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LEE Chan Hae 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 37 NO. 3460 1951-02-08
    대위 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3460 19 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (163 - MISDI - 0277) 11 February 1951
(Atchd 1st Mar Div)

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: LEE Chan Hae (李燦海)
PW NO: 1st M-P-4548
RANK: Sr Lt
DUTY: Co CO
UNIT: II Corps, 10th Div, Arty Regt, 2nd Bn 4th Btry
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SINGAE-RI
DATE OF CAPTURE: 8 Feb 51
INTERROGATOR: Sgt ANDO

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW, his runner and another were captured together at SHINGAE-RI, while PW and runner were trying to trace their unit which had already passed SINGAE-RI. PW was wounded so he offered no resistance. Recommended for further interrogation. PW cooperative, but appeared to be withholding information.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Mission:
10th Div mission was to come to ANDONG area and disrupt UN communication lines and HSR while a powerful unit for KANGNUNG attack UN Eastern zone.

b. Strength of Unit:
(1) Original Strength: When departed HWACH’ON, 27 Dec 50.
Arty Regt - 800
Other Regt - could not determine
Authorized strength for each Regt, aside from the Arty Regt, was 1300 men. These Regt were not at full strength.
(2) Present Strength: 8 Feb 51.
10th Div - 4000
Arty Regt - 450
Code No - Arty Regt 735
Code Name: “CHONGCHON-GANG” (CHONGCHON River). Same code name used since PW joined unit.
Code name for other Regt unk. Usually names of river or mountain.
Following are code names of units in Arty Regt:
Hq 2nd Bn, Arty Regt - “TAEBAK-SAN”
2nd Co 1st Bn - “IMJING GANG”
4th Co 2nd Bn - “CHIEE SAN”
5th Co 2nd Bn - “NAKTONG GANG”
6th Co 2nd Bn - “ODAE SAN”

c. Chronology
21 Jul 50 - Assigned to Arty Regt, 10th Div for the first time and KANGNUNG. Arty Regt was just about to be activated. Other Regt had already been committed near TAEGU. Arty Regt moved to WONSAN where it was quickly organized and departed for SEOUL.
15 Aug 50 - Arrived at SEOUL. Spent three days, during which time artillery pieces and other weapons issued.
28 Aug 50 - Arrived in vicinity of TAEGU. One week later went into battle with artillery pieces.
24 Sep 50 - Started to withdraw. 1st and 3rd Bn buried 20 artillery pieces near KUMCH’ON. Later met other Regt of 10th Div while travelling north.
10 Dec 50 - Arty Regt arrived at HWACH’ON, strength of 500 men. Started reorganizing by picking up stragglers and conscripting several hundred civilians from HWACH’ON area until troops totaled original strength.
27 Dec 50 - 10th Div departed HWACH’ON. 27 and 29th Regt led movement south, followed by Div Hq, 25th and Arty Regt guarding the rear. Troops travelled east of HONGCH’ON and passed TANYANG. 27th and 29th Regt encountered UN force on five to six occasions.
O/a 21 Jan 51 - Arrived east of ANDONG. 27th and 29th Regt separated and headed west from Div Hq. 25th and Arty Regt travelled close with Div Hq. Troops travelled through SONGS-DONG, SAMGO-RI, HARI-DONG, HUNG-DONG and CHONGJA-DONG.
O/a 25 Jan 51 - Arrived at SANGSA-DONG (ER 1012) where meeting of Co grade officers was held. At the meeting it was decided that the Arty Regt was to withdraw north at the first opportunity. It was to go to KANGNUNG to join forces with a powerful NK unit and receive proper artillery training and be supplied with artillery; then return to present area. Arty Regt never had the opportunity to conduct such a mission because of constant enemy contact. Therefore his unit was forced to stay and resume movement with Div Hq. Units then travelled via HASA-DONG (DR 6224), TAESA-DONG Area, ■OCHI-GOK (DR 9627), KORAN-DONG (DR 9427), CHONGSONG Area (ER 0531), CHUKCHANG Area to NAERYONG-DONG. From NAERYONG-DONG (ER 1920) units headed south to OERYONG-DONG (ER 1818).
5 Feb 51 - Arrived OERYONG-DONG where PW 2nd Bn maintained guard on hill 645 at night. 2nd Bn attacked by UN unit. PW received shrapnel wound in leg during attack. When PW and messenger came down from hill. Arty Regt had already departed for SINGI-RI. PW and messenger travelled toward SINGI.
7 Feb 51 - 0200 hours arrived SINGI-RI but learned that Arty Regt had departed south. PW ordered runner to stay with him in a house.
8 Feb 51 - PW and runner captured by KMC. Destination of 10th Div and Arty Regt unknown; however, PW believed that the 27th and 29th Regt are expected to join Div at an assembly area.

d. Personalities:
10th Div CG - Maj Gen LEE, Pang Nam, 27-38
Has been in command ever since PW joined the 10th Div.
Arty Regt CO - Col CHUNG, Ki Yol (鄭基烈), 27
Arty Regt 2nd Bn CO - Maj HWANG, Pong Son (黃鳳善), 23
Korean who was born and raised in MANCHURIA and came to KOREA in 1947.
Arty Regt 2nd Bn 5th Btry CO - Sr Lt CH’OE, Chol Chin (崔哲眞), 23
Arty Regt 2nd Bn 6th Btry CO - Sr Lt KIM, Man Jong (金滿鐘), 24-25
Arty Regt, 3rd Bn 7th Brty CO - Sr Lt PAK, Ki Jin (朴基眞), 23
Arty Regt 3rd Bn 8th Btry CO - Sr Lt MUN, Yong Son (文龍善), 24
Asst Div CG, Lt Col name unknown; also Political Advisor for Regt.
The CO of 1st Bn, Arty Regt was executed by the Asst Div CO, about 13 days ago because Bn CO failed to follow orders.
60-70 nurses were attached to the medical unit with the Div Hq. These nurses are South Koreans who had been taken along during 10th Div withdrawal to the north last year.

e. Weapons and Equipment: Arty Regt
4 US HMG
3 Russian HMG
4 US LMG
5 Russian LMG
70-80 Russian PPSH SMG
80-90 US M-1 Rifles
No mortars or artillery.
Assortments of Russian rifles, American Mls and carbines. Also 50 pistols and 400 had grenades. All troops armed. 30 Binoculars, each Regt had fifteen telephones. 20,000 meters of telephone wire in Arty Regt. One US Wireless transmitter was presently used by Arty Regt Hq to communicate with Div Hq. Also had three Russian transmitter but useless because they had no batteries. Other Regt possessed three to five transmitters each, Div Hq utilized five. Besides communication with each Regt, Div Hq keep close contact with hq II Corps. (Below 38 Parallel, location unknown). All transmitters are run by batteries, there are no additional battery supply.

f. Ammo and Supply:
Present ammo supply per weapon:
20-30 rd for rifles
1500-2000 rd for US HMG
400-500 rd for Russian HMG
800-1000 rd for US LMG
400-450 rd for Russian LMG
130 rd for Russian PPSh
Food - Whatever food in villages are taken by force, including livestocks. Where food is abundant troops are given as much as they can carry; however, food in villages are usually scarce.
Medical - Few medicines and bandages in Regt. Bn had no medical aid. Wounded are left in villages. (When PW arrived at SINGAE-RI, there were four other wounded who were left behind where Arty Regt passed through.)
Clothing - Troops complained of cold because of insufficient winter clothing. When UN soldiers are captured their clothes are quickly exchanged. There are many troops in the 27th and 29th Regt who wore complete American uniform and can appear as ROK soldiers.

g. Other Units:
While PW was in HWACH’ON, Dec 50, he encountered a patrol from the 27th NK Div. PW talked to members of patrol and learned that there are also the 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st and the 32nd NK Div. Also learned that these divisions consisted of large members of Korean nationals who had been in MANCHURIA. A powerful NK unit is believed to be located in KANGNUNG. This unit was expected to move southward and attack UN lines on Eastern coast in coordination with 10th Div mission. The NK I Corps formerly consisted of 10th, 11th, and the 12th Div. 10th Div became subordinate of II NK Corps as of 10 Jan 51.

h. Foreign Elements:
No observation of CCF troops; however, troops were told by Regt Cultural leader that CC troops are located in KANGNUNG and they will start offensive soon.

i. Morale:
Morale among the troops is definitely low due to constant air attacks, insufficient food, improper clothing and absence of artillery for counter-battery. Majority of troops seeking chance to surrender. Troops believed so much of the propaganda which were given everyday and since none of the talks actually materialized, morale has dropped considerably.

j. Weapons Feared:
Air attacks are most feared by troops. Previously, aircrafts usually attacked by groups of four but recent air attacks are carried out in groups of eight, sometimes twelve. There is no place to hid when aircrafts attack simultaneously from all angles.

k. Tactics:
On the way from HWACHON to ANDONG, troops from the 27th and 29th Regt are known to have ambushed UN convoys by wearing American uniforms and posing as ROK troops. One group would boldly take the road toward the convoy while others wait in ambush. As convoy passes through, the last five or six vehicles would be their target. Hand grenades are used for this type of attack. There are 5 to 6 small boys, age 10-12, who are attached to 10th Div Hq, to be used for patrols. Members of patrols (usually an aged soldier accompanying the boy) disguise themselves as refugee. Members of patrol also use SK identification card which are confiscated from villages. Photographs on identification cards are simply exchanged so that members of patrol can disguise as residents of nearby localities. Many former SK Leftists from ANDONG and POHANG vicinity have been assigned to 10th Div because of the previously mentioned 10th Div mission in ANDONG and POHANG are. These troops are able to give valuable information on most any town which may be their target.

l. Atrocities:
Members of ROK National Police force are immediately executed when captured. The police force is most hated by NKA because it is always interfering with their duty. Because wounded NK troops are not taken along by their units, wounded UN PW are never taken along. Wounded UN PW are executed after their clothes stripped. It is believed that approximately 1/3 of the troops in the 27th and 29th Regt are former ROK soldiers who had been previously taken prisoners. They are called “KAIHO CHONSA” (Liberated Soldiers). PW also stated, that there are members of the “SEIJI HOI BU” (Political Defense Bureau), in the 10th Div. All of these officers are known to have been appointed by Kim Il Sung. These officers have the power to execute anyone who shows any sign of anti-communism. They also interrogate PW and decide the fate of each PW. One such officer is attached to each Bn. PW volunteered in the National Security Force in March 1947 at UIJU. He was promoted to 2nd Lt, after three months of training. When this war began hed had been with the Security Force near the 38th Parallel. He was already Sr Lt when assigned to 10th Div. Education none. Former occupation, farmer.

For AC of S G-2:

UYEDA

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