ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3861 8 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MIDI 0264) 8 February 1951
| NAME: | LEE Chong (李成) (CCF) |
| AGE: | 40 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| UNIT: | 38th Army, 112th Div, 335th Regt, 1st Bn, 1st Co, 2nd Plat |
| DUTY: | Rifleman |
| OCCUPATION: | RR Repair Worker |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School 3 yr |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 060600 Feb 51 at CS635405 |
Cooperative and fairly well informed. Not recommended for further interrogation.
a. Chronology:
112th Div crossed the YALU River at MANP’OJIN 22 Oct 50 and preceeded southward via HUICH’ON, KUJANGDONG, SINHUNG-DONG, HUKHO Mt, TOKCH’ON, P’YONGYANG, and arrived YONCHON 25 Dec 50. 1 Jan 51, crossed the 38th parallel after a 3 hr engagement with UN Forces. 7 Jan 51, Div arrived at a location which was heard to be 12 km N of SEOUL. Here Div assembled with the rest of the units of 38th Army in a 4 km sq area for the first time since entering KOREA. After resting for 5 days, 112th and 114th Div and 339th Regt of 113th Div departed the area 12 Jan 51 and travelled in a SE direction over mountain trails for 3 days and crossed the PUKHAN River over a wooden bridge 15 Jan 51, then turned SW and crossed the HAN River over the ice 16 Jan 51.
18 Jan 51, 7 regiments arrived in vic of KWANGJU-RI where they rested until 2 Feb 51. 334th and 335th Regt of 112th Div and 337th Regt of 113th Div departed KWANGJU-RI and arrived at hill vic (CS635405) 030500 Feb 51, where the PW was later captured. Here the Regt dug foxholes and air raid shelters. Commencing at 031000 Feb 51, the area was subjected to continuous UN air, arty and small arms fire.
4 Feb 51, PW picked up a surrender leaflet and 050700 Feb 51, after the area had been under constant attack for nearly 3 full days, he deserted his position with the intention of surrendering and headed for the UN positions. However, due to danger from cross-fire and darkness, PW had to remain in a prone position between friendly and enemy positions. However, at 060600 Feb 51, he managed to reach UN positions and surrendered.
b. Organization and Strength:
38th Army consisted of 112th, 113th, and 114th Div. A Gun Regt was originally attached to 38th Army but heard that all the guns were destroyed by air attacks at KOJANG-DONG.
334th, 335th, and 336th Regt composed 112th Div. 337th, 338th, and 339th Regt composed 113th Div, while 114th Div had the 340th, 341st, and 342d Regt.
Heard a gun (cal unk) Bn was attached to 335th Regt in MANCHURIA, but he does not know whether it crossed into KOREA with the Regt.
335th Regt had 3 rifle bn and an attached Hvy Mort Co. There were originally 2 hvy mort co attached, but one Co was disbanded at KUJANG-DONG to use the personnel as replacements in the rifle co which had suffered heavy casualties at an engagement there. Bn were organized with 3 rifle co and a hvy wpn co. Each Rifle Co consisted of 3 rifle plat. PW Co had approx 380 men originally.
In the engagements at SINHUNG, XUJANG-DONG, and HUKHO Mt between 7 Nov and 17 Nov 51, Co lost 70 out of 100 men. He also heard that only 13 men remained in the 3rd Co of his Regt after the above engagements. Replacements for PW Co were made from gun and mortar units and non-combat units in 38th Army, which was regrouped and reorganized S of TOKCHON 20 Nov 50. Casualties were due mostly to UN air and arty action.
8 Jan 51, 12 km N of SEOUL, Asst Plat Ldr was heard to say that he was going to MANCHURIA to obtain replacements.
c. Deployment of PW Con Unit:
1st Bn was located at the SE food and approx 800 m W of the hill (CS6354056) as of 060600 Feb 51. The remainder of the 335th Regt was also deployed on the same hill, with the 2nd Bn on the N slope and 3rd Bn on the SW slope. 335th Regt CP was 2 km NW of the 1st Bn.
d. Deployment of Other Units:
334th Regt was on a hill at CS623414 approx 1 km NE of PW Bn area. 337th Regt was approx 2 km NE of 334th Regt area and believed at CS623414.
Heard from Co CO that 336th Regt was at YANGCHON-NI 24 km W of the 1st Bn area. Heard from his Co Political officer that 338th and 339th Regt of the 38th Army remained behind at 38th Army assembly area, 12 km N of SEOUL, 12 Jan 51, since they had suffered heavy casualties 1 Jan 51 from UN air and arty action. He was told at about the same time that NK Div was to replace 112th CCF Div. As of 2 Feb 51, 3 Regt of the 114th Div were at KWANGJU.
e. Status of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipment:
PW Co had 8 LMG (400 rd each), 1 60mm mortar (30 rd each), 9 Thompson SMG (100 rd each), 46 M-38 Rifles (50 rd each), 4 US carbines (50 rd each) and each man carried 4 grenades.
Each Bn had 1 US Bazooka and the attached Hvy Wpn Co carried 2x82mm mortars (50 rd each) and 4 HMG (500 rd each).
f. Status of Food and Clothing:
PW Co received no supplies of food and clothing from the rear except at KWANGJU 20 Jan 51 when each man received one pair of canvas shoes, a bottle of liquor for every two men, and a can of beef for every four men. Food was always procured locally, which was nearly always sufficient.
g. Mission and Intentions:
Heard from Co political officer that 334th, 335th, and 337th Regt moved to the hill vic CS 635405 first to defend and hold the area, second, to obtain food in the area, and finally, to wait the arrival of reinforcement from the rear at which time Regt were to take the offensive.
h. Personalities:
LIANG (fnu)(梁), nicknames “Big Tooth”, 50, CG 38th CCF Army
LING So Nung (令紹農), 40, CG 112th Div
SUN Soo Chin (■■淸), 38, CO 335th Regt
WANG (fnu)(王), 40, CO 1st Bn, 335th Regt
WANG (fnu)(王), 30, 1st CO, 1st Bn, 335th Regt
CHAI Bo Ewee (才■■), 30, Political Officer, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 335th Regt.
i. Medical:
One man in Co was sent to the rear for frostbite. When PW was separated from his Co 6 Feb 51, 5 men were suffering from severe cases of frostbite, who were unable to walk. About 15 men were suffering from fever and sore backs, and about 40 had colds. As far as PW knows, there were no epidemics or other disease in his Co.
j. Morale:
Morale was low due to UN air and arty action, and there was very little will to fight among the men. However, they fear that if they surrendered to the UN troops they would be executed as their superiors have always told them. Consequently most of them do not believe in the UN surrender leaflets. Most of the men were waiting for the rumored arrival of the CNA in South KOREA. If this should happen, PW believes that most of the men would surrender, since they trust and believe in their own countrymen more than Americans or South Koreans, and there would be less fear of execution or bad treatment if captured.
k. Propaganda:
Heard a propaganda broadcast from an airplane 2 Feb 51 while marching to the hill at CS635405. However, since 60% of of the men in his Co spoke only the Manchurian dialect, most of them did not understand what was being said. PW heard his fellow soldiers say that it was not right to be fighting the US when it had saved CHINA from the Japanese aggressors during World War II.
l. UN PW:
20 Nov 50 at TOKCH’ON, PW heard from his Co CO that 40 US PW were being taken to MANCHURIA.
For the AC of S, G-2:
YAMADA
