ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3575 26 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (163-MISDI-0298) 14 February 1951
| PW NAME: | NAM Kung On (南宮蓊) (NKA) |
| PW NO: | 1st M-P-4805 |
| RANK: | Lt |
| DUTY: | Co CO |
| UNIT: | 10th Div, 29th Regt, 1st Bn, 82mm Mortar Co |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | OKSAN DONG (ER 2622) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 9 Feb 51 |
| INTERROGATOR: | ANDO |
PW cooperative. Not recommended for further interrogation.
a. Mission: The 10th Div mission in ANDONG and CHONGSON area:
“To obstruct all transportation especially heavy equipment.
To eliminate all police boxes in area.
To attack UN force’s CP.
To spread propaganda among the people and disrupt town administration.
If all of the above can be accomplished successfully it will assure victory for the “powerful force” which is to begin its offensive soon (time unknown).”
b. Strength of Unit: 24 Dec 50 when departed YANGGU.
(1) Original Strength:
10th Div - 2500
25th Regt - 800
(2) Present Strength: 9 Feb 51
10th Div - 2000
25th Regt - 350
c. Code Name and Code No:
Recon, Co, Hq 10th Div - “SAN BUN”
10th Div - #757
25th Regt - “MU SAN MYONG” (mountain). Formerly (o/a 1 Feb 51) “CHONG CHON GAN”.
25th Regt - #747
1st Bn, 25th Regt “CHAE SAM BONG” (three mountain ridges)
25th Regt CO - #1
1st Bn CO - #50
1st Bn, 1st Co, CO #10
Telephone Code Name of Units:
25th Regt - “MINARI” (grass)
1st Bn - “KONGYOK TAE” (combat unit)
3rd Bn - “HANGGONG TAE” (air force unit)
1st Co, 1st Bn, 25th Regt - “TU MAN GAN” (river)
2nd Co, 1st Bn, 25th Regt - “NAKTONG GAN” (river)
32nd Mortar Co, 1st Bn, 25th Regt - “CHONG CHON GAN” (river)
d. Chronology:
24 Dec 50 - 25th Regt departed SOMYONG, the same time other Regt departed. Passed through HONGCH’ON, TANYANG, East of ANDONG.
20 Jan 51 - Arrived CHISO DONG (DR 9923) where all Regt assembled. 25th Regt engaged with UN Forces for three days; received light casualties. 25th Regt, Arty Regt and Div Hq moved away from direction of UN Forces. 27th, 29th Regt and part of Div Hq separated and headed West.
29 Jan 51 - Arrived at TAEJON-DONG (ER 0621). Conducted raids on police boxes and set roadblocks.
2 Feb 51 - Arrived at TOPYONG DONG (ER 0215) where they constructed more roadblocks.
4 Feb 51 - Arrived at SHWAJI DONG (ER 1718)
5 Feb 51 - Attacked and drove out ROK National police in SUGU DONG (ER 2421). PW was wounded in leg by air attack while he slept in the village. Units departed for OKSAN DONG (ER 2226). PW and many other wounded carried on crude stretchers.
6 Feb 51 - Arrived OKSAN DONG. Heard units engaged in fight with KMC. PW and 25 other wounded taken to PALGOK SAN (mountain ER 2421) where they were cared for. Heard that 27th and 29th Regt had joined forces with Arty and 25th Regt.
7 Feb 51 - Medics who were treating wounded suddenly disappeared. PW made way to OKSAN DONG and was captured.
e. Personalities:
10th Div CG: Maj Gen LEE, Pan Nam (李芳男)
25th Regt CO: Col KIM, Chol Man (金哲萬)
25th Regt Chief of Staff: Lt Col LEE, Kae Song (李桂松)
25th Regt 1st Bn CO: Capt KIM, Ung Man (金應萬)
f. Weapons and Equipment: 25th Regt:
2x82mm Mortars - 6 rd each
2x60mm Mortars - 20 rd each
3 US HMG - 1000 rd each
7 US LMG - 300 rd each
2 Russian HMG - 1000 rd each
3 Russian LMG - 300 rd each
50 Russian PPsh SMG - 70 rd each
120 Russian SMG - 70 rd each
50 US M1 Rifles - 100 rd each
20 US Carbines - 200 rd each
70 Russian Rifles - 40 rd each
150 Hand grenades
40 Pistols - 16 rd each
3 Anti Tank Rifles - 15 rd each
10 Anti Tank Grenades
One Wireless transmitter in Hq 25th Regt; however, believed not in use because of lack of batteries.
12 telephones used for communication between Regt Hq and its Bn.
Telephone Wire - 10000 meters
g. Other Units: II Corps:
2nd Div - estimated strength 5000
3th Div - estimated strength 5000
2nd Div last seen o/a 2 Jan 51 at YONGWOL while 10th Div travelled South. 6th Div last seen, o/a 2 Jan 51 heading West when 10th Div travelled South.
Other NK Divisions known 4th Div and 31st Div.
h. Tactics:
NK troops never attacked Un unit larger than their own. When road blocks are set up, troops were always deployed on both sides of roadblock to attack vehicles. About three rounds of Mortar shells were fired into villages everytime an attack was made. This usually frightens all the villagers out and also whatever troops deployed in that village.
PW suggested that the best time to attack NK troops is at daybreak. Troops are usually exhausted at daybreak because of continuous travelling during the night.
i. Propaganda:
PW volunteered into the NKA in Apr 47. Promoted to Jr Lt in Mar 50 upon completing Officer’s Candidate School. Promoted to Co Commander latter part of Jan 51. Primary School graduate. Communist Party member since 46. PW was very surprised and thankful for our good treatment. His surprise was due to the propaganda he had believed until now. Before being captured, NK propaganda had such an effect on him that if he had captured any American prisoners he would have beaten the PW to death instead of shooting him. However, at present, PW attitude has changed after such good treatment. PW bitterness is toward NKA for leaving him unattended when he had served faithfully in NKA.
For the AC of S, G-2:
UYEDA
