ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 2903 17 January 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1295) 30 December 1950
| PW NAME: | LEE, Chun Kun (李春根) (리춘근) (Korean) |
| RANK: | Captain (總尉) |
| ORGANIZATION: | NKA 10th Div, Recon Company |
| DUTIES: | Co CO |
| EDUCATION: | Middle School Graduate and 1 year Military Academy. |
| AGE: | 29 |
| OCCUPATION: | Student, TIENTSIEN Chinese Language School |
| ADDRESS: | PYONGYANG, SOSONG RI, #321 (平壤 西城里 三二一) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 182000 Dec 50 at KUMJONG (DS 8402) |
| INTERROGATOR: | W.T.O. |
PW was cooperative but lacked information pertaining to his unit, in that he has been separated from it since 17 Oct 50.
PW was in a guerilla unit until he surrendered on 18 Dec 50.
The PW could offer no specific information on locations and activities of his guerilla unit.
Approximately 500 NK soldiers from various units of the NKA are presently hiding in the IRWOL Mountain. After the advance of the UN troops in the NAKTONG River area, these troops had withdrawn and reorganized as a guerilla unit and were engaged in guerilla activities in the IRWOL mountain area.
A former NK labor party chief, PAK, CHONG KON (朴鍾根), who had entered south Korea with the NKA and had been assigned duties in ANDONG as labor party head after its capture, was in command of the 500-men guerilla unit.
This unit’s ass’t commander, KANG, CHOL SAN (姜鐵三), has been engaged in guerilla warfare ever since the outbreak of war.
During their retreat in October, ample amounts of ammunition were carried by the troops. PW estimated that this unit has enough ammunition to last 2 days if they were to be committed to a full-scale battle.
Food was ample, as it was frequently confiscated from nearby villages.
This unit had frequently engaged the ROK police in fights.
Morale among the enlisted men was low. Many were contemplating surrender, but were afraid of the consequences. Unit commanders frequently oriented the troops on the murdering of NK troops who had surrendered to the UN forces. In November, leaflets were dropped by planes to this unit. The soldiers had no confidence in what was written on it. Many believe that the leaflets and its contents were merely propaganda.
Another reason for their not surrendering was that they did not actually know what happened to all the NK PW’s who had been captured.
Approx 50% of these troops would surrender if they could be convinced of good treatment upon capture.
For the AC of S, G-2
HONG
