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Li Fu Yuan 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 36 NO. 3408 1951-02-12
    전사 미분류 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3408 17 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164-MISDI-1522) 13 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: Li Fu Yuan (李福元) (CCF)
RANK: Pvt
ORGN: 66th Army, 197th Div, 589th Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 2nd Plat, 5th Sqd
DUTIES: Rifleman
AGE: 20
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: HOPEI-SHENG, T’UNGCHOU-HSIEN, CHI-CHU ANG (河北省 通州縣 紀莊)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 121000 I Feb 51
INTERROGATED AT: 4th Field Hospital, TAEGU (DQ6068)
INTERROGATOR: CCS

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was cooperative and provided prompt, logical answers.
His lack of knowledge of Korean place names and uncertainty on dates detracts somewhat from what seems to be fairly reliable information.

3. CHRONOLOGY:
Conscripted Jan 1948 into CNA at at TING HSIEN (200 Li from PEIPING). After 3 months training at TING-HSIEN PW was assigned to the CNA 31st Div. Performed RR guard duty at PEI-HO-CH’A, and fought several battles with the CCF until the 31st Div surrendered in Aug 48 to an unknown CCF unit in the Vicinity of TING-HSIEN.
PW CNA Div with two other former CNA divisions were then sent to SSUCHA-CHUANG for 3 months training. This training was political in nature, not tactical. This training center was in a large city (SSU-CHA-CHUANG) in the SHANSI Province.
After this 3 months of training PW was assigned to the CCF 197th Div and this unit was sent to CHANG-CHIA-K’OU(張家口) for occupation duty.
PW deserted on the way to this location in Feb 49 and returned to his home.
He was inducted again in Nov 49 and returned to same 197th Div. The unit was stationed near TIENTSEN (at LANG-FANG) where the 197th Div farmed and trained during slack months until after the 1950 harvest when the 197th Div departed by train from LANG-FANG and moved to ANTUNG without detraining (3 days trip). The 197th Div (with all elements of the 66th Army) arrived at ANTUNG, stayed overnight, and crossed the YALU River at SINUIJU.
In KOREA, PW unit marched at night and sleep in the mountains during days. PW knows no place names passed on this march. After approximately a month of this type marching PW unit made first contact with UN forces at a village called “SUN-HWA-TUNG” (phonetic Chinese - location guessed by PW to be 100 mine north of the 38th Parallel).
After defeating UN Forces on this occasion, PW division did not make contact again until about one month later, when they fought UN Forces on the 38th Parallel. The mission of PW Division at this time was to push on and secure the SEOUL area.
PW believes overall mission of all communist forces engaged in this drive, staring at the 38th Parallel was also to secure the SEOUL-INCHEON area.
After the first battle at “SUNGHWATUNG” the division was taken back to KUSONG (XE 9228) to regroup and reorganize, leaving a Regiment (unknown designation) to hold the line. The rest of the 197th Div remained at KUSONG for about 20 days, regrouping and resupplying.
After this period, PW division marched for nine nights (over 100 Li a night) until they fought the “second battle” (on the 38th); this battle was fought around the first of the year. After this battle the 66th Army went to KUMHWA (CT 6538) for regrouping. This period of reorganization lasted about 20 days, after which the entire 66th Army moved southward. PW states that this move was in order to support the TUNGPEI-CHUN (“Northeast Army” no other designation known), the CCF unit actually engaged with UN Forces south of SEOUL. The 66th Army continued southward until contact was made with UN Forces in the vicinity of PW capture (HOENGSONG - DS1149), arriving on 11 Feb 51. PW heard that other CCF and North Korean Units had been fighting here for 3 continuous days and nights prior to his unit’s arrival. These other Communist units’ designations were unknown.
PW states his Bn in his battle did not have active close support from his Division’s artillery or mortars but he knew they were deployed somewhere to the rear.
PW was wounded and left behind as his Company withdrew on 12 Feb 51.

4. T/O & E AND STRENGTHS: (as of 12 Feb 51)
66th Army: 196th, 197th and 198th Inf Divisions
197th Div: 589th, 590th, and 591st Inf Regiments, Mt Gun Bn, Recon Co, Hq Co, Signal Co and Medical Bn.
589th Regt: 3 Rifle Battalions, 82mm Mortar Co, Medical Unit, and Signal Platoon.
3rd Bn: 3 Rifle Companies and MG Company.
7th Co: 3 Rifle Platoons and 60mm Mortar Sqd.
2nd Plat:Original (as of Nov 50)Present (as of 12 Feb 51)
 Personnel:
  EM4018
  Off20
  Total4216
 Equipment & ammo:
  Model 38 rifles (Japanese)40 (100 rd per)17 (100 rd per)
  LMG2 (1,000 rd per)1 (1,000 rd per)
  Grenades4 ea man4 ea man
Note: Ammo was resupplied within the last 20 days after last contact with the UN Forces. Losses: From desertion (7 or 8 men); few from UN aircraft; most casualties from actual battle.
7th Co:
 Personnel:
  EM14941
  Off119 (only 4 〃regular〃 officers)
  Total160Approx 50
 Equipment & ammo:
  Pistol44
  ExplosivesDrawn from higher unit as needed for bridge blowing, etc - not set amount.
  Bugle11
60mm Mortar Squad:
 Personnel:
  EM127
  Off00
  Total127
 Equipment & ammo:
  60mm mortar2 (48 rd per)1 (48 rd)
3rd Bn:
 Personnel:600Approx 300
589th Regt:
 Personnel:2,000(with Approx 1,000 5 x 82mm mortars)
197th Div:
 Personnel:1,000Unk

5. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS:
PW company commander told him that the UN would try to push them north of the 38th Parallel but that their Regiment was to hold the line. His company CO always said they had plenty of help with them in support, but he never specified the unit. On the occasion of this last battle, PW heard this same story, that more CCF were coming to aid them. He had no other information of adjacent units or designations.

6. REPLACEMENTS:
No replacements were received by the 197th Division since leaving CHINA.
PW believes that the Division has dispatched men back to CHINA to escort replacements to KOREA, but PW feels that it will take at least 2 or 3 months for them to arrive. PW was told that when his Div fell back to KUMHWA, they were to rest for 2 to 3 months and therefore would have time to get replacements. However, his CO said that this had to be changed because of the danger of the UN Forces pushing the other CCF units north of the 38th. Therefore, the 197th Div had to move south in order to hold the CCF defense line firm.

7. ARMOR, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT:
PW saw no CCF tanks or aircraft since coming to KOREA. He was told on one occasion by Company CO that the CCF had armor and aircraft but on further questioning of the CO about why they were not used, the CO stated that “the opportune time had not arrived and that at the right time this help would be coming.”
Only artillery seen were those mountain guns belonging to the Division Arty Bn. These guns were about 5 to 6 ft long and were pulled by 3 miles. Number of guns in this battalion were unknown, as well as exact caliber. (PW described core as being about 4” in diameter.)

8. PERSONALITIES:
KAO, Chang Ch’ai
Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat, 7th Co, 589th Regt
YU, P’ei Izu
Co CO, 7th Co,, 589th Regt, 197th Div
WU (fnu)
Bn Co, 3rd Bn, 589th Regt
CHIAO (fnu)
Former Regt CO, 589th Regt
HSIAO (fnu)
CG, 66th Army

9. FOOD, AMMO AND OTHER SUPPLIES:
Only meager supply of food comes from rear (believed to be from CHINA). When insufficient, food is collected from farmers and a slip of paper promising payment is given to farmers for this rice.
Ammo from CHINA was supplied over an unknown route.
No information on supply points. Resupplying was done only in “rest areas” after major engagements such as at KUMHWA. There was never any replenishing of supplies while on the line. Ammo was issued then - no other equipment. This ammo was brought in by trucks, directly to units being resupplied in rest areas.

10. SIGNAL:
Runners were used up to regimental level. From Regt to higher headquarters telephones are used. PW had not seen radios in use.
PW heard that Div Hq used radio.
Bugles were only used to signal final charge in the attack (when they have closed to within about 100 yards).
Flares were used for position location between battalions.
(No specific bugle calls or flare signals known.)

11. MORALE:
Morale is low due to the shortage of food, sleeping on hillside in the cold, and disappointed in learning at KUMHWA that they were merely regrouping for more fighting. (On moving back to KUMHWA, PW and fellow soldiers thought the war was over and that they were returning home; everyone was happy. However, since being informed at KUMHWA that they had to move south again, morale has dropped tremendously).
Fear of UN aircraft, which keeps troops from coming out of the hills to get warm, is partially responsible for low morale also.

12. UN PW:
PW saw five US PW at “SUN HWA TUNG” in early December. He had seen none since.
PW saw 500 to 600 ROK PW marching north on a highway near the 38th Parallel (in middle Jan) while the 197th Div was pulling back to KUMHWA (exact location unk). These UN PW were not tied nor being mistreated. PW has no knowledge of destination of or future plans for these UN PW.

13. MEDICAL:
PW noticed no sickness in his unit (7th Co).
His unit has not received immunizations.
Only 12 men from his company have been sent to the rear for frozen feet. Most of these cases occurred while the unit was further north, near the YALU. At the present time, PW observed very few cases of frozen feet, although all men suffered from exposure to cold and damp.
PW had no knowledge of medical facilities available to the CCF as those men he knows to have been evacuated have not returned and PW himself has never been treated.

14. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
PW was captured after being wounded.
PW heard a broadcast at KUSANG over 2 months ago from a Communist plane, exhorting the CCF to fight on and defend CHINA, praising STALIN and MAO Tze Tung, etc. Since then, he has seen no UN leaflets nor heard any UN broadcast.
PW heard no discussion of leaflets.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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