ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1029 14 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Supl No. 1 to 0386) 12 September 1950
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 532)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | YON Yong Song (尹永成) (윤영성) |
| PW NUMBER: | 106 |
| RANK: | Lt |
| AGE: | 27 |
| ORGANIZATION: | 6th Div, 671st AT Bn |
| DUTIES: | Ex Off “WA HEI” Co, 671st AT Bn |
| INTERROGATOR: | Sgt HAMASAKA (ATIS) |
PW was intelligent and cooperative, however was unable to give replies to questions based on fact, therefore only personal opinions given. PW considered reliable by interrogator.
a. NK Security Units (保安隊) and Guard Units (警湖隊) totaling Regt'l strength stationed in MOKP’O (Hearsay from fellow officer - 15 Jul 50). PW believes NK Security and Guard troops of Regt’l strength are stationed in large coastal cities including: YOSU, KUNSAN, INCH’ON, CHINNAMP’O. PW believes NK Security and Guard troops totaling less than Co strength are stationed in each occupied district (郡) in South KOREA.
b. PW thinks Communist CHINA will act in unison with USSR in any plans for active intervention in the Korean War.
c. PW thinks NK Air Force has bean destroyed by UN Forces. No opinion on NK Navy.
d. UN offensive against NKPA south of 38° parallel will not precipitate USSR intervention. However PW believes if UN offensive is carried north of 38° parallel intervention by USSR and Communist CHINA is certain. In event of intervention, troops from Communist CHINA and USSR would probably enter into North KOREA from all available road and rail routes. PW believes USSR, after entering Korean War, would no longer recognize the 38° parallel, instead will seek to force UN Forces out of North and South KOREA in all-out war. PW unable to estimate strength of USSR Military force in event of intervention in Korean War, however PW believes USSR technique is similar to the Communist Chinese Army and NKPA; namely, to overwhelm the enemy by attacking in mass.
e. PW believes majority of indigenous personnel in South Korean areas retaken by UN Forces will be loyal to South Korean Government. In North KOREA, in event of UN offensive, nearly all of the farmers will actively assist the UN Forces. PW believes the city populace would either be active supporters of the NKPA or, if not, would offer only passively cooperation with the UN Forces.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
