ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3358 14 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (528 MISDI - 0180) 7 February 1951
| PW NAME: | TAE, Pyong Chon (太丙天)(태병천) North Korean |
| PW NO: | Jackson Temporary #345 |
| AGE: | 18 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| DUTY: | Runner |
| UNIT: | 8th Div, 2nd Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co |
| EDUCATION: | 1 yr Technical School |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | SURISAN (CS147360) vic ANYANG |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 061600 Feb 51 |
| CAPTURING UNIT: | 2nd Bn, 35th RCT |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HAMGYON PUKTO, MYUNGCHON-GUN, SOMYON, PYONGI-RI 58 (咸鏡北道 明川郡 西面 坪岐里 五八) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | PYONGYANG Shi, SONGYO SARI #98 (平壤市 船橋 四里 九八) |
PW appeared to be in good physical condition at time of interrogation. He was cooperative and of average intelligence. PW was a student prior to entering the military service.
a. Unit Organization, Strength and Equipment:
8th Div composed of 3 Inf Regt, Arty Regt, Engr Bn, Sig Co, and Med Unit.
2nd Regt composed of 3 Rifle Bn, SMG Co, and Sig Co.
1st Bn composed of 3 Rifle Co, 82mm Mortar Co, 45mm Gun Plat, AT Plat, Sig Co, Medical Plat and HMG Co.
3rd Co composed of 3 Rifle Plat and HMG Plat.
The code number for the 2nd Regt, 8th Div was: 419 "Kun Butai."
| Unit | Orig Str | Date | Present Str | Date |
| 1st Bn | 507 | 2 Feb 51 | 250 | 6 Feb 51 |
| 3rd Co | 107 | 〃 〃 〃 | 65 | 〃 〃 〃 |
Within four days the Bn strength was reduced to half due to arty fire which was very effective. UN air strikes caused negligible damage due to the limited number of rockets and bombs dropped. One Plat had only 4 men left as of 6 Feb 51 and other Plat had as few as 20 men left.
HMG Plat, 3rd Co had 2 HMG with 6,000 rd per MG; rifles with 200 rd per rifle and 2 hand grenades per man. Each Rifle Plat had LMG with 2,400 rd; 4 SMG (type u/k), with 4,000 rd per weapon. 82mm Mortar Co, 1st Bn had 2x82mm mortars with 800 rd per mortar. 45mm Gun Plat did not have any pieces. AT Plat had 9x14.5mm AT rifles with 600 rd per rifle. SMG Co had approx 120 SMG with 500 rd per SMG. Sig Co (atchd to Regt) had 3 radio transmitters (type u/k) and 12-13 telephones. Arty Regt had unk number of guns (believed to be 57mm AT Guns).
b. Unit Assignment and Intention:
PW heard from his Regt'l Comdr on 2 Feb 51, that the Regt was to defend SURI-SAN (CS145363).
c. Disposition:
20 Jan 51, PW heard from a Regt messenger that the 1st NK Corps Hq was located in SEOUL City vic NAMSAN (CS222573). PW stated that the 8th Div Hq was located in vic TAPTONG (CS156464) as of 30 Jan 51. The 2nd Regt CP was located at the foot of SURISAN mountain (CS145363) on the W slope as of 5 Feb 51, but the Regt withdrew in the evening of 5 Feb 51. PW heard that the 47th Div was located in vic INCH'ON.
d. Communications:
Bn and higher echelons used radios and telephones for communications. Lower units used messengers. Supplies were transported at night by oxcarts through mountain roads.
e. Personalities:
YUN, Chong Sang (윤청성) Capt CO, 3rd Co, 1st Bn, 2nd Regt, 8th Div
CHANG, Sung Gwan (장승완) Maj Bn Comdr, 1st Bn, 2nd Regt, 8th Div
KIM, Pong Mun (김봉문) Maj Gen CG, 8th Div
f. Artillery:
O/a 22 Dec 50, PW observed ten truck drawn hv arty pieces (CCF) heading south from P'YONGYANG.
g. Morale:
The morale of PW unit was low due to the heavy casualties. Many had intentions of surrendering but were afraid to do so for fear of being killed.
h. Chronology:
PW inducted into the NKA 28 Jun 50 at P'YONGYANG and received one month training. Upon completion of basic training, he was assigned to the 1943 RR Guard Unit at KOSONG (DU0312) and remained there until Oct 50. The unit retreated to CHOSAN (YF3624) and PW was assigned to his present unit 3 Nov 50. The I NK Corps (8th & 47th Divs) departed CHOSAN 4 Dec 50 and arrived at UNSAN (YE 3927) date unk. I NK Corps travelled through YONGBYON (YE4011), ANJU (YD2888), PYONGYANG, CHUNGHWA (YD4205), SARIWON (YC4065), KUMCHON (BT8227) and arrived at SEOUL 4 Jan 51. 47th Div headed towards INCHON and the 8th Div headed S from SEOUL. PW unit then proceeded to TAPTONG (CS156464) and remained there for approx one month. PW captured at SURISAN (CS147360) on 6 Feb 51.
i. Food and Ammo Supplies:
Food and clothing were insufficient. Food was procured locally. Supplies were transported by oxcarts over mountain roads at night.
j. Replacements:
No replacements were received by PW unit. Wounded personnel were sent to the rear for treatment and upon recovery they were reassigned to other units.
k. Psychological Warfare:
PW saw UN leaflets. Those who read the leaflets entertained thoughts of surrendering but could not do so because if discovered they would be shot. PW heard UN broadcasts in Oct 50, at SUNCHON (YD5367).
l. Captured Equipment:
PW saw two or three US carbines and M1 rifles being used by men in his unit.
m. Road Blocks, Mine Fields:
O/a 24 Jan 51, PW heard that the MSR from ANYANG to YONGDUNGPO (CS1652) was mined. The mines were laid on curves, intersections and down grades on the road. (Exact location u/k)
n. Medical:
PW Co received three typhus immunization shots at KOSONG (DU0312) over a period of four months, with the last shot being administered 20 Sep 50. Diarrhea was the most prevalent sickness in PW Co. No narcotics or drugs were used by troops. There was no typhus in PW unit.
o. Unit Reorganization:
The 8th Div was reconstituted at CHOSAN (YF3624) 3 Nov 50. Half of the personnel came from deactivated units (unit designation u/k) and the other half were recruits.
p. Han River Crossing:
The 8th Div crossed the Han River 7 Jan 51 vic SUBINGO (CS2454). The crossing was made on foot over the ice. No bridging equipment was observed.
q. Effectiveness of Night Bombing:
Night bombing was not very effective.
For the AC of S G-2:
OGAWA
