. After remaining at SINUIJU (XE2040) for 8 days, the 39th Army headed towards SW; the 50th Army towards SE. Four days later, the 40th Army marched to ULSAN (YE3927) and engaged UN Forces for 12 days. The 356th Regt crossed the CHONGCHON River 14 Dec 50 followed by the 11■th Div and then the rest of the 40th Army. 30 Dec 50, entire 40th Army crossed the IMJIN River with the 39th Army on its west flank. 3 Jan 51, 39th and 40th Armies entered SEOUL with the 38th and 50th Armies on their east flank not entering SEOUL. 39th and 40th Army departed SEOUL on 10 Jan 51 and arrived in vic of HABUNG-NI (CS2806) on 12 Jan 51. On 13 Jan 51, PW's unit withdrew towards North but PW and 2 others remained behind due to sore feet and surrendered to UN troops 15 Jan 51.

11th Army Group composed of 38th, 39th, 40th, and 50th Armies. 40th Army composed of the 118th, 119th, and an u/k Div and an Arty Div. 119th Div composed of 355th, 356th, 357th Regts, and an Arty Bn.

UN air strikes inflicted approx 20-50% casualties to the 355th Regt.

2nd Arty Btry had 4x75m/m mountain guns (US make) with 120 rds of ammo for the 4 guns; one LMG with 500 rds; 8 rifles with 100 rds per rifle; 4 SMGs with 200 rds per SMG; 3 pistols (Russian make) with 50-60 rds of ammo per pistol. The Arty Div assigned to the 40th Army was equipped with u/k number of 75m/m Japanese howitzers, u/k number of medium size arty pieces and AT Guns.

PW was told at SEOUL by an official from the Army Group that the objective of the 38th Army was INCHON; the 39th, 40th, and 50th Armies objective was TAEJON and then PUSAN which was to be taken within 2 months. The CCF is to return to CHINA after their mission is accomplished and KOREA is to be turned over to KIM, Il Sung. He heard from an officer o/a 10 Jan 51 that the 4th Field Army's objective is PUSAN and the 3rd Field Army is to advance along the East coast.

4th Field Army Hq was in SEOUL commanded by PUN, Dei-hwai (phonetic), rank u/k. The 3rd Field Army Hq was approx 40 miles East of SEOUL (exact location u/k).

PUN, Dei-hwai (phonetic) - CG of the 4th Field Army

WONG, Xai-shi (〃) - CO, 2nd Arty Btry, Arty Bn, 119th Div

Gen LIM, Piao was the CG of CCF in KOREA.

Communication between Army and high Hqs was by telegraph. Communication between the lower echelons maintained by telephone and mounted couriers. Flares were used by patrols at night. The color of flares used were red, white and blue (meaning of colors u/k to PW). PW stated that, during the hours of darkness, two hand claps were used as means of identification by members of the 40th Army. Three hand claps indicated that the man was from a different Army and one clap indicated that the man was from the same Co.

Code Name: 40th Army - SOO YEA (phonetic)

Code Name: 119th Div - BAZOO TUL (phonetic)

14 Dec 50, PW observed 120 tanks (with muzzle brakes and KV chassis. PW pointed out the picture of JS 1 or 2 tank) and 52 BA-10 Armored Cars driven by Russian operators crossing the CHONGCHON River.

Approx 50% of the men of his unit are former CNA soldiers and that their morales are low. They were forced to fight and hated communism. Many wanted to surrender but were afraid to do so, as they were told by their Political Officer that they will be killed if they surrendered. PW was told by his superiors that the CNA troops from FORMOSA are presently in KOREA.

Food and ammo supplies were insufficient and transportation difficulties were encountered due to constant UN air strikes. Trucks were used to transport supplies. Roads used were mainly the MSR.

New replacements were brought from MUKDEN, MANCHURIA, formed into new units and committed. Units which received heavy casualties were either integrated into other units or used as replacements. Wounded personnel were sent to the rear for medical attention. Approx 3,000-4,000 doctors arrived in KOREA. Replacement Regt was location in ANTUNG. PW heard from officers that GHQ was located in MUKDEN, MANCHURIA. In case a man loses contact with his unit, he is to try his best in locating his unit. No other instructions were given to PW.

O/a 7 Dec 50, PW observed approx 10 automatic rifles (possibly BARs) at UNSAN (YE3927) in the 356th Regt. They were used against the UN forces.

PW observed approx 110 US PWs (including 30 negroes and 3 Nisei) at UNSAN o/a 7 Dec 50. Heard from an officer that they were to be sent to PEIPING and given communist indoctrination and returned when indoctrinated. PW stated that the US PWs were given humane treatment and one PW spoke fluent Chinese.

PW observed 150 fighter planes (type u/k) which arrived at ANTUNG by rail from RUSSIA 10 Oct 50. Also many tanks, guns, POL, trucks and ammo supplies were observed arriving from RUSSIA. The trains were travelling day and night. They were mostly freight trains and that hardly any passengers trains were observed.

Approx 40 Korean interpreters were assigned to the 40th Army. (One interpreter to each Co.)

PW heard from his superiors during the latter part of Dec 50 that there were more than 20,000 Korean guerillas in vic of TAEJON. They were to destroy bridges, set fires to villages and create disturbances in the rear of the UN forces.

PW had no knowledge regarding the use of narcotics or drugs by CCF troops prior to or since entering KOREA.

For the AC of S, G-2: